THE Lutheran Quarterly

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THE LUTHERAN QUARTERLY

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Editor
CONRAD BERGENDOFF
Augustana College, Rock Island, Illinois

Managing Editor
THEODORE S. LIEFELD
Capital University Seminary, Columbus, Ohio

Book Editor
THEODORE G. TAPPERT
7333 Germantown Road, Philadelphia 19, Pennsylvania

Circulation Manager
ANDREW S. BURGESS
Luther Seminary, Como Ave. and Luther Place, St. Paul, Minnesota

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AIMS AND POLICY

I. *Aims:* The aims of this quarterly shall be to provide a forum (1) for the discussion of Christian faith and life on the basis of the Lutheran confession, (2) for the application of the principles of the Lutheran Church to the changing problems of religion and society, (3) for the fostering of world Lutheranism, and (4) for the promotion of understanding between Lutherans and other Christians.

II. *Policy:* The editors will welcome contributions that are likely to be helpful in the furtherance of the aims set forth above. It will be required of such contributions that they be frank and fair in their discussion of moot questions; that they be free from controversial animus; and that their contents be of real scholarly and practical value to the readers. Difference of opinion between contributors, or between a contributor and the editors, does not of itself exclude articles from publication since the editors do not hold themselves responsible for the opinions of contributors.

The Anabaptists—Extinction Or Extension of the Reformation?

Henry H. Bagger

THE Anabaptist movement, which ran its vivid course all over the European continent between the years 1520 and 1535 and even reached into England, was a type of Protestantism that differed radically from both Lutheranism and what was, when later formulated, to become known as Calvinism. It appeared with the suddenness of a John the Baptist—arising almost simultaneously in many widely separated places, though without a general organization. In some respects the Anabaptist groups differed widely from one another but they all stood out definitely against infant baptism and from this fact comes their name, Anabaptists (meaning *Wiedertaeuffer* or Re-baptizers). It was not really that they believed in more than one baptism but rather that there should be no baptism but that of believers. Hence, where infant baptism had been administered, they counted it null and void and so re-administered the sacrament; where infant baptism was commanded, they refused to comply. It would be more just and accurate to call them "Anti-pedobaptists," but name-calling in an opprobrious spirit has ever been a human tendency, nor was it in abeyance in those turbulent days, and "Anabaptists" is the name that stuck. In any case, they represented the left-wing of the Reformation, the ultras, the radicals. And, as R. A. Knox in his excellent book on *Enthusiasm* reminds us, any "enthusiastic" movement (to use the word in its technical sense) is almost certain to meet with the opposition of two groups: "good Christian people who do not relish an eccentric spirituality . . . (and) worldlings who do not relish any spirituality at all."[1] So it was that Catholic and Protestant, orthodox and evangelical, the state and the better established elements of society,

1 Ronald A. Knox, *Enthusiasm*, p. 1.

literally ganged up against them. That we may have a better picture of it all, let us trace, though it be in a somewhat sketchy fashion, some of the outcroppings of the movement.

We begin with Germany. In 1521, after the great imperial Diet of Worms at which Luther had refused to recant, it was commanded that the bull of excommunication, already issued, should be executed and that he was to be counted an outlaw. Spirited away by friendly Frederick the Wise, the Elector of Saxony, Luther was carefully hidden in the Wartburg under the disguise of a knight and the assumed name of Junker Georg or "Sir George." Meanwhile, Andreas Bodenstein, better known as Carlstadt, Luther's most outspoken supporter at that stage, stood as the leader in Wittenberg. In Luther's absence, Carlstadt developed and publicly announced in untimely fashion much more radical ideas of reformation than Luther had yet advocated. These included the marriage of the clergy, abolition of monasteries and nunneries, restoration of the cup to the laity in the Communion, the use of the German language for the mass in place of the Latin, and the removal of vestments, pictures, and images from the churches. The whole town broke out in an approving tumult, with rioting and actual iconoclasm on every hand. Into this situation came three even more radical lay agitators, including Nicholas Storch and Mark Stuebner, from the neighboring city of Zwickau. Followers of a certain Thomas Müntzer, they claimed to be directly inspired by the Holy Ghost (hence bear the name "the Zwickau prophets"), disclaimed need of the Bible, repudiated infant baptism, and wanted the whole existing church-order overthrown and the kingdom of the godly set up by the slaughter of the ungodly. The Wittenberg City Council, caught up in the movement, passed a revolutionary ordinance which Frederick then set aside in the interest of moderation. Confusion reigned supreme. The outcome was that Luther, at the invitation of the City Council, returned to Wittenberg in March, 1522. In doing so he risked his very life, for he came without the guarantee of Frederick's guardianship, though not without his knowledge. In a series of eight powerful sermons preached on successive days in the city church, Luther made clear his own views

and restored order. Carlstadt's influence in Wittenberg was broken and the "prophets" were expelled. In his sermons Luther emphasized two important principles that are descriptive and explanatory of his whole "reformation" position.[2] The first established the authority of the Scriptures as full and final. Even as he would not tolerate Catholic doctrine derived from tradition, so he would not tolerate teachings for which, since they were not contained in the Bible, immediate "inspiration" was claimed. The second enjoined love upon all who would reform the Church, for only as love was exercised would changes be made, slowly and not without education in Christian truth nor without consideration for the effect on other men. The result of the stand that Luther took could not but be the alienation of at least a part of his natural but more impatient following. When, a few years later, Luther reversed himself in the matter of the Peasants' War, still more fell away from him and new impetus was given to the radical movement. However, the execution of Thomas Muentzer, who had been a leader in that same war and whose radical religious ideas had inspired many of the rebellious peasants, plus the fact that the movement was outlawed (the Diet of Speyer in 1529 decreeing death by fire or sword to all Anabaptists), plus the lack of any thorough organization, combined to break the back of the movement in most of Germany and we hear relatively little more of it.

From Wittenberg we turn to Zurich in Switzerland. Here Ulrich Zwingli, a university-trained priest and an eloquent preacher, found himself attached in 1519 to the Great Cathedral. He was convinced that the Church needed a moral reformation and that the way to effect it was to return to the Bible. How much he was inspired by Luther's writings and positions it is difficult to say, though it is certain that he was well acquainted with them. In any case, he began his career as a reformer in 1522 and in short order won a considerable following. But differences and dissatisfaction developed so that he was opposed not only by the Catholic Church but by some of the more radical of his own sympathizers who objected to his tolerance of the State-Church idea and to the

2 Charles M. Jacobs, *The Story of the Church*, p. 215.

practice of infant baptism as either valid, necessary, or enjoined by the Scriptures. Leaders among them were Conrad Grebel, Felix Manz, George Blaurock, William Reublin, Simon Stumpf, and Ludwig Hetzer. Zwingli met the opposition with force and secured a decree of the City Council ordering the baptism of all children and the departure of the radicals from the city. The result was the complete severance of the radicals from the Zwinglian movement and the establishment of an independent church organization, admission into which was secured by adult baptism upon confession of faith. The ideal that moved these dissenters was to organize the Church on the basis of the early apostolic model with the New Testament the sole source of faith and practice. Quite unlike the revolutionary "Zwickau Prophets," they sought to achieve their ends by quiet adherence to their principles and without resort to force which they thoroughly repudiated along with church taxes, office-holding under the civil government, and the taking of life by military force or judicial process. To all this Zwingli retaliated by securing successive mandates from the Zurich Council, each more harsh than those that went before. Fines, imprisonment for life, banishment, and finally death by burning or drowning (which last Williston Walker calls a "hideous parody of their belief") were decreed and administered with increasing intolerance. The outcome was to be expected—the intensified spread of the Anabaptist movement until, by 1530, all northern Switzerland (as well as portions of Southern Germany) was overrun with churches of the new faith. Nevertheless, so relentless was the persecution that the peak was soon passed and by 1535 few congregations remained.[3] Many leaders had been killed, some went back into the more restrained Reformed movement, thousands were exiled, and yet others died in prison.

From the Zwickau Prophets and the Swiss Brethren, we might properly turn to Moravia which became a haven for a number of the Anabaptist leaders, but in the interest of brevity we pass on to the Netherlands and northwestern Germany. Here we shall

3 C. Henry Smith, *The Mennonites—A Brief History*, p. 21.

see expressions of both types of the radical Anabaptist movement —the revolutionary and the quietist.

Melchior Hoffmann was one of the revolutionaries and though "at first a devoted Lutheran, he became an equally earnest Anabaptist with added claims to prophetic inspiration."[4] A furrier by trade, he appeared as a visionary preacher in Emden in 1528. Though he himself was imprisoned in Strassburg, which he had proclaimed as the New Jerusalem, and remained in prison until his death in 1543, he had many followers. One of these, a baker named Jan Mathys (John Matthiesen), he made a bishop; and he, in turn, declared himself the prophet Enoch. Coming to the city of Muenster in Westphalia, Mathys allied himself with a tailor of Leyden named Jan Beukelssen (John Bockhold or John of Leyden). Together they declared Muenster the New Jerusalem successor to Strassburg and, summoning radicals from far and near, organized their forces and overthrew the government, setting up a Kingdom of God on earth amid the wildest excesses. The Catholic bishop of the area besieged the city and though Mathys was killed in battle, the forces of the bishop were routed and Beukelssen, in 1534, was proclaimed king. The utmost licentiousness prevailed (polygamy was established, a community of goods enforced, and all opponents slaughtered). In the end, the bishop, aided by several Protestant princes and their Catholic and Lutheran troops, captured the city in 1535, and the surviving leaders were put to death by extreme torture.[5] The result of all this, though it had by no means been an expression of typical or true Anabaptism, was that the name "Anabaptist" became the symbol of all that was fanatical in creed and immoral in conduct. "The rude and fanatical period of the history of Anabaptism closes with the scandal of Muenster."[6] It did the Anabaptist cause irreparable injury, but it freed the Lutheran cause from the Anabaptist rivalry.

Representative of the quietist expression of Anabaptism was Menno Simon. Originally a priest, he became an Anabaptist in

4 Williston Walker, *A History of the Christian Church*, p. 374.
5 Walker, *op. cit.*, and article on "Anabaptists," *New Standard Encyclopedia.*
6 "Anabaptists," *New Standard Encyclopedia.*

1536 and moved from place to place in the Netherlands and northwestern Germany establishing congregations, aiming to make each a true communion of saints. His followers held to a regenerate church, faith baptism, religious freedom, separation of Church and State; then refused to take oaths or bear arms, and insisted that strict discipline be enforced. Because of the scandal of Muenster, he repudiated the Anabaptist name, his followers gradually becoming known as Mennonites, though not by his desire. Under his leadership the doctrines of the Anabaptists were systematized and Anabaptism itself acquired cohesion and gained a footing. In time Menno Simon was to prove the most influential of all the Anabaptist teachers and, in the words of C. M. Jacobs, "it was the spirit of Menno Simon that ultimately gave to Dutch and Low German Anabaptism its prevailing tone and it was Dutch Anabaptism that (through English refugees in Holland) spread into England after 1625 where it formed close connections with English Independency."[7]

From England and from the continent, the Anabaptist movement was destined to make its way to America where by rather direct descent it has found itself represented in the early Puritans and Separatists and in the Baptist, Congregational, and Quaker bodies, as well as in numerous German-background bodies.

It is now our purpose to try to characterize in a more inclusive way the whole movement, just reviewed in its several outcroppings in Germany, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. Yet it is not an altogether simple matter when we realize that Heinrich Bullinger, the contemporary Swiss reformer, listed forty different sects in his day under the name of Anabaptists.[8] Of those who constituted their ranks Williston Walker says that they were, with the notable exception of the Muensterites, a "peaceable, if rather ignorant, people of great religious earnestness and patient endurance in persecution."[9] As Paul wrote to the Corinthians, "not many wise men after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble" were

7 Jacobs, *op. cit.*, p. 265
8 Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 37.
9 Walker, *op. cit.*, p. 374.

called, but God chose rather "the weak things of the world to confound the things which are mighty."[10] And confound them they did—for they stood for things that were bound to cause conflict.

Of all Anabaptists it may be said that they rejected infant baptism and had a low estimate of the importance of the Eucharist or Lord's Supper.[11] Beyond that, they differed widely in their emphases, so that the general description which follows could not apply to any of them in its entirety. Nevertheless, though the pattern differed, the cloth was pretty much the same. To them, the Church was to be an independent, voluntary group of regenerate believers banded together for the purpose of worship. For membership in such a church, a personal, spiritual experience of the grace of God was an essential, and therefore infant baptism (for which they found no direct spiritual authority and so counted it an invention of man) could not be the initiatory rite. For such regenerated Christians, there could be no toleration of the use of force, political or ecclesiastical, to bring about conformity. Separation of Church and State was a logical corollary of an independent Church. Neither the identification of the Church with the State nor the use of the State by the Church was defensible, for, as the Anabaptists saw it, the evils of the Church were rooted in its connection with the State. Counting the State a kind of necessary evil in an imperfect world, they should identify themselves with it no more than necessary, should not pay Church taxes to it, and should not hold civil office but rather let the unrighteous, who made the State necessary, exercise its powers. Nor should anyone living under Christ's command that His disciples should say only "yea, yea" or "nay, nay" be willing to take an oath. Theirs should be a passive citizenship. Taking the Bible as the only guide of faith and practice, the primitive church was the model they sought to follow and the Sermon on the Mount, quite literally interpreted, furnished the program. Believing in the right of private interpretation of the Scriptures, they also believed that direct and present revelation from God was not to be ruled

10 I Corinthians 1:26-27.
11 Jacobs, *op. cit.*, p. 263.

out. Love was to be the ruling force in all social relationships and therefore the Christian could not take up the sword. There must be personal evidence by a godly life of the truth of their Christian profession and church discipline must be rigorously exercised. The Lord's Supper was by no means to be regarded as a vehicle of the Real Presence but only as a memorial of Christ's suffering and death.[12]

These were the commonly held tenets of their faith and practice and constituted them a definitely left-of-center group. In addition there were the real left-wingers—those who believed in a community of goods, held to the early coming of the Lord, favored a self-supporting ministry or no professional ministry at all, would pay no war taxes or interest on money, and objected to the death penalty.

Holding these views, the Anabaptists found themselves face to face with what they felt to be the compromising and opportunistic policies of the leading reformers. Much that the Anabaptists believed, the reformers had declared themselves to believe and hold in principle, but it was increasingly clear that they were unwilling to carry their principles to their full and logical conclusion. Instead, to the Anabaptists, Luther and Zwingli seemed to retain too much, had lowered their standards to meet things as they were, and were apparently content with national churches with the Catholic conditions of membership (especially infant baptism) and a minimum of discipline.

An historical question intrudes at this point. Was the Anabaptist movement an original movement or is it possible to link it with some of the medieval heresies and movements of reform that had plagued the Roman Church from the twelfth century on? There had been the Petrobrussians, founded by Peter de Brueys, with their denial of infant baptism, their emphasis on the authority of the Scriptures, their objection to meaningless form and their insistence upon believers' baptism. A little later there had been the rise of the Waldensian sect, the followers of Peter Waldo, a merchant of Lyons. They believed in a return to the simple teachings

12 Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-40.

of the Bible, the imitation of Jesus and the Apostles, and the abandonment of the complicated and corrupt organization and elaborate ritual of the Church. They refused the oath, rejected capital punishment, and allowed laymen to administer the sacraments. And then there were the Lollards, those of the colorful name, probably meaning "babblers," given to the followers of Wyclif. Wyclif attacked both the life and the doctrine of the Church. Against its wealth, he proclaimed the ideal of poverty; against its authority, he set the authority of the Scriptures. He repudiated the doctrine of transubstantiation, the worship of saints, auricular confession, pilgrimages, and indulgences. Was the Anabaptist movement directly connected with any of these medieval heresies, or did it have independent and spontaneous origin? Walker writes: "The sources of these (Anabaptist) opinions are still in dispute. By some the Anabaptists are regarded as the radicals of the Reformation period; by others as the fruit of new interest in Bible reading by the literal-minded; by still others as revivals of medieval anti-Roman sects."[13] In proof of this we find one author remarking that there are some writers who permit their pious wishes to get the better of their historical judgments, tracing the Mennonites not only back through the Anabaptists to the Waldensians but all the way back to the Apostolic Church. Challenging even the first step, he then states that "the strongest argument against the theory is that nearly all the leaders of Anabaptism came out of the Catholic Church directly or indirectly." His own conclusion is that "all these bodies sprang more or less independently from the same source, namely, an intensive study by the common man of an accessible Bible."[14] On the other hand, Knox feels that there are those who do not want to trace the Reformation, even in its most violent manifestations, to origins so little respected as the Petrobrussians, the Waldensians, and the Lollards, and are anxious to maintain Luther's credit by perpetuating the notion that Protestantism sprang, ready armed, from his brain.[15]

13 Walker, *op. cit.*, p. 368.
14 Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 42.
15 Knox, *op. cit.*, pp. 117-118, 126.

He concludes his consideration of the question by quoting with approval Conybeare's statement: "It would appear from the way in which Anabaptism sprang up everywhere independently as if more than one ancient sect took on, in it and through it, a new lease of life." For myself, I am inclined to go along with that view, feeling that it is more reasonable to suppose that there must have been some connection, even though difficult to establish, and that ideas so fundamental as those advanced by the heretics of an earlier day could not and did not die, but, though forced underground by persecution for a time, were certain to come forth again once conditions became favorable.

The foregoing survey of Anabaptist history will partially prepare us to deal with the question that is central to this consideration: "Anabaptism—Extinction or Extension of the Reformation?" We answer by asking another question. Did the movement, as it manifested itself on every hand and grew by leaps and bounds, hold more of threat or of promise? Though probably not stated in just those terms, that was nevertheless the problem the Reformers (and their supporters) faced. Both potentialities were inherent in the situation. Should they ally themselves with the Anabaptist movement—or should they set themselves against it? Would such an alliance threaten to extinguish the Reformation or would it extend it? The decision was a momentous one to make.

On the one hand, the Reformers assuredly needed the largest body of support that they could muster for their movement if they were to cope successfully with the might of Rome and the control that Catholicism exercised over virtually every phase and function of life and thought in that day. Why should they not welcome, therefore, the kindred spirit and activity of the Anabaptist movement? Did not the Anabaptists incorporate many of the identical principles that the Reformers were themselves promulgating with might and main—the principles of religious freedom, the authority of the Word, the right of private judgment, of worship according to conscience, and of the application of human reason to the problems and practices of religion? Moreover, the Anabaptists were not theorists but sincere believers in a life that reflected their re-

ligious profession and were prepared to suffer, to sacrifice safety and comfort, life and limb, in loyalty to their convictions. Among them were men of heroic mold and personal force and leadership. Was not here a source of additional strength for Protestantism in the face of the foe? That alliance with them would cause Rome to lash out with renewed and increased bitterness was no doubt true, but was there not great gain in marshalling all of Rome's foes under one banner?

On the other hand, as the Reformers could not but realize, there were doctrinal issues that divided the Anabaptists and the general Protestant movement. Most important was the absolute opposition of the Anabaptists to infant baptism and their not infrequent claim of direct inspiration in depreciation of the Scriptures, which, though differently esteemed and held by Luther and Zwingli, were everything to each of them. Spiritual unity, for all that they had much in common, was therefore impossible, as Luther and Zwingli both sensed at the outset—Luther at Wittenberg and Zwingli at Zurich. There were also practical considerations that could not be overlooked. The Protestant movement was gaining ground among the princes of the many States of Germany. But the Anabaptists were increasingly a thorn in the flesh of the State. The extremes of even non-violent opposition to the State on the part of the quietists among them (the Muenster episode was not typical and did not come until their course was almost run) made for a most irritating unrest and disturbance in the populace while their social theories would undermine the very foundations of the State and constantly challenged the State to assert its authority almost as much as the excesses of the revolutionaries. Thus an alliance with the Anabaptists would threaten to bring the cause of the Reformation into discredit in the sight of those whose support was essential to its success. Did the Protestant movement now make room for these anti-Statists, the best ally it seemed to have might even be lost.

Zwingli, if I am correct, seems to have settled the questions quite promptly. He was an exceedingly practical reformer and statesman. The Anabaptists stood in the way of his reform. Down

with them! Luther, on the other hand, was much more of a mystic and idealist and would seem to have been far less sure just what position to take—wavering somewhat in spite of his prompt routing of the "Zwickau Prophets." As has been pointed out by one historian at least, "the statue at Worms represents Luther armed only with the Bible; that at Zurich is equally appropriate in presenting Zwingli with one hand grasping the sword and the other on the Bible."[16]

All told, as Bainton has made clear, "Luther's leniency toward them (the Anabaptists) is more to be remarked than his severity."[17] In 1527, Luther wrote with regard to the Anabaptists, "It is not right, and I am deeply troubled that the poor people are so pitifully put to death, burned, and cruelly slain. Let everyone believe what he likes. If he is wrong, he will have punishment enough in hell fire. Unless there is sedition, one should oppose them with Scripture and God's Word. With fire you won't get anywhere."[18] Why, then, did he not come out for them? The reasons are not far to seek. It would seem that by their growth they threatened his territorial churches; by their extreme positions they threatened his program of retaining all that he conscientiously could of the Catholic faith and practice rather than destroying all that he could; to him the Anabaptists' endeavor to restore the minutiae of New Testament practice carried with it a new legalism and externality and looked like trying to win salvation by a higher righteousness —and so was no improvement on monasticism; he sensed a depreciation of the external Word in their claim to immediate impulses of the Holy Spirit; he opposed their timing and their method, though sympathetic with many of their ideals; he believed that the Spirit of God did indeed reveal the meaning of Scripture to each but surely He would not reveal that which was so counter to what he, Luther, "in the comparative certitude of scholarship" (to use R. A. Knox's phrase) found in it; and, finally, Luther counted them guilty of sedition in their abstention from public office and

16 Henry E. Jacobs, *Martin Luther, Heroes of the Reformation* series, p. 279.
17 Roland Bainton, *Here I Stand*, p. 378.
18 *Ibid.*, p. 375.

military service, and of blasphemy in their public attack on orthodox teaching. How could he then identify himself with them?

Though many, and I among them, condone Luther's position to a large degree, Rufus Jones, R. A. Knox, A. P. Evans, and others have found much fault with him for his opposition to the Anabaptists. They charge that he betrayed his commission and denied his own principles. In a measure I think they are right—at least, they certainly "have something" on him. But seeming to see more of threat than of promise in their movement, unorganized and sporadic and lawless as it was, he set himself against them. The results were not altogether happy for, as Knox reminds us, "it left the Anabaptists free to attempt the realization of their theocratic state by violent means; it hardened them in their distrust of learning, their reliance on the inner light. Correspondingly, it cemented from the first that alliance between Church and State that so long governed the outlook of official Protestantism; and it deepened in official Protestantism a contempt for those enthusiastic movements towards which, if it had consulted its own genius, it should have been sympathetic."[19]

Thus, though for different reasons, the two leaders, Luther and Zwingli, conjointly consolidated official Protestantism and the worldly State. Whether for better or worse, it is hard to say. Had they not done so, the Reformation might well have been extinguished. As it was, while some values were not carried along, other values that would for the time being at least have been lost, with the defeat of the Reformation, were established. Regretting that a whole loaf was not possible, should we unduly fault those who made the loaf possible? Should we not be glad for the half rather than none? In any event, the idea of the separation of Church and State and the idea of a spiritual Church rather than an institutional Church were not to die.

It is futile to wish that something else had been done by or seemed possible to the great Reformers. Given the circumstances, their temperaments, and the temper of the times, their position would seem to have been natural and well nigh necessary. It is

19 Knox, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

hard to believe that the identification of the Reformation cause with the Anabaptist movement could have resulted in the Reformation's extension rather than its extinction. And as we judge those great leaders, we need to remember how much easier it is to exercise unemotional hindsight than to exercise clear vision in the heat of the hour itself.

But it is quite to the point that we should ask ourselves what the Anabaptists have to say to us and the world in this our own day and what our attitude should be in the particular religious circumstances that confront us.

To me it seems that the Anabaptists have one great word for the Church of today. They stood for a spiritual Church as opposed to an institutional Church—hence their emphasis at their best on independence, on voluntary membership, on a personal spiritual experience, on a return to the simplicities of the Apostolic Church, on disciplined Christian conduct, on an earnest attempt to embody the Sermon on the Mount in their own behavior, on their desire to be not of the world though of necessity in it. How contrary are the marks, if not also the emphases, of the Protestant Church to which we today give for the most part all too apathetic allegiance! The Church seems to be growing more institutionalized each year—and none know it better than the pastors. It has taken on the characteristics of big business. It bears the stamp of the world upon it. And it would seem that it is bound to grow increasingly institutionalized in proportion as it is or becomes linked to the State, allows membership to be a conventional matter only, fails to place any significant value upon the importance if not the necessity of a personal spiritual experience, elaborates its organization, exercises no discipline to speak of, and fails to insist upon the ethical force of the absolutes of our Lord's teaching and so rests itself in the world and identifies itself with it. Nothing is more needed than that the Church shall become its distinctive self. Were it a fact that the Church had so changed the world that she no longer stood in contrast to the world and its institutions, the situation would be a happy one. But the reverse is true—the world has so changed the Church that there needs to be a renewal of its

authentic character and of its freely accepted authority in the lives of its people. To this end the sixteenth century Anabaptists still speak to us and to this end the varied emphases of the sects that have followed in their wake are constant, though at times irritating, reminders.

Nor is it to the Church alone that they speak. They speak also to the State and the world. To the State they say that it dare not think more highly of itself than it ought to think, that it must not violate but rather permit, if not indeed protect, the freedom of the Church and its worship, that government has its own field and limits and must stand to serve the people and not to make the people serve it, that it must cultivate a sense of stewardship, of trusteeship under God, being responsible not only to the people over whom it is set but unto Him by Whose permission it has come into being. To the State and the world they testify to the ultimate futility of force, to the power of the principle and practice of love in all human relationships, to the waste of war, and to the higher citizenship of the Kingdom of God. These are things it is well for us to remember and to heed.

It is also well to ask ourselves what our attitude (especially if we are of those who condemn or criticize the Reformers for their attitude toward the Anabaptists)—what our attitude shall be to the spiritual successors of those early Anabaptists, those "stepchildren of the Reformation" as they have been called—the Mennonites, the Baptists, the Brethren, the Quakers, the Congregationalists, the Adventist bodies, the Schwenkfelders, the Churches of God, the Jehovah's Witnesses—those many sects that are in our midst and have found our Protestant American climate favorable to their growth and multiplication. Shall we malign them, as there is strong temptation to do, for many of them often malign our better established or more orthodox communions? Shall we simply ignore them as best we can? Or shall we view them with such tolerance as we can muster, learning from them what we can and granting them "lebensraum"? To Rome, of course, they are (and logically so) anathema—even as other Protestants—for, to the sole possessors of the truth, error has no rights and must not be

tolerated. But to Protestants it would rather seem that they should be seen as part of the price that must be paid for the essential Protestant principle of individual freedom in faith and worship. While we must often lament their frequent over-emphasis on certain aspects of the faith and consequent one-sidedness, should we not bear in mind the dictum that "every error is a perverted truth" and test ourselves to see whether we may not be neglecting that for which they stand with more than reasoned or reasonable fervor? This is not to say that we must of necessity exercise fellowship with them—for we have a perfect right to apply the evangelical test before engaging in fellowship—but does it not mean that we must, while pressing our own cause, permit them to press theirs without undue let or hindrance? And may it not be that we, in our relative smugness and apathy, may learn from them lessons of zeal and stewardship that we sorely need? Finally, be it remembered, there are those who, like C. W. Ferguson see in the sects "the really vigorous wing of American religious life," find "the orthodox churches . . . inadequate for our faith and boundless passions," and believe that "the cults stand for creative religion in the hands of the people."[20] In any event, it remains true that most of our orthodox churches were at one time outlawed religions. And I think McGlothlin is quite correct when, in closing his article on Anabaptists, he says, "Some of their views were crude and dangerous, while others were centuries ahead of their day and are now among the priceless treasures of our modern life."[21]

Before concluding, a further question should be asked. Why are "tolerance" and "breadth of spirit" such fine things in the field of religion but not in certain secular fields? In economics, for instance, where today, if I sense things rightly, even an academic defense of or interest in socialism as experimented with by the British is almost certain to lay one open to charges of a communistic taint? Or in the field of government, where, if one were to argue the right of a people to establish a communistic state if they wish it, one is likely to be counted traitorous in spirit? Or

20 C. W. Ferguson, *The Confusion of Tongues*, pp. 3, 8, 9.
21 Mathews and Smith, *A Dictionary of Religion and Ethics*.

why should tolerance be called for in the field of religion, while in the field of medicine or the healing art it is deemed perfectly proper that every obstacle should be put in the way of experimental or unorthodox medical systems? Or why, if tolerance is so much to be desired, should a community of level-headed people let itself become wrought up when a few youths ask a series of rather innocent questions through the city in an effort to find out just what sentiment there might be for peace? Oh why should the NAM or Standard Oil, or General Motors, or U. S. Steel be allowed to fill the mails with their literature of propaganda without a single hint of criticism, while the moment that a paper is mailed in which a remarkably objective protest is made, considering its source, against the trial and conviction of a group of Communists in New York, without any endeavor to expound any principles of communistic thought, there is an immediate reaction and a minor "Red" hunt is promptly instigated? Or why should they who fight for the negro's community of privilege be looked at askance? Or why should the conscientious objector, in many senses truer to the spirit of Christ and the New Testament than the rest of us and in all probability as truly the prophet of a new day as was William Lloyd Garrison in his generation, be made to endure opprobrium?

Is it because the matter of religion is not of equal importance and immediacy and touches a less significant area of life that we think toleration proper in connection with it—and not to be expected in connection with the other concerns of life? In part, that may be the reason. But in a larger sense it is of course because in this particular period people are unnaturally tense and taut and tremendously partisan in their thinking where socialism and communism and medical practice and peace propaganda and national defense and the negro question and conscientious objection to military service are concerned. Bearing this in mind, must we not be lenient in our judgment of the Reformers who, faced with the battle of their lives and the fear that their cause might be extinguished were they to tolerate the Anabaptists, turned against them intolerantly and in deep abhorrence? It is all very well from our present place of peace and quiet, removed by four hundred years from the

scene of struggle, to say that they betrayed their commission and denied their own principles. But are we ready to be judged with the judgment we mete out to them as in our day we face our crises of thought and conduct? Whatever else may be said, they acted according to their best conscience. We can do no more—and should do no less.

Luther and War

Armas K. E. Holmio

HERO-WORSHIP and glorification of war were common in ancient Greece and Rome. When the Greeks placed a monument on the grave of Aeschylus, their greatest tragedian and the founder of Greek drama, the inscription did not mention that he had been a famous poet but only that he had fought in the battle of Marathon. To the Hebrews of the Old Testament war was a sacred thing, a concern of God.[1] Israel's enemies were also God's enemies.[2] According to Joshua 10:11, the assistance God gave His people took even such practical forms as casting stones upon the enemy in the battle.

Medieval Christendom inherited this hero-worship and glorification of war; and Arianism, which was the form of Christianity with which many nations first became acquainted, gave to it its concept of Christ as being closer to the Old Testament God of Hosts than the New Testament Saviour and Redeemer.

Consequently, to many medieval minds war was the positive part of international relations and peace only its negative alternative. The famous statement of Karl von Clausewitz, the Prussian authority on military science, "War is not merely a political act, but also a political instrument, a continuation of political relations, a carrying out of the same by other means," would have been acceptable to the medieval scholastics. Since war was considered as a more or less normal function of the State, the Church was involved automatically, because according to medieval concept, the Church and the State were only two different sides of the same Christian commonwealth or the Kingdom of God. The forced conversions of whole tribes, the crusades, and the religious wars were

1 Exodus 15:3, 17:16; Numbers 32:20-23; Deuteronomy 20:12, 13, 21:10; Psalm 144:1.

2 Judges 5:23, 31; I Samuel 30:26.

the natural outcome of this viewpoint. The medieval mind saw little contradiction in the fact that St. Bernard of Clairvaux wrote *O Sacred Head, Now Wounded, Jesus, How Sweet Thy Memory Is,* and other hymns distinguished by a mystic fervor and holy love, and at the same time was a most enthusiastic preacher of war against the infidels; or that Pope Julius II was also a successful army commander. The medieval canon law stated definitely that war was no sin. Especially did the rise of Islam and the apparent danger of annihilation of Christian civilization give a halo of sanctity not only to the crusades but to religious wars in general.

It is most interesting to study the attitude of Luther towards war against this background. In principle he was a man of peace. It would be easy to fill a pacifist pamphlet with anti-militarist quotations taken from Luther. In his exposition of Psalm 14:2 he writes that pagan poets sing praises to war as such, but that in the sight of God, war is a horrible and extremely cruel thing.[3] Cannons and firearms are inventions of the devil; "If Adam had seen in a vision the horrible instruments his children were to invent, he would have died of grief."[4] War is the greatest of calamities, and destroys both religion and government. "High prices and pestilence are only like foxtails when compared with war." "It is better to fall into plague than into the hands of soldiers."[5]

This last statement apparently was caused by Luther's experience with Captain Johann von Metzsch, who, from 1530 on, commanded the rebuilding of the fortifications at Wittenberg. Luther did not like him because of his questionable morals, the poor discipline he exercised over his men, and because his work interfered with Luther's property rights. On August 13, 1531, the cup was full, and Luther preached a violent sermon on Luke 19:41-48 against von Metzsch and his troops, describing them as "rascals, without wife or children, adulterers and scamps, ravishers of women and girls, blasphemers, gamblers, gluttons; to sum up,

3 Walch, IV, 894.
4 Walch, XXII, 1440. *Table-Talk,* Hazlitt edition, No. DCCLXXVI.
5 Walch, XXII, 1442. Cf. Kerr, *A Compendium of Luther's Theology,* p. 197.

these knaves are the very chosen children of the devil."[6] In other connections Luther criticizes the superstitious beliefs and crude speech of the soldiers.[7]

In the *Treatise On Good Work* (1520) he quotes the wise words of Caesar Augustus, "War is like fishing with a golden net; the risk of loss is always greater than the catch can be."[8] "Victory never makes up for what is lost by war."[9] "Peace is the greatest of earthly goods," is an idea repeated often in his sermons.[10] A prince who loves peace and administers it is a model ruler of a country,[11] but a headstrong and unyielding prince is a cause of wars and calamities.[12] To the true Christian, spiritual peace, however, does not depend on the absence of enemies, or of calamities, or of death; on the contrary, it becomes stronger and bolder when these are present.[13]

Especially do Luther's sermons offer this type of material. It must be kept in mind, however, that sermons in general, prepared mostly for devotional purposes and, particularly in Luther's case, often edited by others, are hardly more than secondary source material for the solution of problems concerning theological principles and ecclesiastical policy. Luther would be misunderstood entirely if we, through a few quotations from his sermons, made him to speak the sentimentalist's language: war is a cruel thing; therefore, it is illegal and I reject it. St. Jerome in Bethlehem took this attitude and wrote his jeremiads when the barbarian nations destroyed the Roman Empire. St. Augustine in Hippo accepted the inevitable and wrote his *City of God,* which shaped the policy of the Church for a thousand years. Luther lived in an era when the

6 "Freihansen, haben weder Weib nor Kind, sind Huren und Buben, Frauen- und Jungfrauenschänder, Gotteslästerer, Spieler, Schwelger; Summa, diese Landsbuben sind des auserwählten Teufels Kinder gar."—Walch, VII, 1470-1477. Cf. Smith-Jacobs, *Luther's Correspondence,* II, 385.—However, Captain von Metzsch was appointed by the Elector and accepted by Luther as one of the co-inspectors of the churches of Saxony.

7 *Works of Martin Luther* (Holman, Philadelphia), V, 71 f. W. A., 19,660.

8 *Ibid.,* I, 265. Cf. IV, 304.

9 "An Exposition of the Eighty-second Psalm," *Works of Martin Luther,* IV, 304.

10 For example, in "A Sermon on Keeping Children in School."

11 *Works of Martin Luther,* IV, 304.

12 Epistle sermon, Fourth Sunday in Advent.

13 Luther's *Church Postil,* First Sunday after Easter, sermon on John 20:19-31.

Turkish invasion of Christian Europe created a panic similar to that experienced by Christendom about A. D. 400. A former Augustinian monk, Luther followed the course of St. Augustine and arrived at a practical yet deeply Christian solution. In speaking of war, he did not give theoretical answers to theoretical problems but dealt all the way with hard realities.

There was never a full year of peace in Europe in Luther's lifetime. After the fall of Constantinople to the Mohammedans on May 29, 1453, the *Türckenfurcht*—the fear of the Turk—had spread over Europe, filling Western Christendom with anxiety and fear. Year by year the Turks advanced toward Central Europe. In 1492, when Martin was nine years old, he hardly heard of Columbus and the New World, because there was more important and alarming news: the Turks attacked and overran Carinthia and Styria committing unspeakable atrocities. The emperor Maximilian finally defeated them in 1494. But again in 1497 they devastated large areas of Poland. Before peace was concluded with Poland, in 1500, the Turks had achieved their greatest victory at sea by defeating the Venetian fleet and capturing Lepanto, in 1499.

After 1500 there were years of peace so far as the Infidels were concerned, but not peace in Christendom. Louis XII of France (1498-1515) carried on a war in Italy, actually all of the seventeen years of his reign, mostly against Julius II (1503-1513), one of the most martial of all the popes. The papal successor, Leo X, gave three-quarters of Italy to the emperor Charles V in exchange for outlawing Luther. This act kept the whole of Europe in turmoil for forty years. Meanwhile the Turks had conquered Egypt, in the year that Luther started the Protestant Reformation, 1517. Also the sultan inherited the title of caliph, thus becoming the religious as well as political leader of all the Moslems. In 1520, when the Lutheran Reformation reached its greatest power, Suleiman the Magnificent (1520-1566) became sultan and caliph and the most dangerous enemy the Christian Church has had until the present day. On the pretext that no congratulations had been sent on his accession, Suleiman declared war against the king of Hungary in 1521 and captured Belgrade. The year 1525 saw the hor-

rors of the Peasants' Rebellion in Germany, and the disaster of Pavia in Italy, where Francis I of France (1515-1547) lost to the emperor and was taken prisoner to Madrid.

The following year revived all the old anxiety and apocalyptic expectations in Europe, when Suleiman again attacked Hungary. August 29, 1526, the Magyar king, Louis II, was killed on the field of Mohács together with two archbishops, five bishops and 24,000 of his soldiers, the cream of the Hungarian nobility. Budapest fell to the Turks, and 105,000 Christian captives were taken as slaves to Turkey along with a tremendous booty. When the news of the disaster of Mohács reached Luther, he wrote: "Christ has begun to weary of this world's course, therefore He has given it over to Satan, who will punish it for its ineffable contempt of the Word of Grace. Hence these raging heresies; hence these enemies in arms and these downfalls of great kings! In a word, the world is hastening on to ruin, doubtless a great sign that the last day is at the door."[14] The fall of Hungary, which since the days of János Hunyadi had been the bulwark of Central Europe against the Mohammedan hordes, prompted Luther to write his main treatise on the problems of war, *Whether Soldiers Too Can be Saved.*[15] He dedicated this booklet to Assa Von Kram, an officer with a long and distinguished military record, who had fought in Italy and in Denmark and, in the Peasants' Rebellion, had commanded the troops of the Elector of Saxony.[16]

The disaster of Mohács, however, did not unite Christendom, nor even the Catholic world against the enemies of Christianity. On May 6 of the following year the army of Charles V, with many Lutheran soldiers in its ranks, sacked Rome, taking the pope

14 Luther's letter to Nicholas Hausmann, written September 13, 1526. Enders, 5,383, as translated by Smith-Jacobs in *Luther's Correspondence,* II, 376 f. On October 14 he writes to Hausmann: "You say truly that the world is going to ruin, and I hope that the day is near at hand when the advent of the great God will appear, for all things everywhere are boiling, burning, moving, falling, sinking, groaning."

15 *Ob Kriegsleute auch in seligem Stande sein können.* W. A., 19,624 ff.; Erlangen, 22,246 ff.; *Works of Martin Luther,* V, 34-74; Walch, X, 488-531.

16 Assa von Kram had been in Wittenberg after the Peasants' Rebellion and had suggested to Luther the writing of this tract. First the news of Mohács compelled Luther to fulfill the wish of von Kram. Von Kram died in 1528.

Clement VII (1523-1530) prisoner and reviving the saturnalia of Alaric and his Visigoths in the Eternal City.[17] This dissension among the Christians encouraged Suleiman to begin large scale war preparations. While all Germany was expecting the great Mohammedan invasion, Luther published in April, 1529, his treatise *On War Against the Turk,* and dedicated it to the landgrave Philip of Hesse. It is primarily a theological study explaining the Mohammedan religion. At the same time he revised the Litany, discarded in 1525, published it in the third edition of the Small Catechism and restored it permanently in the evangelical worship as a special prayer to God against the enemies of the Church. In 1529 the Turkish invasion actually started. Suleiman recaptured Budapest and marched on Vienna, and besieged and bombarded it until October 14, 1529, when he lifted the siege.

For ten years Western Christendom was again occupied principally with its own wars. But in 1539 emperor Ferdinand marched into Hungary where he was finally defeated in 1541 by Suleiman, who devastated large areas and turned the churches into mosques. The war continued until 1547, when Suleiman sold a truce of five years to the emperor for 30,000 dukats a year.

Luther died the year before, at a time when three wars were ravaging Europe: the Turkish war, the fourth war of Francis I and Charles V, and the war of Francis against the Waldenses.

These endless wars are the background for our study of Luther's attitude toward warfare in general. His sober comprehension of the cold realities of life could not leave him ignorant of the basic fact, that this world in which we live is not a communion of saints nor the Kingdom of God, but that it is populated mostly with sinful men whose instincts and desires are evil and even criminal. Therefore, "A man who would venture to govern an entire country of the world with the Gospel would be like a shepherd who should place in one fold wolves, lions, eagles, and sheep together and let them freely mingle with one another and say, Help yourselves, and be good and peaceful among yourselves; the fold is open, there is plenty of food; have no fear of dogs and

17 Luther refers to this: *Works of Martin Luther,* V, 117.

clubs. The sheep, forsooth, would keep the peace and would allow themselves to be fed and governed in peace, but they would not live long; nor would one beast keep from molesting another."[18] In this wicked world, "fighting is as necessary as eating and drinking."[19]

When Suleiman was planning his great invasion into Central Europe in 1529, Luther advised Christendom to fight.[20] The Diet of Speyer was also then in session, and Luther ridiculed the fact that the Diet found time to discuss such spiritual matters as fasting and the eating of meat and fish "and foolishness like that," which was not their duty, but ignored the political situation and the necessary preparations for war.[21]

According to Luther, war is justified by the Scriptures. He gives three main proofs for this in his oft-mentioned tract on soldiers. 1. John the Baptist did not condemn the profession of the soldiers who came to him (Luke 3:14). 2. Christ, when He stood before Pilate, admitted that war was not wrong, when He said, "Were I king of this world, then would my servants fight that I should not be handed over to the Jews" (John 18-36). 3. Abraham, Moses, Joshua, the Judges, Samuel, David and the kings of Israel were soldiers. And Luther cites St. Peter and St. Paul to support John the Baptist in refuting the idea that there would be some difference in this respect between the New and the Old Testament.[22] The government has the sword from God and is authorized to use it in war.[23] This sword "is a sword and not a fox-tail"; and Luther quotes Romans 13:4 wherein St. Paul calls it "the wrath of God."[24]

War under certain circumstances is not only justified by the

18 *On Secular Authority* ("Von weltlicher Obrigkeit"), chapter IV. *Works of Martin Luther,* III, 237.

19 *Whether Soldiers Too Can Be Saved.*

20 *On War Against the Turk.*

21 *Works of Martin Luther,* V, 123.

22 *Works of Martin Luther,* V, 38.

23 *Short Exposition of Isaiah* (1532). Walch, VI, 493.

24 W. A., 19,628.—It might be mentioned in this connection, that Luther approves of the death penalty in extreme cases. Cf. James Mackinnon, *Luther and the Reformation,* IV, 69.

Scriptures, but it is also an instrument of God for several purposes. Without the right of the government to wage war there would be no order in the world nor protection for "the just, wife and child, house and farm, property and honor."[25] And Luther is even more definite: "The small lack of peace, called war, must set a check upon this universal, world-wide lack of peace, before which no one could stand. Therefore God honors the sword so highly that He calls it His own ordinance and will not have men say or imagine that they have invented it or instituted it. For the hand that wields this sword and slays with it is then no more man's hand, but God's. . . . All these are His works and His judgements."[26] This idea of war as a means and an instrument of peace appears often in the writings of Luther.[27] And without peace and order there would be little room for the Kingdom of God in this world.

When Tolstoi and the pacifists see only one interested party, the aggressor, and demand that Christian love be shown to him, Luther leans sympathetically toward the victim of aggression, and demands that love be shown to him in the practical form of help and protection. Therefore, war can also be an instrument of God's love. "True love is at the same time a great foe and friend. . . . It punishes severely and helps wonderfully. It has a hard shell but a delicious kernel."[28] And in his treatise *On the Fifth Commandment* (1528) Luther says: "Holy Scripture has fine, clear eyes and looks in the right way upon the worldly sword as that which must be merciless for mercy's sake and exercise severity out of sheer goodness."[29]

For all these reasons soldiering is a calling and profession acceptable to God. In his treatise on soldiers Luther divides the

25 Walch, X, 493.

26 Luther refers to Romans 13:1. *Works of Martin Luther*, V, 36. W. A., 19,626.

27 *Exposition of the Prophet Micha*, lectured in early spring 1525 and printed 1542; Walch, XIV, 1068. *Sermon on Matthew* 5:20-26, Sixth Sunday after Trinity, 1536; Walch, XI, 1359. W. A., 19,625.

28 W. A., 10,266; 23,517.—When Luther speaks of war as an instrument of God's love he, however, never follows the line of thought of Hegel and Nietzsche, that war is necessary for the morale of the nation.

29 W. A., 30,1,70.

people into two main classes, those belonging to *agricultura* and those to *militia*, agriculture and military service. "Agriculture is to feed and warfare is to defend," that is, soldiers are to receive their income and their food from the other classes of society. "Therefore, since it is a right office, ordained of God, it is fitting that there should be pay and reward for it, as Christ says in Matthew 10, 'A laborer is worthy of his hire.' "[30]

It is interesting to note that mercenaries, also, have the approval of Luther: "Just as a good artisan may sell his skill to anyone who will have it, and thus serve the one he sells to . . . , so a soldier has his skill in fighting from God and can serve with it whoever desires his service, exactly as though it were an art or trade, and he can take pay for it as though for his work. For this, too, is a calling that springs from the law of love."[31] In his table-talks he once commends German mercenaries as better than the Spanish, because the German soldiers "protect the property and the wives and daughters of the people."[32]

Luther classifies wars into three groups: Inferior against superior, equal against equal, and superior against inferior.[33] The first group, inferior against superior, is not war in the strict meaning of the word. It is rebellion, of which Luther says: "I have never known a case of this kind that was just, and even now I cannot imagine one." However, in the treatise *Whether Soldiers Too Can Be Saved* he argues for fourteen pages before he is satisfied with his opening statement, that rebellion is contrary to the will of God. The most difficult problem for Luther to solve, in this connection, was the Danish rebellion of 1523 against Christian II, whom the Swedes and the Finns call Tyrant because of the bloodbaths of Stockholm and Turku. The good Germans of Lübeck had fought on the side of the Danish rebels. After some hesitation Luther decided to give absolution to the people of Lübeck but refused it to the Danes. The Peasants' Rebellion of

30 W. A., 19,654. *Works of Martin Luther,* V, 66 f.
31 W. A., 19,657.
32 Walch, XXII, 1441.
33 *On Secular Authority;* W. A., 11,229 ff. *Works of Martin Luther,* V, 42-64.

1525 was not justified, according to Luther's theory, and is hardly mentioned when he deals with problems of peace and war.

The third group, superior against inferior, when a prince is using force against his rebellious subjects, is war only in a relative meaning of the term. Luther, when discussing the activities of the princes during the Peasants' Rebellion, would certainly have approved the term "intervening in a situation," used by modern students of political science.[34] According to Luther, it is the God-given and simple duty of the princes, even if he knows them to be "the greatest fools, the worst scoundrels on earth," to use the sword in order "to punish the wicked (the rebellious Peasants) as long as there are such sores in the body politic as now exist." If the prince has to die "for God's word" in suppressing a rebellion, he dies with a good conscience.[35] Luther applied to the rebels the words of Jesus in Matthew 26:52: "He that taketh the sword shall perish by the sword."

Luther knew that many a prince forgets peaceful measures and is too anxious to draw the sword. Therefore he warned the seventeen year old duke John Frederick, in 1521: "Temporal power is in duty bound to defend its subject. . . . Yet this defence of its subjects should not be accompanied by still greater harm; that would be but to leap from the frying-pan into the fire. . . . If a robber knight robs a citizen of his property and you, my lord, lead your army against him to punish this injustice, and in so doing lay waste the whole land, who will have wrought the greater harm, the knight or the lord?"[36] Two years later he wrote to the same duke: "A prince must punish the wicked in such a way that he does not step on the dish while picking up the spoon, and for the sake of one man's head plunge land and people into want and fill the land with widows and orphans. Therefore he

34 Cf. Fritz Grob, *The Relativity of War and Peace: A Study in Law, History, and Politics*. Yale University Press, 1950.

35 Luther to John Rühel, May 5, 1525. Smith-Jacobs, *Luther's Correspondence*, II, 308. See also Luther's treatises dealing directly with the Peasants' Rebellion.

36 In the *Magnificat*, dedicated to John Frederick, who became the elector of Saxony in 1532. *Works of Martin Luther*, III, 174 f.

must not obey the counselors and fire-eaters who incite and provoke him to begin war."[37]

There are, however, also wars of the first and the third group which are started by the superior and in which the inferior is fully justified in defending himself. There existed such a possibility in November, 1529, after Suleiman had lifted the siege of Vienna and returned to Constantinople. Luther had information that the emperor was planning an attack against the Lutherans. On November 18 he sent a letter to his elector, John of Saxony, in which he gave the elector a free hand "to defend his own faith . . . if it goes so far that our overlord, the Emperor, attacks us."[38] About ten years later Luther dealt with the same problem in his table-talks and expressed as his opinion that the emperor, if he starts a war against the Evangelicals, becomes a tyrant oppressing both the Church and the secular government. "In this case there is no question but that we must fight for religion, for children and families."[39] In Luther's mind a tyrant by his oppressive acts justifies the use of arms by the "inferior" to defend himself which in principle makes the latter an "equal."

The second group, equal against equal, is war in the proper and strict sense of the word. These wars, usually fought between states and nations, are either aggressive or defensive. Aggressive war is always unjust, according to Luther. "He who starts a war is wrong; and it is right that he who first draws the sword shall be defeated or even punished in the end; this is what has usually happened in history."[40] Aggressors are the cause of "that universal lack of peace which must be prevented by right wars and sword, and forced into peace."[41]

Even in the case of a just war, however, the innocent party should first try "to settle the issue by legal procedure, discussion,

37 *On Secular Authority* (1523), also dedicated to John Frederick. *Works of Martin Luther,* III, 268.

38 Smith-Jacobs, *Luther's Correspondence,* II, 506.

39 Walch, XXII, 1454-1467.

40 Walch, X, 513.

41 *Works of Martin Luther,* V, 37.

or agreement."[42] If this is fruitless, Luther gives to the victim of the aggression a sixteenth century version of the "Rules of Land Warfare," justifying him "to kill, rob, and pillage the enemy, and to do everything that can injure him until one has conquered him according to the methods of war. Only, one must beware of sin, not violate wives and virgins, and when victory comes, offer mercy and peace to those who surrender and humble themselves. Therefore in such a case let the saying hold true, God helps those who help themselves."[43] When war has been declared one should not wait until the enemy arrives and begins a siege, but "one has to meet him when he is still far away, or even better, when he is still in his own country."[44] As in modern Christian ethics a defensive war against an aggressor is not a questionable right but a duty, so it is also in the political ethics of Luther: "If the sword were not on guard to preserve peace, everything in the world would go to ruin because of the lack of peace. Therefore, such war is only a little, brief lack of peace that prevents an everlasting and immeasurable lack of peace, a small misfortune that prevents a great misfortune."[45]

The defensive war Luther had to deal with was that against the Turk. When Suleiman was advancing Luther did not say that the princes must defend us, but he said, "we must fight against the Turk." He took active part in the war by preaching sermons and writing books to arouse the nation to arms against the enemy, and by condemning those who took a lax or disloyal attitude. In his treatise, *On War Against the Turk,* he wrote of them:

> These people are doing wrong by making themselves partakers of great and numberless sins and loading themselves down with them in the sight of God. . . . These people are faithless and guilty of perjury to their rulers, to whom they have taken oaths and done homage; and this is in God's sight a great sin that does not go unpunished. In case the Turk is victorious, the conscience of these people must forever suffer compunction, pain, and unrest,

42 In the treatise *Whether Soldiers Too Can Be Saved,* p. 62.

43 *On Secular Authority.* Abraham's war in Genesis 14 is given as an example. *Works of Martin Luther,* III, 269 f. Cf. Walch, X, 413.

44 *Exposition of the Psalms,* Psalm 9:16. Walch, IV, 725.

45 *Works of Martin Luther,* V, 36,

if indeed it does not result in despair and everlasting death, because you submitted to the Turk willingly and without necessity against your sworn duty. . . . Besides all that, such faithless, disloyal, perjured folk commit a still more horrible sin. They make themselves partakers of all the abominations and wickedness of the Turks; for he who willingly goes over to the Turks makes himself their comrade and an accomplice in all their doings. . . . He who consorts with the Turk must be a partaker of this terrible abomination and brings down on his own head all the murder, all the blood that the Turk has shed, and all the lies and vices with which he has damaged Christ's Kingdom and led souls astray.[46]

Through his sermons and writings Luther was instrumental in helping Europe to stop Suleiman at Vienna in 1529. But he did more. He created in Europe the will to defend which led to united Christian resistance to the Mohammedans. This finally saved Western civilization by destroying the Turkish sea power at Lepanto in 1575 and defeating its land armies before Vienna in 1683.

Even though Luther considered Mohammed the greatest enemy of Christianity, who already had "led the whole Eastern world from Christ,"[47] and even if he played a prominent part in the defense of Christendom, he did not think of the Turkish war in terms of a crusade. He condemned all "religious wars," the *cruciata* or the preaching of crusades and crusading-taxes, and advised the pope to stay out of the war.[48] What is then, in Luther's opinion, the right attitude of a Christian towards war?

First of all, a Christian belongs to two spheres of life, the spiritual and the secular. The secular is divided into two, the political and the economic spheres, so that a Christian finally has his native place or abode in *religio, politia,* and *oeconomia,* in religion, politics, and economy.[49] The number of true Christians, who alone can claim citizenship in *religio* or the spiritual sphere, is very scant. They are a small minority, *ein Häuflein klein;* they "are few and far between."[50] "Among thou-

46 *Works of Martin Luther,* V, 111 ff.
47 *Earliest Christian Creeds.* Lenker, ed., 24,225.
48 *On War Against the Turk. Works of Martin Luther,* V, 104 f.
49 These are mentioned several times by Luther, e.g., in *op. cit.*
50 *Works of Martin Luther,* III, 27.

sands there is scarcely one true Christian."[51] "So far as they themselves are concerned they are subject to neither law nor sword and need neither." Their hearts are united in one spirit through the same faith, which does not leave room for war.[52] The Sermon on the Mount is the rule for true Christians in their mutual relations.

A Christian, however, is as much a citizen of the secular (political and economic) sphere of life as he is of the spiritual. If a man maintains that the secular world should be governed according to the rules of the Sermon on the Mount, Luther corrects him with the following advice: "First take heed and fill the world with real Christians before ruling it in a Christian and evangelical manner. This you will never accomplish, for the world and the masses are and always will be unchristian. . . . Therefore it is out of the question that there should be a common Christian government over the whole world, nay even over one land or company of people, since the wicked always outnumber the good."[53] To be sure, Luther does not agree that even the Sermon on the Mount can be made to mean the opening of the gates for aggressors and criminal elements. In his *"Exposition of Matthew,* 5:38-41, he exclaims: "What kind of a foolish mother would it be, who would not protect her child against a dog or wolf, but would say: A Christian should not make war."[54]

Luther realizes that there are "weak, timid, and doubting consciences," who are confused by the cold realities of life. They find it difficult to accept their proper place in case of war and are offended by military service in general. For their instruction he words the treatise *Whether Soldiers Too Can Be Saved.*[55] To the

51 *Works of Martin Luther,* III, 236.

52 *Exposition of Isaiah 9:8.* Walch, VI, 167.

53 *On Secular Authority,* chapter IV. *Works of Martin Luther,* III, 237. See also Luther's dedication of the treatise *On War Against the Turk* to Philip of Hesse, in which he complains that some "stupid and crazy preachers" have used his, Luther's, name in defending their pacifist attitude.

54 Walch, VII, 469.

55 Luther's undated letter to his "worshipful and honorable sir and friend" Assa von Kram. W. A., 19,623. English translations in Smith-Jacobs, *Luther's Correspondence,* II, 385 f., and *Works of Martin Luther,* V, 32 f. Cf. Smith-Jacobs, *op. cit.,* II, 457.

question, whether a true Christian should submit to military service or to service of the state in general, he gives a simple and practical answer: ". . . you are under obligation to serve and further the sword by whatever means you can, with body, soul, honor or goods. For it is nothing that you need, but something quite useful and profitable for the whole world and for your neighbor. Therefore, should you see that there is a lack of hangmen, beadles, judges, lords, or princes, and find that you are qualified, you should offer your services and seek the place, that necessary government may by no means be despised and become inefficient or perish. For the world cannot and dare not dispense with it."[56]

Speaking of the approaching war against the Turks and enlisting in the emperor's army Luther said: "Everyone can assure his own conscience that he is obeying the ordinance of God, since we know that the emperor is our true overlord and head, and he who obeys him in such a case obeys God also, while he who disobeys him disobeys God also. If he dies in this obedience, he dies in a good state, and if he has previously repented and believes on Christ, he is saved."[57]

Luther does not accept the idea that there would be contradictions in the original Christianity, namely, that Jesus would teach one thing and St. Paul another. He takes a realistic view of this world and of the life of the Christian. This world is God's world and Christians are His people. He does not dream of a man-made permanent and international peace, but he expects an eternal peace, promised by God and arriving with the Kingdom of God. Until that day the Christians have to follow, step by step, the development of this world, outwardly bound to it and "rendering unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's," but inwardly being children of God and "rendering unto God the things that are God's."[58]

56 *On Secular Authority,* chapter VI. *Works of Martin Luther,* III, 241.

57 *Works of Martin Luther,* V, 102 f.

58 Cf. Hermann Steinlein, *Luther und der Krieg;* Smith-Jacobs, *Luther's Correspondence,* II, 503; and *Works of Martin Luther,* V, 118.

Luther assigned duties to the pastors and preachers in the case of a just and right war as that against the Turk. It is their duty "to exhort the people most diligently to repentance and to prayer," because this is the only way to beat Allah, "the Turk's god, the devil." "The pastors must sing the Litany as a special war-prayer at every worship and explain to the people the passages in the Old Testament in which God hears and answers prayers.[59] He even wrote a suggested speech for men going to war.[60] When there is a just cause, *eine gute Sache,* let the enemy come, because the Christian faith finds strength in the word of Christ, "I can do all things."[61] And if a Christian soldier, who goes to war in the name of God, obeying the orders given by his government under which God has placed him, is shot and killed, he dies a good death. "The Word of God is on his side, he is found obedient to God, and he knows that he has orders given by God to perform his military duties."[62]

Luther's "last word" concerning war and warfare is the following prayer which he wrote for soldiers, suggesting that they say it before battle:

"Heavenly Father, here I am, according to Thy will, in the external work and service of my lord, which I owe first to Thee and then to my lord for Thy sake. I thank Thy grace and mercy that Thou hast put me into a work of which I am sure that it is not sin, but right and pleasing obedience to Thy will. But because I know and have learned from Thy gracious Word that none of our good works can help us and no one is saved as a soldier but only as a Christian, therefore, I will rely not at all on this obedience and work of mine, but put myself freely at the service of Thy will and believe from the heart that only the innocent blood of Thy dear Son, my Lord Jesus Christ, redeems and saves me, and this He has shed for me in obedience to Thy holy will. On this I stay; on this I live and die; on this I fight and do all. Dear Lord God

59 *Works of Martin Luther,* V, 88-93.
60 *Works of Martin Luther,* V, 70. W. A., 19,658.
61 Walch, XXII, 1444. *Works of Martin Luther,* V, 73.
62 Luther's sermon on Fifth Sunday after Trinity, 1534. Walch, XIII, 2218.

the father, preserve and strengthen this faith in me by Thy Spirit. Amen."

And Luther adds: "If then you want to say the Creed and the Lord's Prayer, you may do so, and let that be enough. Thus commit body and soul to His hands, and draw sword, and smite in God's name."[63]

63 *Works of Martin Luther*, V, 73.

The Lutheran View of the Lord's Supper

Conrad Bergendoff

IN THE story of the Christian Church there is nothing more tragic than the fate of the sacrament of the altar. Instituted as an expression of the love of Christ and for the nourishment of the love of the members of the Church it became in the course of the centuries a cause of controversy and dissension. There has been bitter quarreling at the table of the Lord, and sometimes it seems that Christians have been more hostile towards fellow Christians with different views of the Supper than towards those who are outside the household of faith. Then too there has been an attitude of finality about the discussion of the sacrament which has left the impression that the different positions are rigid and unchangeable for all time to come. What happened, especially in 1529 at the Wartburg, has definitely fixed the boundaries of the churches and one cannot hope for a new approach to the problem. The experience of four centuries has left little hope of change, I admit. But I dare believe that the divisions within the Church are a source of deeper grief to the Lord of the Church than they seem to be to most of His disciples, and His love is a more eternal factor than our complacency. The time may yet come when His followers will give themselves anew to a study of this sacrament in the hope of removing rather than justifying their differences. They will then be less proud of their distinctive positions and more concerned about the unifying power of Him who would have all His people around Him at His table. There need be no fear of "compromising with the truth," for we are speaking of Him who is the Truth, and He found no discrepancy between truth and love. In fact many of His disciples have failed to follow the Apostle's injunction that truth be spoken in love, and the result has sometimes been that their conceptions both of love and truth have been affected.

It is, then, in a spirit of humility that I review the position of

our Church, and with a prayer for the future peace of the Church that I point out what has made us strangers to fellow Christians in the past. It may be that the greatest contribution any of us can make at this point in our relationships with other churches is in the attitude we take to them. May it be that a certain definition of Christian truth is of less effect as Christian testimony than the spirit in which the definition is made? The world may not understand what Christians say to each other, but it quickly senses how they feel toward each other. The truth in Christ is far more than correct intellectual concepts.

The Lutheran doctrine of the sacrament of the altar has been determined in opposition to explanations which the Church has believed to be inadequate or not in accord with the foundation on which doctrines must rest, namely, the Word of God. This dialectic character of doctrine is of course not peculiar to the Lutheran Church, for from earliest times Christian doctrine has been framed in answer to opposite interpretations. But the principle should be recalled for otherwise it is easy to view the Lutheran doctrine as an absolute statement without regard to the origin of the form in which we have received the doctrine. It is absolute in so far as it is a positive declaration in opposition to a contrary opinion, but not in the sense that it fully describes for all time what the doctrine affirms. The future may state the answer in a different form, depending on the situation that may call forth the statement.

We can explain the Lutheran doctrine, therefore, only by referring to 1) the Roman Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation, and 2) the other Reformation teachings concerning the relationship of Christ to the sacrament. In addition, it is necessary to refer to non-doctrinal aspects of the sacrament, such as 3) the liturgical and 4) the legal, which have probably had much more to do with the influence of the sacrament than we have allowed, in our preoccupation with the intellectual framing of the doctrine.

CONFRONTING ROME

The opposition of Luther to the Roman Catholic view of the sacrament did not at first center on the explanation of the mean-

ing, so much as on the abuses which had grown up around the use of the Lord's Supper. Once the Reformer had arrived at clarity on the point of the Scriptures as the source and standard of all teachings of the Church, he could find no justification for the withholding of the cup from the laity. But even more important was his discovery that the Mass (= Lord's Supper) could not rightly be thought of as a good work which an ordained clergy could perform in order to secure merit thereby from God. The mass was not a work of man at all, and needed no hierarchy to produce what the laity could not do. For the sacrament was a testament, a gift of God, by which He continued in all generations to give to His followers what He had given to the first disciples on "the night in which He was betrayed." This led to a renewed study of the Gospels and epistles as to what was the substance of the sacrament, and, again, these provided no foundation for any idea of change in the bread and wine into something else. The reason that bread and wine are used is that "He took bread," "He took the cup," and He said, "This do in remembrance of Me." Medieval scholasticism invented a complex theology of "substance" and "accidents," making the bread and wine to retain the appearance of bread and wine, the "accidents," while acquiring, through the action of the priest, another reality, a "substance," namely the body and blood of Christ, so that after the consecration the bread and wine was the body and blood of Christ, to be adored, carried in procession, received, preserved, as the corporeal Christ. For all this Luther found no biblical authority. Rather the sacrament was a testament, a legacy, given by the dying Savior to His disciples, who, remembering what He did and said, took Him at His word and as oft as they did in this manner, received Him who again was present among them with His life and gifts.[1]

The Lutheran teaching, thus, shifts the emphasis from an action of the priest who, by virtue of his ordination, can be an in-

1 Luther's earlier statements on the sacrament are found in: *Treatise on the New Testament,* 1520, Holman Edition, vol. I; and *Treatise Concerning the Blessed Sacrament and Concerning the Brotherhoods,* 1519, and *The Babylonian Captivity of the Church,* 1520, Holman Edition, vol. II.

strument in transforming the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ, to an action of the congregation which remembers what He commanded His disciples to do. It transfers the faith of the communicant from an hierarchically organized Church to the gospel on which the congregation is built. The minister who administers the sacrament is chosen by the congregation to do this, but he has no power different from that of the laity, and the efficacy of the sacrament depends not on his character or action but on the promise of Christ whose word he and the congregation seek to obey.

One might also say that the opposition of the Lutheran sacramental doctrine is directed less at the ultimate gift which the recipient experiences (we do not hesitate to say that the faithful Roman Catholic receives Christ) than at the doctrine of the Church and the ministry which the Roman theory of transubstantiation undergirds. "Almost," we say, because there are other considerations involved, and none more vital than the assumption of the Roman Church of a power to declare a dogma which is without Scriptural authority. There is no such authority for the doctrine of transubstantiation, and most of the abuses which Luther attacked in the Mass and in the Church grew out of a teaching which made the sacrament a sacrifice in the hands of man rather than a gift in the hand of God. And when men believe that they can earn the favor of God with their sacrifices they proceed to build the kind of theory and of system which the medieval church became. They are tempted to think that their sacrifice has influence on God and that they can somehow build an institution which can guarantee some control over God's actions, which destroys the true relationship of Creator and created, and robs the terms grace and faith of their true meaning.

CONFRONTING ZWINGLI

Strangely, the fiercest opposition on the central meaning of the sacrament Luther encountered within the ranks of the Protestants. So divisive was the issue that the Lutherans would not

allow the Swiss reformers to include their names on the Confession presented at Augsburg in 1530, and Melanchthon had more hope of a reconciliation with Rome than with Zurich. And to this day German Lutherans speak more kindly of Rome than of the Reformed,[2] and Lutherans generally shy away from the "Anabaptists" whom they barely know except through their confessions of four centuries ago. The ἐστι of the sixteenth century sacramentarian strife cut almost as deep a cleavage in Christendom as the *iota* of the fourth century Trinitarian controversy!

For the followers of Zwingli could not believe that when Christ said, "This is my body," "This is my blood," it meant this literally. The result was a Christological development which forced the Lutheran and the Calvinist churches far apart. The details cannot be given here. We are concerned merely with the result in the Lutheran doctrine of the Lord's Supper. It can most briefly be stated by saying that Luther refused to budge from his position that the words mean exactly what they say. He felt that it was harder to believe the theories which sought to explain away the mystery than the simple words of the text, mysterious as they are. And all through the ages Lutherans have learned this definition of the sacrament in the words of the Small Catechism, before they have gone to their first communion: "It is the true body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ under the bread and wine, given unto us Christians to eat and to drink, as it was instituted by Christ Himself." To the question, "How can this be?" they have given diverse answers, but on the central point there has been a remarkable agreement—He is Himself present at His table.

The objections made to Luther's interpretation by Zwingli and his party were not new. Nor for that matter was the literal rendition of the words of Christ new, for both Greek and Roman Catholicism accepted it. But from Zwingli to Calvin there was a development which sought to rationalize away the plain meaning and to erect a new interpretation. Luther pointed out that these attempts did not agree among themselves, and logically often re-

2 For example, Asmussen, H., *Warum Noch Lutherische Kirche* (Stuttgart, 1949).

futed themselves. In general, it was held that Luther's exegesis involved a Capernaitish understanding of the eating of the body and drinking of the blood of Christ. Or, it was claimed, Jesus did not mean to identify the words "this is" with his body or blood, but gave the elements as tokens or symbols of His death. Nor could He be present bodily at each celebration of the sacrament, for after the ascension He was at the right hand of the Father in His resurrection body—one could therefore only speak of His Spirit being present at the table. And the injunction to "do this in remembrance of Me" made each repetition of the Lord's Supper a memorial of His death, edifying to the congregation but not a sacrament which had effect on both the believers and unbelievers in any physical sense.

It is difficult sometimes to distinguish between exegesis and theology—does the exegesis determine the theology of the sacrament, or does the theology of the interpreter determine his exegesis? One cannot escape the impression that a constantly elaborated theology is brought in to justify the exegesis, on both sides. I need only mention the *ubiquity* doctrine and the Christological *communicatio idiomatum* on the Lutheran side. But scholastic as these attempts were, they did not have any other purpose than to refute those who said Christ could not mean what the text said. When the Reformed urged that the Lutheran interpretation was impossible, the Lutherans proceeded to show how it could be possible. Probably they could have desisted, and simply held to the biblical statement. But when challenged they met their opponents on their own ground.

Zwingli and Oecolampadius contended that Christ could not be present bodily in the bread and wine except in a spiritual way, for the body of Christ after the ascension was in heaven at the right hand of the Father. And while Calvin indicated a virtual presence of Christ which was more substantial than that of the Swiss reformers, the Reformed doctrine in general differed from the Lutheran precisely on the point of the presence of the human nature of Christ. "They divide the person of Christ, as if there were two persons," Luther asserted, and went on to claim, "We hold our Lord Jesus Christ as God and man in one person, not con-

founding the natures nor dividing the person."[3] Much of what Luther said hinged on this conception of an indivisible Christ, who was always present in his human nature as well as his divine nature. To proclaim that the human nature, the body, of Christ was in heaven and so could not be in the bread and wine, meant to Luther a denial of the unity of Christ's person. That unity was eternal, and was another expression of the truth of the incarnation, and the resurrection. He was willing to make a distinction between the form of the body of Christ in the incarnation and in the sacrament, but the body was the same. "To speak in plain terms, we do not say, that the body of Christ is in the Eucharist in the same form in which he was given for us—for who would say so?—but that it is the same body which was given for us, not in the same form and mode, but in the same essence and nature."[4]

The doctrine of the sacrament is of such profound significance in Lutheran teaching just because it lies so close to the central truth of the Christian gospel—the incarnation of the Son of God for the redemption of humanity. When the incarnation is denied, and the bodily resurrection of Christ, then it easily follows that the sacrament assumes another meaning. But to one who firmly believes that the Son of God dwelt among men and assumed human nature in order to identify himself with mankind, it becomes impossible ever after to separate the human and the divine in Christ. Because God has revealed Himself in a human body, humanity can know God, and to humanity there is no other God. But we must therefore take seriously the word that when He is present in the Eucharist He is present in a form of his humanity, and the form he has determined is in the bread and wine, which do not themselves change form but are the means whereby the undivided Person of Christ enters into followship with those who receive the bread and wine. "Elevated through the influence of the Word" the believer "is a new creature in Christ, endowed with

3 *Von Abendmahl Christi, Bekenntnis,* 1528, Weimar Ed. vol. 26, p. 324. Trans. by Jos. Salyards and Ambrose Henkel, *Luther on the Sacraments,* Newmarket, 1853. Section 131, pp. 212-213.

4 *Luther on the Sacraments,* Sect. 85, p. 188.

new spiritual perceptions" and sees "that the bread is not mere bread, but the true body of Christ."[5] The hymnist has put it simply and adequately:

> For His true body, as He said,
> And His true blood, for sinners shed,
> In this communion we receive:
> His sacred Word we do believe.
> (H. Spegel, 1686. Hymn 234 in Augustana Hymnal.)

Because He said so, and because we believe His word—this is the Lutheran answer to all the questions which can be raised against this interpretation. That Christ can be present everywhere is no difficulty for him who believes in a God greater than the dimensions of the human mind. The Creed says that Christ is at the right hand of the Father, and Luther explains—the right hand of God is everywhere.[6] Why Christ should associate His presence with bread and wine we cannot explain, except to say that this is what He commanded and the experience of the centuries confirms the truth of His word. How He can be both the host and the gift at His table cannot be explained in physical terms, but Lutheran teachers have always held that if this was possible at the first celebration of the sacrament it is no less possible in each succeeding observance.[7]

Between the presence of Christ and His gift in the communion there can be no severance.[8] It is because He is present that something happens in the sacrament. He is inseparable from His gifts, and the Last Supper "was to be an abiding memorial of his bitter suffering and death and all his benefits, a sealing of the New Testament, a consolation of all distressed hearts and a firm bond and means of union of Christians with Christ their head and one

5 *Ibid.*, Sect. 106, pp. 198-199.

6 *Ibid.*, Sect. 117, p. 205.

7 Elert, W., *Morphologie des Luthertums* (München, 1937), I:266, and note 2, quoting Brenz. Also *Bekenntnis*, 1928, Newmarket trans. Sect. 113, p. 203 "If the body of Christ can sit at the table and still be in the bread, it can also be in heaven and wherever he wishes to be, and still be in the bread."

8 Cf. Edmund Schlink, *Theologie der lutherischen Bekenntnisschriften* (München, 1948), p. 240.

another."[9] Schlink has this comment on the fruits of the sacrament: "The virtue of the Lord's Supper is not only a promise of forgiveness, but the actual presence of forgiveness, life and salvation. It cannot be forgotten that all these gifts are eschatological realities, that is, forgiveness ultimately is the absolution at the final judgment and life is the eternal life of resurrection. In the doctrine of the Lord's Supper our vision does not rest on the time that separates us from Christ's return, but as we receive the sacrament the coming of Christ and His gifts are most assuredly already present to us. To the faithful, receiving the body and blood of Christ, the time of the final struggle is overleaped and victory over sin, death and the devil already won."[10]

The Christ with whom the believers are united in holy communion is an indivisible Christ, whose body and spirit we cannot separate. Nor can we separate between our own body and spirit. The life and salvation which are His gifts have a corresponding effect on both our body and spirit, and the light of His presence casts a ray of light on the meaning of human life and on the resurrection of the body and the spirit. Rudolf Stier has remarked: "He who does not recognize the *glorified corporeity* of the resurrection as the goal of all God's dealings with the children of men delivered from the bondage of death, he who does not see that in order to the victory of grace over sin, the *restitutio in integrum* of fallen man, something would be eternally wanting if bodily death was not also vanquished, so that the ἀνάστασις alone consummates the ζωή—and further that this restoration can come to us only through the *body* of the second Adam, the man from heaven, first glorified—he who does not apprehend all this, will never understand either the Lord's Supper itself, or the testimony which the Lord here gives (John 6:39, 40) of its deep foundation and principle."[11]

When something of this depth of the meaning of the sacrament is reached we can understand why Lutherans teach that even

9 *Formula of Concord,* Part II, Sect. 44, Ch. 7.
10 *Op. cit.,* pp. 230-231.
11 *The Words of the Lord Jesus,* vol. V:172. (T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1870.)

the unworthy recipient is affected by the sacrament—to his judgment. His unbelief does not make the sacrament of no effect—rather the presence of Christ becomes the presence of the Judge instead of the Savior. As little as the unbelief of man can banish Christ from His creation, so little can his unbelief remove Christ from the place He has promised to be. Faith sees Christ beyond the bread and wine—unbelief makes the elements a means of condemnation.

THE LITURGICAL ASPECT

Thus far I have spoken only of the doctrine of the sacrament and its intellectual formulation. But this is only one aspect of the Lutheran view of the Lord's Supper. Another aspect is the liturgical, and in the life of the individual it is probable that the forms and customs which surround the sacrament are more effective than the definitions he has learned. For in the Lutheran Church the communion is the climax of worship and the most impressive moment in the ministry of the Church. In the main the Lutheran Church continued the tradition of the medieval church and built its sanctuaries around the altar, so that the very architecture of the church building witnessed to the central place of the sacrament of the altar. The dim light coming in through stained glass windows set off the darker sanctuary wherein the light from burning candles threw the altar itself into relief and fell on the silent group kneeling at the rail. A deeply religious mood was evidenced in the chorale music which came from organ or congregation. The festive dress of the minister, and the slow, measured repetition of the words "For you" intoned in the holy silence of the worshipping group kneeling to receive the elements, all made of this solemn moment something unique in the life of the believer. As a child he may have sat in awe as his parents left him in the pew when they went forward to commune. The day came when as one of a confirmation class he went for the first time to the table of the Lord. He may not have been able clearly to explain what he received each time he bowed humbly, trustingly, at the altar, but that in some way Christ was present he would confidently af-

firm—present as at no other time, nearer than any other person, speaking to him personally of the relationship effected by His death and resurrection. The Lutheran Church has emphasized word and sacrament as the means of grace and the marks of the Church, but has hardly been aware that its hold on its people might be due more to sacrament than it has imagined.

An interesting comparison might be made between the language of dogmatics and of psalmody in describing the Lutheran meaning of the Lord's Supper.[12] From the abstract, polemical, often violent language of the schoolroom which Lutheran dogmatics represent, we pass to a quiet, simple, worshipful spirit, the atmosphere of the sanctuary.

To us on earth still dwelling
Thou didst descend to give,
In love all love excelling
Thyself that we may live,
And sayest, ever kind and good:
Take, eat, this is my body,
Take drink, this is my blood.
(F. M. Franzen, 1814, *Augustana Hymnal* 235:2.)

That we may keep this truth in mind,
Thy broken body here we find;
Here we receive Thy precious blood,
A cleansing, sacrificial flood.
(Luther, 1524, *ibid.*, 240:2.)

And in the moment of communion the Lutheran Church does not hesitate to use the words of Bernard of Clairvaux:

We taste Thee, O Thou living Bread,
And long to feast upon Thee still;
We drink of Thee, the Fountain-head,
And thirst our souls from Thee to fill.
(*Ibid.*, 241:3.)

12 "Man kann keinen Artikel der Augustana beten," p. 35, Hans Asmussen, *Warum Noch Lutherische Kirche.*

nor the words of James Montgomery of the Moravian Church:

> Thy body, broken for my sake,
> My bread from heav'n shall be:
> Thy testimonial cup I take,
> And thus remember Thee.
> (*Ibid.*, 239:2.)

In his monumental work, *The Shape of the Liturgy*,[13] Gregory Dix has recounted how meaningful the re-presenting of Christ has been to the infinite number of those who have, through the centuries, taken Him at His word and believed that in the sacrament they were in His presence. The action of the Eucharist has been the creative center of the Church. At the end of his long treatise Dix asks, "Was ever another command so obeyed? For century after century, spreading slowly to every continent and country and among every race on earth, this action has been done, in every conceivable human circumstance, for every conceivable human need from infancy and before it to extreme old age and after it, from the pinnacles of earthly greatness to the refuge of fugitives in the caves and dens of the earth. Men have found no better thing than this to do for kings at their crowning and for criminals going to the scaffold; for armies in triumph or for a bride and bridegroom in a little country church; for the proclamation of a dogma or for a good crop of wheat; for the wisdom of the parliament of a mighty nation or for a sick old woman afraid to die; for a school boy sitting an examination or for Columbus setting out to discover America; for the famine of whole provinces or for the soul of a dead lover; in thankfulness because my father did not die of pneumonia; for a village headman much tempted to return to fetich because the yams had failed; because the Turk was at the gates of Vienna; for the repentance of Margaret; for the settlement of a strike; for a son for a barren woman; for Captain so-and-so, wounded and prisoner of war; while the lions roared in the nearby amphitheatre; on the beach at Dunkirk; while

13 Glasgow, 1945. P. 744.

the hiss of scythes in the thick June grass came faintly through the windows of the church; tremulously, by an old monk on the fiftieth anniversary of his vows; furtively, by an exiled bishop who had hewn timber all day in a prison camp near Murmansk; gorgeously for the canonisation of S. Joan of Arc—one could fill many pages with the reasons why men have done this, and not tell a hundredth part of them. And best of all, week by week and month by month, on a hundred thousand successive Sundays, faithfully, unfailingly across all the parishes of Christendom, the pastors have done this just to *make* the *plebs sancta Dei*—the holy common people of God."

THE LEGAL ASPECT

The least attractive part of the story of the Lutheran view of the sacrament is the use which has been made of it as a legal instrument of governments. For in those days and those countries when the Lutheran Church was the one church of the nation the temptation was at hand to make attendance at the sacrament a legal test of conformity. Something of this was inherited from the medieval church, and similar customs prevailed in other lands, for instance, England. But it must, nonetheless, be deplored that this sacred rite of the Christian Church should become a tool in the hands of governments more intent on political power than on religious sincerity. Only those could hold public office who had "made their communion" at stated intervals. And in the homeland of the Reformation the doctrine of the sacrament became one of the marks by which political units recognized and reacted on each other. It is difficult to distinguish between religious conviction and political motives when the sacraments or the creed become the criteria of political parties or governmental units. Yet it was the fate of the sacrament to become such a test, and no one can say how much this fact contributed to the contempt into which religion fell with fatal consequences both to Church and state.

I refer to this sad chapter in the history of the sacrament because I think that something of that political entanglement un-

consciously is related to American Lutheran "rules" concerning the Lord's Supper. Much can be said for those who framed the Galesburg, or more properly, the Akron Rule, for they were concerned about a right attitude on the part of every communicant who came to the Lord's Table. But there is about the form of the statement a harsh legalism much more akin to law courts than in harmony with the Last Supper of our Lord. The spirit of the Gospel is one of invitation—this rule is concerned with exclusion. The sacrament has to do with the Lord's Table—the rule talks about *Lutheran* altars. The unworthy communicant at the Last Supper was a traitor. The persons envisaged by the Rule are members of other communions who mistakenly see no difference between the doctrines of their churches and the Lutheran. For this phenomenon in our history I can find no other explanation than a centuries-old tradition bound up with the laws of homelands which confused political loyalty with sacramental uniformity. The justification for the Rule was a confusion of faiths on the American frontier, and an attempt on the part of Lutherans to keep their religious identity. But conditions have changed. Not that there is still no confusion, but the enemies of Christ are hardly apt these days to seek access to the Lord's Table, and the relationship of the churches has undergone in America a remarkable transformation. The Galesburg Rule is a misleading "law," and the time is not far distant when Lutherans should re-examine the implications of that statement. I am advocating no loose "unionism" or superficial "open communion"—I am expressing the hope that the Church of the Gospel can find some better way of explaining its conception of the sacrament than by an imitation of political legislation.

And I express the hope, too, that the Lutheran Church will abandon a certain inflexibility in the consideration of possible agreement among Christians as to the meaning of the Lord's Supper. In his penetrating study, *Eucharistic Faith and Practice,* Brilioth has clearly shown that no one denomination has exhausted, or even represented, all of the richness of the sacrament. The Lutheran Church has given an impressive testimony of the elements of mystery and of sacrifice which are inherent in the Last Supper,

but it has not been as fortunate in making clear the elements of thanksgiving or of communion or of remembrance. The emphasis has been if not too much on the individual's securing of benefits for himself from the sacrament, at least not enough on the individual's participation in a community of saints of which he is only one part.[14] And the somber tone of the sacrificial with its demand for a penitent mood has all but crowded out the note of thanksgiving which gave to the original Supper the name of Thanksgiving, or Eucharist.[15] These elements have been more fully preserved in some of the denominations with which the Lutheran Church has differed on the matter of doctrine. We should be willing to re-consider the full meaning of the sacrament in a spirit of seeking to discover, rather than in a spirit of having nothing to learn and everything to teach. We would then find that there is a difference between the teaching of Zwingli and of Calvin, and that we cannot indiscriminately speak of a "Reformed" teaching. Calvin and Luther had fundamental disagreements,[16] but at the point of the definition of the mode in which Christ is present in the sacrament both held that ordinary words were insufficient. When one cannot agree on the precise meaning of simple words how can one agree on what words to use? Luther insisted on saying that the body of Christ present in the sacrament was the glorified human body—Calvin could see no difference between such a body and a spirit,[17] and felt that he safeguarded the doctrine of the Presence by maintaining a real presence of a spiritual power in the sacrament. It is true that Calvin then went on to localize the human body of Christ in heaven and to this Luther opposed the idea that we do not rise to heaven but Christ descends to us. Yet one of the most acute students of the controversy, Hellmut Gollwitzer in a recent work questions if there is much difference to the recipient

14 Brilioth, Y., *Nattvarden i evangelisk gudstjenstliv*[2] (Stkm., 1951), p. 412. Cf. English trans. of first edition (1926) by A. G. Hebert, *"Eucharistic Faith and Practice Evangelical and Catholic* (Macmillan, 1930).

15 A prayer of thanksgiving is provided in the new Lutheran liturgy of the American churches—for the first time since the Reformation.

16 Brilioth, *op. cit.*, Eng. Trans., p. 170.

17 *Ibid.*, 168.

between the Calvinist and the Lutheran statement. If, he says, the Calvinist is in danger of sacrificing something of the reality of the Presence, the Lutheran is in peril of losing something of the significance of faith by giving a certain meaning to the reception of the elements apart from faith. He then ventures the question, "*ob es sich hier wirklich um einen articulus fundamentalis handelt der eine kirkliche Gemeinschaft im Dissensfalle sprengen muz.*"[18]

However we answer this question, we ought in all honesty realize that the doctrine of the sacrament is not a revelation dating from the Wartburg, 1529, but a matter of a living Church which in the twentieth century may no longer be contained in the compartments of the sixteenth. We owe it to the Faith and Order movement that the hard ground of dogmatic controversy packed by the controversies of the past is being broken up and softened, so that out of barren areas of disagreement we may still hope for the cultivation of more attractive Christian statements. If, as we maintained at the outset, our doctrine is shaped, as to its form, by the surrounding forces which oppose it, then we may explore whether the present *form* of our statements actually meet the conditions of our day, or if like some deserted building certain of our supports and beams no longer are held up by counter stresses or no longer carry any weight.

In any event we must honestly face the fact that the prayer of Christ that all His disciples "may be one, even as Thou, Father, art in me, and I in Thee, that they also may be in us" refers exactly to the believers who in this world are one with Him in the Eucharist and not only to some celestial state beyond history. We cannot, if we be one with Him through the sacrament, be complacent about the divisions which not only separate us from one another, but cause Him continuing grief and gives the world cause to question the community of the saints. The most unseemly quarrel

18 *Coena Domini* (Munich, 1937), pp. 153-155. The author thinks the main difference is in the localization of the mystery. "Lutherisch: nur der glaube kann die unbegreifliche gegenwart, sich dem Worte beugend, begreifen; reformiert: nur für den Glauben gibt es überhaupt die Gegenwart" (153). But there is a further difference: for the Lutheran, *communio indignorum.* Cf. also Asmussen, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

in the world is the quarrel of His disciples at His table. We must seek His presence to find a unity which sacrifices nothing of truth and nothing of love, nothing of His promise or power, but a unity which gathers up all the treasures of His gift and builds a communion which can truly rejoice and be thankful in this unspeakably great Eucharist.

The Rig Veda

Herbert H. Stroup

THE Rig Veda is the earliest and most important of the sacred scriptures of Hinduism. In fact, it is the oldest document among the world's living religions, preceding the literature of even ancient Israel. Properly, all the Hindu scriptures are known as the Vedas, or "Books of Knowledge," but the term is loosely used to designate more particularly the four earliest collections, of which the Rig Veda is the first, longest, and most important.[1]

"Rig" means a song of praise, and "Veda" means holy knowledge; therefore the Rig Veda is a hymn book of holy knowledge. There are 1,028 hymns or lyrics in the collection, representing the experiences and religious aspirations of the Aryan tribes as they established themselves among hostile aborigines in the northwest of India, the district of the five rivers.[2]

Western scholars date this earliest collection anywhere from 2000 B. C. to 1000 B. C. Orthodox Hinduism claims that the Rig Veda was created before the world and literally revealed to the seers who wrote them down word for word in the Vedic or Old Sanskrit language. Consequently, not one word—jot or tittle—may be changed or doubted. The content has been memorized and handed down by brahmans from generation to generation.

The Vedic hymns somewhat resemble the Psalms of the Old Testament in form and spirit. The religious content, however, is for the most part nature-worship; the forces of nature are gods who rule the world, with some ancestor worship.

The collection is divided into ten Mandalas or books. The first book addresses only nature gods, of which the Maruts (the storm gods who surround Indra) are the most primitive. By the

1 The other three are the Yajur Veda (The Veda of Sacred Formulas), Sama Veda (The Veda of Chants), and Atharva Veda (The Veda of Charms: priestly).

2 Geographical references are to be found in the hymns.

time the Rig was formed, however, these Maruts (if they had come first in the primeval Aryan worship) had been already outranked by the broader conception of Indra, a general god of the weather. After the first and oldest book, the Rig presents seven books containing the hymns preserved, and perhaps composed, by seven priestly families. Each of these books received the family name. The ninth book contains only hymns to Soma. Soma, an intoxicating drink used in religious ceremonies, was apparently deified because of its inspiring effect upon its devotees. The tenth book is a late collection from many sources, it would seem. It contains new poems and older songs not before included; in rescuing the latter the priests were less particular as to the religious spirit of the poem (several could hardly be classed as hymns). Yet this last book of the Rig contains the celebrated Creation Hymn, which resembles the biblical account, and the profound address to the Unknown God. (It appears at the end of this article.)

A clear distinction was already drawn in the Rigvedic age between ruler and priest; both the nobility and priesthood, however, were closely connected by ties of mutual dependence. The ruler depended upon the priest for the proper performance of the sacrifice and the latter depended upon the former's honorarium (daksina). Most of the material of the Rig Veda was probably composed by indigent priests under contract to wealthy rulers to provide the hymns necessary for the solemnizing of the sacrifice. "This means," says Griswold, "that the Rig Veda is a literary monument of the religious views and practices of the Vedic aristocracy and priesthood alone, the usages of the Vaisyas and Sudras being inadequately represented."[3]

RELIGION OF THE RIG VEDA

THE MAKING OF THE GODS

The Aryans had already progressed beyond Animism, the first stage of religious development, in the period of the Rig Veda. In many cases, however, the development had not reached the

3 Griswold, *Religion of the Rigveda*, p. 50.

stage of fully personalized gods. There were a number of "special gods"[4] of limited activity which were named simply by the thing they represented, e.g., dyaus "sky," agni "fire," surya "sun," usas "dawn," vata "wind," etc. Agni had to do originally only with fire, Vata with wind, etc., but all the special gods could annex the sphere of activity of others, and the more a special god did this the more personalized he became, his original physical basis being forgotten.

Each of these "special gods" had his particular function to perform, there being, so to speak, minute division of labor among them. The sun, for example, has many distinct aspects and functions. "It is a bright orb (Surya), a light-giving friendly power of nature (Mitra), a great stimulator of life and activity (Savitar), a nourisher and protector of cattle (Pusan), wide-striding from earth through mid-air to zenith, 'he of the three steps (Visnu)', and the one who at dawn shines in every direction (Vivasvant)."[5]

When annexed by one of the greater gods, these special gods tended to become merely epithets of the latter. In general, harmonious elements would attach themselves—Varuna would attract the holy and good, for example, whereas Rudra in his development would attract to himself such semi-demonic qualities as were akin to his original character.

The gods also reflected the changing environment and experiences of the Aryan tribes. "Accordingly, like earthly rulers, one god would increase his domain at the expense of another, or himself be despoiled of some or all of his attributes. Thus Varuna, the majestic god of the Rig Veda, became later a night-god and finally only a god of lakes and pools, so completely did he lose his sublime attributes of holiness and sovereignty."[6]

We have, then, existing side by side, "special gods" and personal gods of varying degree, created out of the stuff of natural phenomena. The Vedic demons are fashioned likewise, only out of the injurious activities of nature instead of the beneficial. Gods

4 Thesis developed by Usener in his *Gotternamen;* see Griswold's discussion, *ibid.*, pp. 13, 81 f.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 83.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 86.

and demons alike are the interpretations of cosmic phenomena in terms of human experience. Contrasted with the Atharvaveda, the Rig Veda gives relatively little attention to the demons, concentrating its devotion to worship of the higher gods.

The gods may be grouped according to several principles of division. The oldest classification, found in the Rig Veda itself, divides thirty-three gods into three levels—heaven, mid-air, and earth—eleven for each. Another bisects them into males and females. Still another, into smaller groups, even as the human race is broken up (Adityas, Vasus, Rudras, Angirasas, Ribhus, etc.). Or they may be divided according to function: Agni and Brihaspati were priests, Indra and the Maruts warriors, Tvastar and the Ribhus artisans; thus following the pattern of Vedic society.

There are certain common features that characterize the Vedic gods as a group. Their proper habitat is the sky (even such terrestrial deities as Agni and Soma have descended from a heavenly origin); they are mysterious (Asura) and possess occult power (maya); other attributes in common are: brilliance, power, knowledge, beauty, righteousness and benevolence. These attributes, however, are not possessed by all in the same degree. "Thus Usas, the lady 'Dawn,' has more beauty than knowledge and strength; Indra, the warrior god, more strength than knowledge and righteousness. Of all the Vedic gods Varuna possesses the best combination of physical and moral attributes. Agni, as a priestly god, is well endowed with knowledge, Jatavedas ('knowing all generations') being his exclusive epithet."[7]

One of the great conceptions of the Rig Veda is that of Rita (Eternal Order). Heaven and earth are the parents of Rita; the gods (devas) are Rita, express Rita, are the guardians and cherishers of Rita. For example, Usas, the goddess of Dawn, follows the rein of Rita, for day by day she returns to the appointed place. In the thought of Rita being expressed by the daily recurrence of dawn we have the idea of the uniformity of nature. Varuna and Mitra are the gods most closely associated with Rita, so that what seems in some passages to be the work of Rita, in others is referred

7 *Ibid.*, p. 107.

to as the work of Varuna. The conception of Rita unifies the multiplicity of nature and its gods, which are thereby seen as the reflection of a single will that maintains the whole cosmic order. "Thus the tendency of Rigvedic religion was toward some form of unity, whether monotheistic or pantheistic."[8]

INDRA

Indra is the most important god in the Rig Veda, if we judge from the fact that he is celebrated in nearly one-fourth of the total number of hymns. According to the traditional view, he is the storm-god who sends the rain and lightning. Griswold represents him as "the apotheosis of naked might, the embodiment of the martial and imperialistic tendencies of the Vedic Indians. No phenomenon of nature is so suggestive of ruthless might as the lightning stroke."[9] Indra's chief feat is the slaying of the demon Vritra and letting loose the waters—I. 32:

1. Let me tell out the manly deeds of Indra,
   Which he accomplished first of all, bolt-weaponed:
   He slew the serpent, opened up the waters,
   And cleft in twain the belly of the mountains.

2. He slew the serpent lying on the mountain;
   Tvastar for him the heavenly bolt had fashioned;
   Like lowing cattle downward sped the waters
   In rapid flow descending to the ocean.[10]

Most scholars regard this episode as referring to the atmospheric drama of the thunderstorm in which the demon of drought is pierced by the lightning and made to surrender the pent-up

8 *Ibid.*, p. 108. Griswold notes, in this connection, Max Muller's theory that the Vedas reflected a Henéotheistic religion; and also Swami Dayanand Sarasvati's theory that Monotheism is to be found in the Rigveda (I. 164. 46—"The one Being priests speak of in many ways: they call it Agni, Yama, Matarisvan." X. 114. 5—"Priests and poets with words make into many the bird that is but one.") Strained exegesis is required for any monotheistic interpretation.

9 *Religion of the Rigveda*, p. 178.

10 *Ibid.*, p. 178 f. Oldenberg's translation used as basis. There are fifteen verses in all.

waters. Indra, like Varuna, also controls the earthly water—To Indra, III. 33:

1. (Visvamitra, talking to the rivers)
Forth from the bosom of the mountains, eager,
Like two mares racing side by side, loose-coupled,
Like two bright mother cows that lick each other,
Vipas and Sutudri pour down their waters.

2. Sent forth by Indra, begging him to speed you,
Ye twain move seaward, as it were on chariots;
Running together, swelling with your billows,
Ye lucid streams, to each draws nigh the other.[11]

Indra extends his martial career to become the war-god of the Aryans in their struggle with the aborigines (Dasyus)—To Indra, II. 12:

9. Apart from whom men never are victorious
Whom they when fighting call on for assistance;
Who is for every one a match, who moveth
The things immovable; he, O men, is Indra.

10. Who with his arrow slays the perpetrators
Of grievous sin, when such fate not expecting;
Who pardons not the arrogant man his arrogance,
Who slays the Dasyu; he, O men, is Indra.[12]

THE MARUTS

Called also Rudras and Rudriyas, the Maruts are the storm-winds closely associated with Indra. To the Maruts, I. 85:

1. As wondrous sons of Rudra, racers of the sky
Who on their course, like women, beautify themselves,
The Maruts have indeed made heaven and earth increase;
Th' impetuous men rejoice in rites of sacrifice.

11 *Ibid.*, p. 187.
12 *Ibid.*, p. 193.

2. Having waxed strong, they unto greatness have attained,
In heaven the Rudras have established their abode;
Singing their song and generating Indra-might,
Glory have they put on, the Prisni-mothered ones.

8. Like heroes bold, like warriors speeding in the fray,
Like glory-seekers, they in fights array themselves;
All creatures are afraid of the fierce Marut-band,
Like kings of aspect fierce and terrible are the men.

12. The shelters which you have to give the zealous
Extend them threefold, Maruts, to the pious;
Extend them to us also, O ye Maruts,
Grant wealth to us with hero sons, ye mighty.[13]

Indra and his storm-gods, the Maruts, lose in popularity with the growing mind and stability of the people. In one hymn there is a suggestion that some had already begun to turn away from Indra and say, "He is not."[14]

AGNI

The favorite of the priests was not Indra or the Maruts, but the more pacific deity, Agni. They have placed his hymns first in each of the ten books. Agni is the second most prominent of the Vedic gods, being celebrated in about 200 hymns. He is the lord of fire—chiefly of the hearthfire and its beneficent warmth, the sheltering god of home and the softer side of life. "Agni is the messenger of the gods and brings them to the place of sacrifice, where they sit down upon the strewn grass. The sacrifice was not a communal ceremony, but was performed for one family or person. As a king had a chaplain or household priest (purohita), so Agni is the household priest of the gods and their Hotar (the priest who recites the prayers at the sacrifice)."[15]

1. Agni I praise, the household priest, God and offerer of the sacrifice, the Hotar and best bestower of wealth.

13 *Ibid.*, pp. 203-204.
14 To Indra, II. 22, 5 (see Macnicol, *Hindu Scriptures*, p. 13).
15 Thomas, *Vedic Hymns*, p. 25.

2. Worthy of praises by seers of old time and by those of new,
   may Agni bring hither the Gods.
3. Through Agni may one win wealth and welfare day by day,
   honour most rich in heroes.
4. O Agni, the offering and sacrifice which thou on all sides
   encirclest goes verily among the Gods.
5. May Agni the Hotar, with sage's insight, truthful, whose
   fame is most loud, come hither a God with the Gods.
6. That good indeed which thou, Agni, wilt grant to thy worshipper,
   that good of thine is true, O Angiras.
7. To thee, O Agni, illuminator of the darkness, day by day
   with prayer bringing worship we come;
8. To thee that rulest over the sacrifices, protector of Law,
   radiant one, increasing in thine own abode.
9. Be thou, as a father to a son, O Agni, easy of access to us.
   Abide with us for blessing.[16]

In addition to his domestic character, Agni dispels darkness, repels enemies, wards off hostile magic, destroys or puts to flight the demons, and banishes illness.[17]

SOMA

By statistical standards, Soma ranks third in importance in the Vedic pantheon. Since the Soma sacrifice furnished the basis for the whole Rigvedic ritual, this deity is in a sense the most important of the ritualistic gods. His hymns occupy, as we have said, the first place in the family books and the entire ninth book. Butterworth observes that the deification of the Soma plant and its intoxicating juice was "prophetic of the unparalleled importance which sacrifice and ritual were to assume later on when religious observances were held to react upon the performer to such extent as to confer upon him powers endangering the supremacy of the gods themselves."[18] Some scholars maintain that the moon is the Soma of the gods and that Soma worship is in reality Moon-worship.[19]

16 *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.
17 See Griswold, p. 155 f., for illustrative selections.
18 Butterworth, *The Substance of Indian Faith*, Introduction, ii.
19 Thomas, *Vedic Hymns*, p. 75.

VARUNA

Varuna is the most impressive deity among all the Vedic gods. More than any other, he is the guardian of the moral order, and some of the finest hymns are addressed to him.[20] Griswold brings out the following points in discussing this ethical god[21]: a.—Varuna inflicts disease as a reminder and punishment of sin. b.—Fellowship with Varuna is broken by sin. c.—Varuna is besought to loose the sinner from sin and its penalty. d.—Sin is the transgression of the law of Varuna. e.—As omnipresent and omniscient, Varuna is a witness of the deeds of men. f.—Penitence, confession, prayer, change of purpose, sacrifice and praise are means of gaining Varuna's mercy. g.—Varuna grants protection and happiness to his worshippers. h.—Varuna is a holy god.

Since Rita embraces cosmic as well as ethical and ritualistic order, Varuna is Creator and Sovereign. His creative power is manifested especially in the great vault of heaven, through which he has made a path for the sun to travel by day, and for the moon and stars by night (I. 24, 7-8, 10).

LESSER GODS

Usas, the dawn, is properly represented as a lady. "The most graceful creation of Vedic poetry" is characterized by feminine charm. She is the only goddess of importance, and is celebrated in twenty-one hymns.[22]

The Asvins are the inseparable twins of twilight and morning star, the twin lights of morning that usher in the dawn. Then there are the sun-gods Surya, Savitar, Pusan and Visnu; and minor atmospheric and terrestrial gods. We pause only to make brief comment on Rudra which, though a distinctly subordinate god, being celebrated in only three entire hymns (II. 33; VII. 46; I. 114), is important as the Vedic anticipation of Siva, the third person of the Hindu Trimurti. Rudra is the father of the Maruts

20 V. 85; VII, 86; VII, 88; VII, 89.
21 Griswold, p. 122 f.
22 *Ibid.*, p. 244 f; Macnicol, pp. 9, 20; Thomas, pp. 29-30.
23 See Griswold, p. 285 f.

and partakes of the nature of both Indra and Vritra, being thereby both divine and demonic. He is "the destructive agency of lightning," although his sphere of malevolent activity is extended to include sunstroke and illness in general. Notwithstanding Rudra's evil character, he is appealed to as a god of grace. As "the bearer away of harm by gods inflicted" (II. 33, 7) he is besought to avert the anger of the gods (I. 114, 4).

The naive elements of primitive religion are to be found in the Rig Veda: nature worship, ancestor worship, elves, tutelary deities, demons and magic, and the seeking of material benefits: sons, health, success over enemies, wealth. Nevertheless, the religion of these Aryans, over 3,000 years ago, shows a remarkable stage of development. "The Rigveda does not present us with any naive outpouring of the primitive religious consciousness, but with a state of belief which must have been the product of much priestly effort and the outcome of wholesale syncretism."[24] "It may be said that the gods (of the Rig) are in the main of the order that in Greek religion is termed Olympian."[25]

The common attributes of the Vedic gods was later to lead to the conception of a deity possessing the attributes of many gods and, finally, of all the gods (Brahma, in the Upanishads).

"In the tenth book we become aware that the Indian spirit is finding its natural element and the direction of its future travail. The name Veda signifies 'knowledge,' and already it is becoming evident that the road by which these ancient sages will journey will be rather the road of those who seek to understand than the road of those who are ready to obey or love."[26]

We respectfully leave the last word to India's poet, Rabindranath Tagore. "Perhaps the most significant thing that strikes the reader as he goes through some of the Vedic Hymns is that they read, not like so many commandments, enjoined by priests

24 Prof. B. Keith, *Cambridge History of India,* I, 103 (quoted by Macnicol, xiv).

25 Macnicol, *Introduction,* xiv.

26 The worshippers in the tenth book do not now approach the gods with prayers for cattle or saying, "Promise us gifts O Savitar." The questions they ask are, "What god shall we adore with our oblation" (X. 121, p. 32 in Macnicol; X. 129, p. 37 in Macnicol)? The above quotation is from Macnicol's introduction to *Hindu Scriptures,* p. xv.

or prophets . . . but as a poetic testament of a people's collective reaction to the wonder and awe of existence. A people of vigorous and unsophisticated imagination awakened at the very dawn of civilization to a sense of the inexhaustible mystery that is implicit in Life. It was a simple faith of theirs that attributed divinity to every element and force of nature, but it was a brave and joyous one, in which fear of the gods was balanced by trust in them, in which the sense of mystery only gave enchantment to life, without weighing it down with bafflement—the faith of a race unburdened with intellectual brooding on the conflicting diversity of the objective universe, though now and again illumined by such flashes of intuitive experience as "Truth is one: (though) the wise call it various names" (Rig I. 164, 46).[27]

THE CREATION HYMN

(Box X—Hymn 129)

Rig Veda

1. Then was not non-existent nor existent: there was no realm of air,
   no sky beyond it.
   What covered it, and where and what gave shelter? Was water there,
   unfathomed depth of water?
2. Death was not then, nor was there aught immortal: no sign was there,
   the day's and night's divider.
   That One Thing, breathless, breathed by its own nature:
   apart from it was nothing whatsoever.
3. Darkness there was: at first concealed in darkness this All
   was indiscriminated chaos.
   All that existed then was void and formless: by the great
   power of Warmth was born that Unit.
4. Thereafter rose Desire in the beginning—Desire, the
   primal seed and germ of Spirit.
   Sages who searched with their heart's thought discovered
   the existent's kinship in the non-existent.
5. Transversely was their severing line extended: what was
   above it then, and what below it?
   There were begetters, there were mighty forces,
   free action here and energy up yonder.

27 Foreword to *Hindu Scriptures*, ed. by Macnicol.

6. Who verily knows and who can here declare it, whence it
was born and whence comes this creation?
The Gods are later than this world's production. Who
knows then whence it first came into being?
7. He, the first origin of this creation, whether he formed it
all or did not form it,
Whose eye controls this world in highest heaven, he verily
knows it, or perhaps he knows not.

(Griffith's translation)

TO THE UNKNOWN GOD

Rig Veda

Book X—Hymn 121

1. The Golden Germ arose in the beginning,
Born the sole lord of everything existing;
He fixed and holdeth up this earth and heaven—
Who is the god to worship with oblation?

2. He who gives breath and strength, he whose commandment
All beings follow, yea the gods acknowledge;
Whose shadow immortality and death is—
Who is the god to worship with oblation?

3. He who through greatness hath become sole monarch
Of all the moving world that breathes and slumbers;
Who ruleth over quadrupeds and bipeds—
Who is the god to worship with oblation?

4. The one to whom through might these snowy mountains
Belong, the sea with Rasa, as men tell us;
To whom belong these quarters and the two arms—
Who is the god to worship with oblation?

5. He through whom sky is firm and earth is steady,
Through whom sun's light and heaven's vault are supported;
Who in mid-air is measurer of the spaces—
Who is the god to worship with oblation?

6. He to whom look the rival hosts in battle,
Sustained by his support and anxious-hearted,
When over them the risen sun is shining—
Who is the god to worship with oblation?

7. What time the mighty waters came containing
Everything germinal, producing Agni,
Thence there arose of all the gods the one life—
Who is the god to worship with oblation?

8. He who in might surveyed the floods containing
Creative force, the sacrifice producing;
Who 'mid all gods has been and is alone god—
Who is the god to worship with oblation?

9. Ne'er may he harm us, he earth's generator,
He who with order true begat the heaven,
And gendered, too, the bright and mighty waters—
Who is the god to worship with oblation?

10. Prajapati, apart from thee no other
Hath all these things embraced and comprehended;
May that be ours which we desire when off'ring
Worship to thee; may we be lords of riches.

(Griswold's translation)

Ernst Cassirer and Contemporary Thought in Transition

Charles W. Kegley

IN THE field of philosophy the figure of Ernst Cassirer towers over the first half of the twentieth century. Its equals in grandeur and significance are very few indeed—perhaps the most familiar, when one thinks in terms of penetration and creativeness, are Whitehead, Russell, Dewey, and Santayana. Having previously published scholarly volumes on these four leaders in thought, Professor Paul Arthur Schilpp has rendered a unique service in presenting a monumental work of over 900 pages devoted to a critical exposition of *The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer.*[1] That his choice is correct is emphasized by Professor Fritz Kaufmann, who describes Cassirer as "one of the most venerable figures in recent philosophy, . . . one of the most encyclopedic of modern minds." The fact that the volume does a more than satisfactory job of explicating Cassirer's thought is reason enough to warrant our careful study, but there are two additional reasons. On the one hand, it very considerably aids our understanding of the man who, along with Nicolai Hartmann, was the outstanding representative of the "academic tradition" in contemporary German philosophy.[2] Cassirer occupies this position not only because of his creative work on the newly investigated problems of the history of science and philosophy, but also, following Ernst Cohen's Neo-Kantianism, because of his creative interpretation of the functional nature of philosophy and, indeed, of the functional nature of all con-

1 Edited by Paul A. Schilpp, Vol. VI, *The Library of Living Philosophers,* Inc., Evanston, Ill., 1949, and now available through Tudor Publishing Company, New York City.

2 I quote the generally accepted phrase of Werner Brock in his excellent volume: *An Introduction to Contemporary German Philosophy* (Cambridge: The University Press), 1935, pp. 89-92.

ceptual forms. On the other hand, a careful study of Cassirer's philosophy discloses to the student of philosophy and religion certain important trends in the advanced thinking of our age. Of the main fields in which Cassirer, and his present critics, operate—the sciences, cultural issues, the arts, and religion—we shall in these remarks deal chiefly with the last-mentioned area.

Profitably to undertake even this task, however, we should be mindful of several features of Cassirer's thought and general position which are sketched at this point in severely condensed fashion. As one of the leading representatives of Neo-Kantianism,[3] Cassirer was convinced that advance must be made *from* this Kantian approach to the twin problems of epistemology and metaphysics, *toward* the problems of modern science. Such an advance would lead, as he tried to demonstrate, to views like the following: that scientific cognition is an analysis of the "logical foundations of the exact sciences"; that the "understanding" of the world is a free and creative activity of the mind which "constitutes" processes according to the form of space and time; that these latter forms—together with number and causality—are merely functional, that is, they are "schema of connection by which what is sensuously perceived is set in certain relations of coexistence . . ."[4] that, as a parallel in metaphysics, the universe is not a myriad of objects but a "pure spiritual expression," so that what it is really important to know are not *things* but *relations;* that as the philosopher and scientist join in their quest for understanding, they will discover that the relativity and quantum theories, far from contradicting these epistemological and metaphysical views actually substantiate them. Finally, as in his recent, *An Essay on Man,*[5] Cassirer, again following the Kantian tradition, eloquently tried to show that essences—e.g., "man"—are never known *per se*, metaphysically, as some kind of *substance,* but only *functionally*,

3 See his *Substance and Function, Philosophie der Symbolischen Formen,* and *Das Erkenntnis Problem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit.*

4 *Substance and Function and Einstein's Theory of Relativity* (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co.), 1923, p. 412.

5 Sub-title: *An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture* (New Haven: Yale University Press), 1944.

in appearances and activities. We comprehend man, for instance, by understanding his use of symbols in language, art, religion, and culture generally. Mindful of these background considerations, we may now turn our attention more directly to the religious elements in Cassirer's philosophy.

There are several reasons why an examination of Cassirer's thought about religion is important. For one thing—and it is now a trite comment—in this age which on all sides is called catastrophic and decisive for the future of mankind, many scientists and philosophers are turning with what amounts to a missionary's zeal to basic religious problems. Cassirer, who as a German and a Jew, was driven from homeland to hospitable Sweden and thence to America, had painfully immediate knowledge of these "existential" experiences with which modern man is confronted. He could not help but write in their light, hence what he had to say is born not merely out of the desire to know, but also out of the necessity of making decisions about the nature and destiny of human life. Second, it is commonly the case (as with his master, Kant) that the reflective scholar turns toward the close of his career and at the height of his power to the problems of religion. With Cassirer this is at once partly the case and partly not so. That it is so is illustrated by his work *An Essay On Man* which reveals his interest in the broad religious problem concerning the foundations, forms, and products of human culture. This means that the religious issues, as he conceives them, are basically moral, dealing as they do with the symbolic and mythological way in which man handles his beliefs, feelings, and action. On the other hand, the absence of a specific philosophy of religion must candidly be admitted. The plain fact, as Professor Fritz Kaufmann points out, is that "in Cassirer's thought religion occupies a somewhat precarious position between myth and morals: in his *An Essay On Man* it seems almost restricted to the moral, positive revaluation of the ancient taboo system."[6] Third, it is of considerable interest to observe how Cassirer's treatment of religion compares with

6 *Op. cit.*, p. 805.

its parallel treatment by other members of the Neo-Kantian school. What I am pointing out may be seen by calling attention to the fact that Cassirer's great teacher, Ernst Cohen, largely gave up this "neo Kantian position," as this phrase is used in German histories, and that he began asking strictly metaphyical questions and entertaining an increasingly favorable attitude toward religious issues, writing, indeed, a philosophy of religion. In Cassirer, however, a certain standpoint is quite consistently maintained, and it is precisely this attitude which, in part, makes our study of him as revelatory of contemporary trends the more worthwhile.

It has widely been said by Professor Brand Blanchard that Cassirer was "rather a distinguished reflective scholar than a great speculative philosopher"[7] and that his learning was not mobilized in the interest of any particular theory. This makes it difficult clearly to capture the convictions of the man on religious issues, nonetheless, the following are valid characterizations, I believe, as showing the drift of his thought on several main themes.

First, then, in Cassirer there is clearly exhibited a characteristically modern position concerning the nature of religion and of man's relation to God. We purposely cast the problem in these terms because, in spite of the notoriously diverse directions which definitions of religion take, almost all of them share this root notion, namely, of some kind of relation between finite human beings, on the one hand, and some super-human and/or supernatural power(s) which are called divine or godly. Now it is entirely in harmony with his general epistemological and metaphysical position that Cassirer holds such a position to be misleading if not untenable. It is so for one reason, to put it bluntly, namely, that man cannot sustain a relation of belief in, feeling toward, or action in the light of such an Infinite Being if there *is* no such Infinite Being. To be sure, a defender of Cassirer might reply to the above by saying that the Infinite is precisely that concept which man uses to describe the wonderfully and mysteriously varied setting in which all human life is placed, and that we should not

7 *The Philosophical Review,* Vol. LIV, Number 5, September, 1945, p. 510.

demand the unreasonable or impossible, that is, some metaphysical entity which transcends the space-time universe. We should be sure, he might point out, that it is the truth of the matter that we are retaining and not merely a terminology that we are defending—in this case the time-honored substance—attribute terminology of Protestant as well as Catholic scholasticism. There is undoubtedly much discernment in this warning, but even so this defense serves in another regard to reinforce our point: if man is related to any Infinite at all, this is for Cassirer a kind of mystical relation between man and his total environment.

Second, the point just made verifies and is consistent with the kind of statement that must be made about man's *knowledge* of any God that may exist. For Cassirer it is not primarily God who, being qualitatively and metaphysically different from man, *comes to man* but it is rather man who, in seeking more adequately to understand himself, constructs myths and symbols in which the term God is used. According to this view, it is manifestly improper to speak, as do many contemporary theologians, of man being confronted by God. The priority—both in knowledge and in reality—is given to man, not to God. The god-concept, therefore, serves chiefly as an imaginative technique whereby man may render more intelligible to himself his nature and his experience. Moreover, man must always recognize the mythological character of this way of thinking, lest he delude himself into believing that there is some Reality which metaphysically preceded his thinking and to whom he stands in some relationship of objective knowledge and judgment.[8] One can hardly help thinking that there is a striking similarity here between the views of Cassirer and those of certain contemporary naturalists—John Dewey is a striking instance—who suggest that the word God may be used, pro-

8 I assume it is not necessary to point out that the use of the term myth is not "loaded" and should not be offensive. Its use represents an effort to retain and convey truth, not to dispel it in a sophisticated fashion. It stands, accordingly, for insights which cannot adequately be communicated in the more prosaic fashion. Cassirer's discussions of the role of myth are unusually rewarding, it may be added. See his seventh chapter "Myth and Religion," in: *An Essay On Man*, and over fifty references in *The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer*.

viding we recognize clearly that the word stands, not for a metaphysical reality, but for the active relation between our ideals and our on-going life.

A third main characteristic of Cassirer's religious thought is best seen as an outgrowth of his persistent emphasis upon the historical. In the light of Cassirer's immense erudition in the history of ideas, and the importance which he attaches to history, it is not in the least surprising that when he turns to the issues of religion he almost seems to be more interested in the historical transformations of religious thought than in the nature and validity of religious truths as such. That this is the case is seen in the fact that he repeatedly emphasizes the necessity of moving from the primitive and naive expressions of religion, with their ceremonial and moral legalism to the *spiritualization* of religion. By this Cassirer does not mean, of course, that many of the alleged ceremonial and moral commandments of religion should be abolished, much less ridiculed or contemptuously treated. He rather insists that we should strive for that intellectual advance and moral transformation which allow "purity of heart and the inner obligation" to become central to all religious thought and action. Perhaps it is not too strong to say that if man can at last realize what it is that the idea of God really stands for and what the symbolic purposes of religious ceremonies and practices actually are, he will not need to worry so much about whether some kind of God *exists* in a supernatural realm, and he will not find it necessary to devote so much energy to the ceremonial practices intended to strengthen his purity and feeling of obligation. Externalization and materialization in religion may gradually, in the religion of a mature mind, give place to inner purity of thought and a constantly criticized sense of obligation.

Fourth, it is clear that there is a strongly optimistic note running through Cassirer's philosophy—an optimism which has increasing importance when one turns to the field of religion. It is here that Cassirer stands in striking contrast with his famous contemporary Heidegger, who may be called a delineator of man's finiteness and frailty. This optimism, as we have called it, cer-

tainly is no mere expression of Cassirer's personal experiences in life, because these, as we have observed earlier, had their emphatic elements of poignant sadness. The optimism is rooted, rather, in his conviction that man can, and indeed has, with increasing effectiveness, understood and mastered his environment and found creative and cooperative expression for his interests. Life thus is cast in terms of light, rather than of shadows; its symbol is the dawn—not the dusk, its key-note is a cautious belief in progress. The dominant words in its vocabulary are understanding, achievement, meaning, and aspiration. Almost totally absent from its vocabulary are the words "death and defeat." Cassirer's *An Essay On Man* stands in dramatic contrast with Kierkegaard's *Fear and Trembling*. In Cassirer the emphasis is on ability, not inability, upon creative understanding, not upon frustrated fear in the presence of incomprehensibles, upon the intelligent achievement of the harmonious and cooperative life rather than upon the timorous and tortured concentration on man's alleged stupidity and sin, and finally, upon the capacity of man to achieve a measure of intelligibility and coherence rather than to glory in the paradoxical.

At the outset it was suggested that the thinking of this widely-hailed contemporary has some significance for an understanding of the thought of our age, and for contemporary philosophies of religion in particular. Undoubtedly there are those who will receive it with rejoicing and consider it an elequent expression of the height to which the human mind can attain. Equally certain it is that others, although recognizing its erudition and its capacity for dealing constructively with complex problems will, at the same time, call it an example of the hang-over in our age of an exaggerated and unwarranted nineteenth century optimism. I should like particularly to call attention to the fact that the most penetrating and severe criticisms have been and are being made not by theologians but by philosophers.

It probably is wiser to look for the truth of the matter somewhere between those two positions, though certainly nearer to the latter point of view. The following and concluding observations

may assist us in estimating the enduring significance of Cassirer's thought and also in exhibiting rather clearly the transition that is taking place in the thinking of some of the abler minds of our age.

For one thing, Cassirer's thought dramatizes the fact that in the present intellectual scene the common meeting ground of the problems of epistemology and metaphysics demands re-thinking. That is to say, the double-barrelled question of *how* knowledge is possible and *of what* we may be said to have knowledge rises anew as being foundational to all other problems. And the very central way in which this problem rises in the philosophy of Cassirer illustrates clearly the transition that is taking place in philosophy generally. We may observe this by viewing the issue first from within Cassirer's own system, and then from without, as an issue posed with renewed persistence for contemporary thought.

Viewed from within his system the problem might be stated as follows. Is Cassirer correct in describing the knowledge process in terms of symbolic forms? Has he shown how these arise, how they are internally related, and precisely to what they refer? At every one of these important points there is ambiguity, an ambiguity reflected constantly in the futile effort of the able contributors to *The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer* to fix precisely upon these issues. To be specific and to illustrate: according to Cassirer, the symbolic forms—language, myth or religion, and art—are elemental forms of understanding. They are "the only set of terms of which even a meaningful experience is possible."[9] But how are they arrived at? Are they deduced, *a la* Kant, from something inherent in the nature of mind, or of the universe, or, as is more likely the case, are they merely the larger and more obvious ways in which, when we observe the knowing process, people seem to think? The latter evidently is the case, for Cassirer seems to deny the former.[10] If, however, it is the latter, are they not somewhat

9 *Op. cit.*, p. 181.
10 *Cf., op. cit.*, p. 566.

arbitrarily named, and hence open to suspicion? Moreover, how are these forms related to each other? One would expect to learn whether they are atomistically or organically related: For example: do you and I think now according to the symbolic form of language, later in the form of art, at another time according to the form of science? This hardly seems to be the case. I should expect that in concrete living these forms of understanding are neither (a) wholly separate, nor (b) successive stages, but rather are (c) interpenetrating, and organically related ways in which we achieve meaning.

Another problem is directly involved in this epistemological one, namely, the problem of the reference of these forms of thought to reality. We need to know *what* the reality is like of which we have knowledge when, in science, for instance, we reach, according to Cassirer, the summit and consummation of all human activities. The interpreters of Cassirer seem never to be sure *what*, if anything, is given in these symbolic forms, or, for that matter —recalling the time-worn Kantian problem—whether knowledge creates or reveals the objective universe. To this cardinal question Cassirer gives no answer.

These problems, arising within Cassirer's system, lead directly to our earlier observation that in Cassirer we see an excellent instance of contemporary philosophy in transition. The last issue cited nicely raises the problem, which might briefly be stated as follows. Can contemporary philosophy answer the traditional question of metaphysics by telling us what that objective reality is which presumably we "know" in science, art, religion and the like? Manifestly, just as there is no agreement on this question in Cassirer's writings, so there is no agreement in contemporary thinking on this issue—except the hearty agreement that this is a crucial issue! One school of thought, of course, would tell us that any genuine knowledge is limited to that which is physically and experimentally verifiable and measurable, and that it is useless to look for knowledge of the universe *as such*. Noting Cassirer's "non-metaphysical" bent, and thus claiming support from his profound insights, advocates of this position would have us conclude

that any verifiable knowledge of ultimate reality is unattainable. Representatives of other schools of thought, however, are equally convinced that Cassirer and contemporary philosophy cannot thus read out of court the metaphysical problem, but rather must address their best critical thinking to this issue. In fact, they might point out that for good or for ill, a metaphysical position is presupposed in Cassirer's philosophy—as, it is, similarly, in logical positivism, for example!—and that *this* position requires examination. Contemporary philosophy and philosophy of religion, in short, must re-think the issues of the nature of thought and of the reality known by thought. Science, art, and religion, among other major interests, demand an answer to the questions not only of how man knows but of what he can have knowledge. The answer is not found in Cassirer; rather, its compelling character is freshly emphasized. There is in our day a legitimate demand for a comprehensive insight into the nature of things. This demand, moreover, is ineradicable from human inquiry, no matter how much the antimetaphysicians—whether old-fashioned sceptics or contemporary positivists and traffickers in mere methodology—may thunder against this demand. Now if the older metaphysics has little to offer in satisfying this demand, religious as well as other interests must press for an answer. It will not do merely to show that in positivism and radical empiricism there is a hidden metaphysics—there *is,* I believe, and this must be shown. It is necessary, beyond this, to indicate what knowledge of reality we can have, and how this knowledge, for example, illumines our understanding of religious thought and life. I am myself of the opinion that such epistemological and metaphysical considerations, particularly if formed in the light of the newer physics, would have led Cassirer, and will lead us to a revised form of idealism. Such a position, moreover, is, as I believe, better suited than any other so far available as a framework for interpreting the fundamental convictions of Christianity.

Finally, in Cassirer the fact is highlighted that in twentieth century thought the problem of *man* is unquestionably central. Has any other period in the history of civilization, save only the bril-

liant Periclean age in Greece, witnessed so constant and strenuous an effort on the part of man to understand himself, to comprehend his nature and his destiny? To be sure Augustine, Pascal, and others wrestled with these questions, but in our era the concern is more widespread, as involving many fields of study, and not merely religion and philosophy. It has about it, moreover, at once a personal and a collective urgency which is very well suggested by one of Leslie Paul's books, *The Annihilation of Man.* That this fact is itself exceedingly revealing requires no emphasis for students of religion and philosophy. But what is likewise very instructive, as we try to understand our mid-century problems, is that Cassirer illustrates the transition that is taking place in the interpretation of man. Generally speaking, it must be admitted even by his most ardent admirers, that Cassirer's view is one that is swiftly passing out of favor, as being false and misleading. Why? Because, in spite of its brilliant effort accurately to portray man and his culture, it seems to concentrate all its attention upon the human spirit as a *spontaneously and autonomously creative agent.* The French say "the adjective makes the noun," and the function of the adjectives in the previous sentence is crucial. In other words Cassirer represents—albeit brilliantly—the view of man as a magnificent product of the culture which he has himself created. Man, the *animal symbolicum,* is seen as the measure of all things. As one looks through the eyes of Cassirer at the history of the human culture created by man, one feels compelled to judge, with him, that it is good. But the question persistently recurs: is this an accurate picture of the nature of man? Granted that it is a penetrating description of the way man functions, how does it help us to account for man's existence? Can such a creature really be autonomous? Whence came this remarkable ability of the spirit of man to objectify itself? By what is the human spirit conditioned? Moreover, what would we discover if we studied with equal discernment the natural and social environment that has perhaps equally *made* man and conditioned his life? Finally, admitting the fact that man has dealt imaginatively with his environment, has learned in some measure to control it, and to introduce considerable

coherence into his symbolic thoughts about it, where, in Cassirer's philosophy is account taken of the irrational, the role of conflict (both between man and his environment and between human beings), and of fear, frustration, and despair? At the risk of putting it too concisely, is this not much too optimistic and one-sided a view of man? In our day such a view seems to demand the corrective which, as many of our able critics claim, is more thoroughgoing in its analysis of the conditions of man's existence, and, frankly, more pessimistic precisely because it deals more "realistically" with those externally powerful and internally deep, recalcitrant conditions and forces which produce frustration, fear, and loneliness. Can any lordly attitude such as Cassirer's do credit to the undeniable element of struggle which plays so central a role in life?

To try in this modest fashion to see what some of the main contemporary problems are, and to see how they arose, this in itself should be helpful. It is not equivalent, of course, to pointing out in each case a solution to the problems. There are, to be sure, an increasing number of religious and secular authoritarians who claim to have the true and final answer, but no one who correctly estimates the meaning and difficulty of the questions arises confidently to proclaim the answer. Much has been gained, however, if through even a brief study stimulated by Cassirer's thought we understand some of the issues which must be faced as we enter the second half of the twentieth century.

Notes and Studies

Theology in the United States has just begun to feel the effects of the emphasis which in European schools has become dominant in the past two decades, namely, eschatology. A recent document issued by the Study Department of the World Council of Churches at Geneva gives a useful survey of the leaders and the literature in the contemporary treatment of eschatology. We reproduce one section of this report—other parts deal with the biblical texts, and the pronouncements at Ecumenical Conferences; page citations, of course, refer to the original report; a valuable bibliography concludes the document, which can be secured from the Geneva headquarters. It bears the title, *Eschatology and Ethics,* and is numbered A 3/4—November, 1951.—Ed.

THE TREATMENT OF ESCHATOLOGY IN SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

Every theology contains eschatology in some shape or form. But it is a matter of controversy how far the teaching of the Bible about eschatology can be taken over today as it stands, and if it is taken over, what meaning can be attached to it today. We shall begin by noting a few examples which in our view are selective in their treatment of biblical eschatology. Then we shall turn to those attempts to interpret the eschatological message as a whole for the present day. These are only a few selections from the available material: the order in which they are taken is logical rather than chronological.

1. First, there is what might be called the *"apocalyptic"* interpretation of biblical eschatology. Its distinctve feature is its separation of the future hope from the past acts of God in history as testified by scripture (on this see below p. 18). Consequently the necessity of a literal acceptance of the eschatological prophecies of the New Testament is emphasized. "By attempting to give an exact date for the end, such people always assert that they stand immediately before the end. This is a regularly recurring phenomenon in the millenarian sects of America" (Filson, cf. also B. No. 29). In social ethics the usual consequence is

a tendency to escapism or die-hard conservatism. Since the world is doomed to come to a speedy end, it would be useless to change its *status quo.*

2. The *ecclesiological-sacramental* interpretation of eschatology. Here the Church is regarded as the place where the time-factor is eliminated by the sacraments. The incarnation, which the early Church interpreted pre-eminently as the miracle by which the antithesis between the transcendent and immanent was overcome, can be conceived equally as the miracle of the irruption of eternity into time. This miracle is continued in the Church as the extension of the incarnation. The same is true of the death and resurrection of Christ: in the Church's sacraments, these are not repeated, but they are extended beyond the limitations of time. This results in a weakening of eschatological tension and expectation as regards social ethics in the idea that it is the Church's function to permeate and sanctify the world. The Church alone has the power and the duty to promulgate authoritative ethical norms.

While this view is in some ways typical of Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic thought, it should be noted that in both Churches there is a growing interest in biblical eschatology. (Cf. e.g. *Danielou, E. Walter* and *M. Schmaus,* and for Eastern Orthodoxy cf. below p. 13.)

3. *Individualistic eschatology.* For a long time it was the dominant tendency in Protestantism to confine the doctrine of the "Last Things" to individual survival after death, either as a doctrine of immortality, or in the biblical form of resurrection. The cosmic eschatology of the Scriptures was either left in the background, or abandoned altogether (B. N. 38). As might be expected, personal ethics still retained some connection with this individualistic eschatology, but social ethics were developed in complete independence from it.

4. The re-discovery of the teaching of Jesus about the *Kingdom of God* marked a real advance on this individualism. In contrast to the apocalyptic interpretation (which is probably a permanent phenomenon in the history of the Church), pietism and

the Protestant missionary movement is pre-eminently interested in "spreading the Kingdon of God" by the preaching of the Gospel, or in preparing the way for the advent of the Kingdom by the evangelization of all nations as its necessary prelude. Eschatology is in this case either nothing but an expression of the urgency of the missionary endeavor (*J. Baillie*), or (without altering the meaning of the "futuristic" biblical hope) eschatology inspires that sense of urgency in missions. This may be combined with an individualistic preaching of salvation or with a kind of social gospel, according to one's theological predilections (see below).

5. In the first quarter of this century some combined the older Calvinistic christocratic theology with the preaching of the Kingdom of God just noted to produce a socially active theology of the Kingdom of God. In Europe it took the form of religious socialism under the influence of the younger *Blumhardt, Kutter,* and *Ragaz,* and in America the form of the social gospel under the influence of *Rauschenbusch.* Similar tendencies may be seen in the recent Iona experiment in Scotland (*G. MacLeod*). All these movements repudiate spiritual conceptions of the Kingdom of God which "offer redemption for the spiritual life but leave economic life unredeemed" (Rauschenbusch). The Kingdom of God is regarded here as the goal (*telos*) of history attainable in this world. Hence T. E. Torrance has called it "realized teleology" on the analogy of "realized eschatology." The older theology of the social gospel was wedded to evolutionary optimism, but there modern successors have become more sober and realistic. Despite this, however, they tend to overlook the eschatological tension between the "time of the promised fulfillment" and the "coming time of fulfillment" (*Stauffer*). Like the advocates of realized eschatology, they emphasize solely those parts of the New Testament which speak of the Kingdom of God as having already come with the advent of Christ.

We turn now to those views which seek to do justice to the *whole* range of New Testament eschatology, in the sense in which it is presented at the close of Section I. The primary problem is: How is this message to be interpreted in our own day? And it is

on the answer to this question that our conception of the relation between eschatology and ethics will depend. Taking our cue from *Holmström's* excellent analysis, we shall enquire in each case how far "the element of the future end of time" is taken seriously. Two prevailing tendencies are apparent: one tends to a supra-temporal (timeless) interpretation of the eschatological sayings in scripture; the other to maintaining or stressing its character as denoting the end of time. It is impossible to draw any clear line today between these two tendencies. In the first place, many systematic theologians have changed their views in the course of the last thirty years, and secondly in every instance not only the understanding of time but also Christology is involved. We begin with the supra-temporal interpretations.

1. The theologians (and Christian philosophers) who are primarily interested in the operation of Christ in *history*: these employ the concept of "supra-history" just because they are anxious to assert this operation in a non-liberal sense. By supra-history they mean the mysterious purpose of God which, originating from beyond history, invades in and controls its course. *C. H. Dodd* combines this conception, which in part at least is rooted in the idealistic philosophy of history, with his realized eschatology. He says for instance that the gospels are "a narrative of events whose meaning is eschatological, that is to say, events in which is to be discerned the mighty act of the transcendent God which brings history to its fullfillment" (*History and the Gospel,* p. 36). "The time scale is irrelevant to the ultimate significance of history" (*Parables,* p. 71). It is obvious that eschatology is here transformed into "timelessness." History is interesting not in its course, but in the significance present in it at any given moment. Like *Tillich,* Dodd is interested in *kairos* rather than chronos. The Last Judgment for example is a crisis which is potentially present at every moment. The ethical task of the Church is to interpret these crises to the world, to enable it to meet them in the light of the Cross and resurrection, and to help it by suffering to fresh creative activity. The Christian ethic cannot be formulated in general principles; it must be unfolded to suit each successive *kairos.*

It is hard to see any difference between this and an ethic based simply on the idea of the continuous creative activity of God or a belief in providence. It is a paradox that some of those who adopt the foregoing argument are even prepared to defend a Christian doctrine of natural law. The upshot would seem to be that ethics can in the last resort dispense with eschatology, and that all we really need is the Old Testament doctrine of the judgment and grace of God in history.

2. The *anthropological-existential* exposition of eschatology, especially in *R. Bultmann.* For Bultmann the "mythological" imagery of the New Testament, including not only eschatology itself, but also in a certain sense the resurrection narratives, are the medium employed to express a particular understanding of self. They are to be taken existentially, in other words so expounded that the change in human life attested in them may become possible for modern man and for his understanding of existence. What matters is not any particular hopes for the future, but our personal attitude to life at any given time. The new life is eschatological because it is a life which accepts everything from the hands of God. Bultmann calls the decision to accept this new life "eschatological." This is the decision which Jesus and his apostles sought to produce in men by preaching the Gospel. The controversy now raging about the demythologizing of the New Testament is to a large extent a controversy about two different approaches to the New Testament—that of *Heilsgeschichte* and that of "existence" (cf. the report of the Study Department 49/E/103 which summarized the debate).

3. The *christological* eschatology, pre-eminently represented by *K. Barth,* stands in marked contrast to the foregoing view. The revolutionary feature of his Commentary on *Romans* consisted in his unqualified acceptance of the basic eschatological structure of the New Testament's message, as valid for the present day. This he was able to do by interpreting eschatology or eternity as the absolute transcendent which stands in radical antithesis to time. Barth was convinced that he had discovered the key to the New Testament understanding of time, and that this was the only way

to do justice to the centrality of Christ. On this view there is no end of history and no future advent of the Kingdom of God, for the end is always equally at hand. Christ's Lordship is an ever-present reality even though it is in some degree hidden: we need no longer wait for its realization, but have only to proclaim its presence and summon men to obey the Lord of the world.

As is well-known, the ethical consequence of this was Barth's radical critique of cultural Protestantism (*Kultur-Protestantismus*). As the complement of his eschatology he propounded an ethic of "actual obedience." In this he was at first not so far removed from the *kairos* theology. Ethics was a matter of concrete decision in particular situations, not a matter of general principles. "But in course of time Barth came to see that this attempt to base ethics exclusively on eschatology was impracticable, so he returned to the traditional Reformed doctrine of theocracy" (Piper). The more he did so, the more he was led to formulate certain basic ethical rules, deduced not so much from the isolated ethical injunctions in the Scriptures as from their central testimony to Christ on the principle of analogy.

Today, however, Barth is becoming increasingly dissatisfied with this approach also. For in the meantime he has been moving more and more away from the timeless conception of eschatology, as may be seen from his personal confession in Dogmatics II, 1, p. 716.

4. The exploitation of the dialectical tension between *telos* and *eschaton*. This is seen most clearly in *P. Althaus* and *Reinhold Niebuhr*. It began with a timeless interpretation of *telos* in the eschatological sayings in the New Testament: the cultural values press forward to a goal (*telos*) immanent within them. *Holmström* remarks of this earlier view of Althaus: "As in Troeltsch and Ritschl the underlying conviction is that religion confers what morality demands—the realization of the needs which the cultural values cry out for" (p. 288). Like Althaus in his earlier phase, Niebuhr interprets the eschatological sayings as symbols for the *telos*-character of history. But both Althaus and Niebuhr attach a high significance to the actual course of history in time, and so

they both affirm today the further idea of a fulfillment of history at the end of time, and thus the dialectical tension between *telos* and *eschaton* becomes theologically fruitful (Niebuhr calls it *telos* and *finis*). Here lies the foundation of that sober realism which is characteristic of both. Niebuhr holds that in the course of history the powers of evil increase just as much as the good; he makes a great deal of the idea of Anti-Christ. All the same, neither Althaus nor Niebuhr have completely emancipated themselves from supra-temporal eschatology.

It is not therefore surprising that even today Althaus bases his ethics primarily on the historicity of the orders of this world. Although in his more recent work he has anchored his eschatology more firmly to Christology, his ethics remain one-sidedly dependent on the doctrine of creation (or on the doctrine of cultural values). His basic conviction is that in a world doomed to pass away there is no possibility of the "orders" being governed by the Gospel, for the Gospel points towards a world to come. Niebuhr takes a different line here; he lays greater emphasis on the effect of the Gospel on the historical "orders."

5. In a rather similar way to the last two thinkers, *K. Heim* tries to work out a dialectical conception of eschatology. While holding fast to the futurity of the eschatological event, he interprets this event as itself the dissolution of time. But this dissolution of the time pattern is "not an annihilation, but an unveiling of the eternal content already to be found in it. Such an unveiling must come, otherwise God would not be God." (*Glaubensgewissheit*, p. 422, quoted from Holmström, p. 360.) The notion that "temporality and separation from God" are intimately connected disposes Heim to accept the idea of history as a battlefield between the satanic powers and the divine redemption. This would seem inevitably to involve a serious view of the eschatological hope for the future. Hence Heim seeks to replace the idealistic understanding of time by a more biblical one, and in doing so he is greatly assisted by his expert knowledge of modern physics. On the philosophical side *D. Lamont* has propounded a similar thesis. Künneth is also influenced by Heim.

6. It need hardly be said that the problem of time also plays a great part in the studies in the philosophy of history by *Butterfield, Farmer, Macmurray, C. Dawson, Collingwood* and *Loewith*, and also in the work of *J. Baillie* mentioned below. All these are seeking new insights to replace the old belief in progress. Thus *Bevan* for instance suggests that this globe should be regarded as a "platform" across which humanity has to pass in the course of its history. The essential element in history is not the succession of generations, but the transition into the "invisible," where God restores perfect fellowship among men and with them (see *The Kingdom of God in History*, 1938, pp. 56 f.).

7. The idea of history as a battlefield between the satanic powers and the redemptive act of God is also an important feature in the pietistic conception of the Kingdom of God outlined above. It is often especially prominent where the connection between eschatology and the missionary movement is emphasized. An example of this occurs in the writings of *M. Warren*, which are particularly interesting since Warren has his eye on the ethical implications: "Eschatological Christianity is eagerly expectant and revolutionary" (*The Truth of Vision*, p. 58). It is precisely when fulfilling her prophetic function towards the state and society that the Church must never forget that she is looking to an event "which still lies in the future, the triumph of God in history." Warren calls the Church a "resistance movement" operating in the world in enemy-occupied territory (*The Triumph of God*, p. 363). It is to be noted that in contrast to the views quoted under 1 and 2 the triumph here occurs in history. Therefore although this triumph is most definitely an act of God, it means in part at least that God through the Holy Spirit makes use of man's cooperation. It is of the utmost importance that this view takes seriously the normal "naive concept of time" in contrast to the views previously mentioned.

8. Contemporary *Eastern Orthodox theology* emphasizes in a very similar way that in speaking of Christ's death and resurrection as extended into the present and as an anticipation of the age to come the time factor must not be eliminated. This repre-

sents a modification of the traditional ecclesiastical-theocratic view: the King (Christ) has already come, but not his Kingdom. Thus the present time acquires an eschatological significance without weakening the expectation of the age to come. Because the end is still to come, the theocratic influence of the Church, in the sense of the historical community, can never be fully successful: the Church must be a theocratic community without any illusions, the agent in Christ's battle for the Kingdom.[1]

9. The leading Swedish Lutheran theologians, *Aulen* and *Nygren* are moving in the same direction. They find in the tension between the present age and the age to come as presented in the New Testament the key to the understanding of the eschatological reality which for Christians is even now more than a mere hope and in fact a power which is already transforming the world. For social ethics this means that Christ's messengers in the world must by the very fact of their eschatological preaching be working for the betterment of conditions in the world. The assumption of the autonomy of the orders of this world (cf. above on Althaus) must always be shattered and called into question in the light of the revelation of God in Christ. Hence the contrast is not between some sort of purely spiritual Kingdom on the one hand and the unchanged and unchangeable old world on the other: the Gospel must be applied to all life, though Christians must always remember that the orders of this world can never be so completely transformed so as to bring in the Kingdom of God on earth. But they must constantly strive to improve the state of the world, for otherwise the field would be left to the demons.

While Nygren seeks to re-interpret Luther's much controverted and often misconstrued doctrine of the two kingdoms in the light of the doctrine of the two ages, *H. Thielicke* has brought the latter doctrine into close connexion with the *"Simul peccator et justus"* of the Reformation. The Christian is already a member of the new age through baptism, but "in virtue of a mysterious *simul* he is at the same time still a member of the old age."—

1 This paragraph was formulated after a long discussion with Prof. G. Florovsky and the final draft approved by him.

"This means that Christian believers are in a double relation of continuity and discontinuity with the old age" (*Ethik* I, p. 68). "Ethics is thus concerned with relative achievements in this world. Its task is determined by the not-yet-realized still-delayed *parousia*" (*ibid.*, p. 70). "Ethics is eschatological, or it is not ethics at all" (p. 78).

The relation between justification and ethics has always been a crux for Protestant theology; it dominates e.g. the ethical teaching of *Brunner*, as also that of *Cave*. It is remarkable how Thielicke loses sight of eschatology, despite his premises noted above, when he comes to deal with this particular problem.

Book Reviews and Notices [1]

The Interpreter's Bible. Volume 7: New Testament Articles, Matthew, Mark. Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1951. 913 pages. $8.75.

This volume, the first of a twelve-volume modern commentary on the Old and New Testaments, cannot but send a parish pastor's heart leaping in anticipation.

Quite aside from a critical appraisal of contents, the mere fact that one of our great Protestant publishing houses budgets over a million dollars for such an enterprise and employs 146 biblical scholars in its production is in itself an exhilarating fact.

Dr. George A. Buttrick, a parish pastor, is the editor, and it was his appraisal that "the most urgent task in the field of religious publishing today . . . is a new commentary on the Bible which would bridge the gap between exegetes and the rank-and-file teachers and preachers" which became the seed from which *The Interpreter's Bible* grew. And certainly the American pulpit can well use a commentary born out of the American scene.

Of the General Articles on the New Testament, all necessarily rather brief in treatment, "The Life and Ministry of Jesus" we thought particularly well done. The resurrection of Jesus from the dead is given the full weight of historic fact. Elsewhere, in some articles, the authors yield to the temptation to delete the Scriptures by a "critical" distinguishing between history and legend, fact and vision, realism and miracle. But anyone who reads this work and remembers that it represents what must be a somewhat polyglot collection of the scholarship of over a hundred men will not dismiss the whole because it does not have one, unambiguous point of view.

The expositions, which in the Gospel according to Matthew are given by Dr. Buttrick and in the Gospel according to Mark by Halford E. Luccock, I have found very helpful in both teaching and preaching. Both in richness of language and in illustrative material they are a boon to the preacher.

ALVIN N. ROGNESS

The Interpreter's Bible. Vol. 8. Edited by George A. Buttrick. Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1952. 811 pages. $8.75.

This commentary on the gospels of Luke and John is the second volume to appear in the series of the *Interpreter's Bible,* in twelve volumes covering the whole Bible. Into the production of this major work has gone the labors of some of the most eminent biblical scholars of today. The general scheme is the same as in the previous volume on Matthew and Mark, viz.: Introduction, the Text in King James and the Revised Standard Version printed side by side, Exegesis and Exposition. One could wish that the book had been divided into two separate books so that they could be more easily handled.

In the present volume S. MacLean Gilmour, of Queen's Theological College, has written the introduction to and exegesis of Luke; and the exposition has been written by Walter Russell Bowie, of the Protestant Episcopal Seminary in Virginia, John Knox, of Union Theological Seminary in New York, George A. Buttrick, and Paul Scherer, of Union Theological Seminary. Wilbert F. How-

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1 Books reviewed or noticed in these pages may be purchased through your church's publication house.

ard, Handsworth College, Birmingham, has written the introduction and exegesis of the gospel of John, and Arthur J. Gossip of Glasgow has written the exposition.

The introductory chapters present a very complete review of the problems connected with each gospel. Since the general articles on the New Testament were contained in Volume 7, the introduction is confined to the specific problems presented by each gospel. The presentation is necessarily brief, but the material is presented so clearly and concisely that it is easily available. In the introduction to Luke the sections on the sources, the interests of Luke, and the history of the text are especially valuable. In regard to Lucan authorship Prof. Gilmour is "impressed with the case against the tradition," but he reports that the author of the introduction to Acts takes the opposite view.

In the introduction to John all the theories about authorship, date, and sources are discussed without giving preference to any one solution. The date suggested is about A. D. 100. The chapters dealing with the general structure of the gospel and its relation to contemporary religious thought are especially clear and informative. The author is more concerned to bring out the religious character and value of the gospel, rather than deciding such historical questions as date, place, and authorship.

The exegetical notes are brief and to the point. Names, titles, places, customs, and historical facts are explained clearly and adequately. In Luke frequent references are made to the parallel passages in the other gospels, but the exegesis is not overloaded with speculation about the sources from which Luke has gathered his material. No attempt is made to rationalize the miracles. It is pointed out that Luke and Mark understood such incidents as the stilling of the tempest as an exhibition of the supernatural and that this fact "must not be obscured by any process of rationalization." "The story of the Gerasene demoniac articulates the faith of the church that Jesus came to free men from the power of Satan and point the truth that evil is self-destructive" (p. 155). In the exegesis of John's gospel the explanation of terms and ideas receives the most attention. Here is a wealth of information, insights, and suggestions which throw light on the mystical character of John's language.

The exposition is possibly the part which will prove most delightful and helpful to the reader. Here the religious and theological interests predominate. The gospels reveal and proclaim the faith of the church in Jesus her Lord. In his words and deeds the purpose of his coming is revealed. In these commentaries it is recognized that the final end of interpretation is to set forth the message of the New Testament books. The reader, whether pastor or layman, will find in these notes on exposition much that will enrich his spiritual life and make the gospel of Christ living and fruitful in the church.

From the two volumes which have now appeared we can begin to sense the general character of the *Interpreter's Bible*. It is evidently meant to be a work that sums up the results of criticism and interpretation to date. There is nothing much that is new, and the authors do not specially advocate what may be their own views on various questions. We may characterize these volumes as thorough, scholarly, encyclopedic, and cautious. Such statements as being "impressed with the case against the tradition" are typical. The same caution is evident in the discussion about such subjects as the virgin birth, the miracles, the person of Jesus, and the resurrection. The exegetes recognize the limits of historical investigation and leave to the expositor to bring out the religious significance of the events. This approach gives a certain ecumenical character to the commentary. The reader will find here the results of generations of study and meditation on the gospels. With all this wealth of material the com-

mentary will provide a better understanding of the gospels and the words and deeds of Jesus the Christ.

E. H. WAHLSTROM

The Witness of Luke to Christ. By Ned B. Stonehouse. Grand Rapids: Eerdman's, 1951. $3.00.

This book is not a commentary on the Gospel of Luke, but a study of certain passages which indicate what Luke contributes to the portrait of our Lord. The material was delivered as lectures at the Free Church of Edinburgh and Sheffield University in 1949. The author has previously published a similar volume entitled *The Witness of Matthew and Mark to Christ.* In an introductory chapter he defends the authorship of Luke, the physician and companion of Paul, and gives a brief survey of the critical approach to this problem. The second chapter is an exposition of the significance of the prologue. Since Luke here discusses his sources and methods of writing, this chapter also is concerned with introductory problems. The author holds that Luke was a competent and conscientious historian who used various sources, including Mark, but was in the position to check the accuracy of the traditions available to him. In general he feels that such scholars as Cadbury, Dibelius, and Creed are too skeptical in their approach to the introductory problems of Luke-Acts.

The other six chapters constitute the main part of the book. The titles indicate the content: "The Gospel and Historical Beginnings," "Preaching and Conflict at Nazareth," "The Galilean Ministry as a Whole," "From Galilee to Jerusalem," "Death and Resurrection," and "The Kingdom and the Messiah." The approach which the author has chosen to pursue seems somewhat unsatisfactory. The result is not a commentary, nor does it seem to bring out the peculiar quality and contribution of Luke's gospel. His chief concern seems to be to vindicate Luke as an historian. This concern occupies such a large part of the argument that the real object, *"The Witness of Luke to Christ,* comes to be confined mostly to the story of the Passion. This "witness" should also include the ethical teaching found in the great parables and in the other discourses recorded in the gospel.

E. H. WAHLSTROM

The Reader's Bible . . . Designed for General Reading. New York: Oxford University Press, 1951. xlvii, 1,938 pages. $6.50.

Produced by the so-called "privileged presses" of England which have a monopoly on the King James Version, this edition of the Bible contains Old Testament, Apocrypha, and New Testament in the King James text. It differs from other editions in its typography: the text is printed in legible type and in a single column to the page, with chapter divisions but without the traditional division into verses, and with poetic passages set in the form of poetry. There is an introductory article on the text of the Bible, and there are brief historical introductions to groups of books (Pentateuch, Historical Books, Poetical Books, Prophets, Apocrypha, Gospels, Acts, Pauline Epistles, Non-Pauline Epistles, Revelation) immediately preceding the texts of the books discussed. These introductions are compact and helpful. Significant, too, is the reproduction in this edition of the seventeenth century preface, "The Translators to the Readers," with its reference to the fact that a new translation of the Bible "deserveth certainly much respect and esteem, but yet findeth but cold entertainment in the world." "But how shall men meditate in that which they cannot understand? How shall they understand that which is kept close in an unknown tongue?"

Handsomely bound in blue buckram, this volume is an invitation to read.

The Synoptic New Testament. By Russell A. Peterson. Boston: Meador Publishing Company, 1951. 159 pages. $2.50.

The author, a Lutheran pastor at Flandreau, S. D., offers in a new translation from the Greek "a chronological account, rendered in narrative form without the usual breakdown into chapters and verses, of the Four Gospels" (p. 7). His text is usually the sixteenth edition of Nestle. Chronology is based on Mark, supplemented by the second half of Luke, with differences clarified by "the chronological perspective of the Evangelist John . . . used as an over-all time nexus" (p. 7). The quest of the translator is "a modern biblical language" with "clarity of expression and ease for reading."

The resulting English often ignores the literal tense (e.g., John 1:5), voice (John 1:11), or case construction (John 1:14) of the original for freer expression. Archaic words are eliminated—"you" is employed consistently, even in prayers to God, but pronouns referring to Christ are always capitalized. Quotation marks are ignored (as in Msgr. Knox's "timeless English"), yet the first word in a quotation is never capitalized either (an aid to reading which Knox and most AV editors adopt). Poetry (e.g., in Luke 2) is not printed as such.

Typical examples of the translation: "The Word already existed at the beginning of time. The Word was with God, yet the Word was God. Both He and God existed when time began" (John 1:1-2); "Praise God in heaven for giving peace to men on earth who want it" (Luke 2:14). Some touches are very good—e.g., "astrologers" for "wise men" (which even RSV perpetuates) at Matt. 2:1; John 20:17 ("Do not try to hold me back"); and Mark 1:41 ("moved with love"). But "the freedom to worship him without fear" (Luke 1:74 sounds more modern than biblical.

At times the author's harmonizing interests lead him to difficulty. Matt. 4:17 is rendered, "From this time on, Jesus continued to preach, repent, because the Kingdom of God is near." But the original read, "*began* to preach"; so Matthew introduced our Lord's public ministry after the Baptism and Temptation. But when you insert three chapters of teachings from the Fourth Gospel prior to this point, then some change must be made to harmonize it all!

Other times conflation is practiced—as with the detail at the tomb: one angel at Matt. 28 and Mark 16, but two men in Luke 24. Or parts are omitted—e.g., the Lucan account of the Lord's Supper (22:14-23) with its extra cup. Nowhere do I find all the material of Matthew 5-7, though Luke 6:20-49 is listed as the Sermon on the *Mount,* with Luke 11:33-36 appended, obviously because its Matthean parallel occurs in the traditional Sermon on the Mount.

Occasionally changes seem to fall completely flat—Luke 6:42, "What right do you have to say to your brother, brother, let me take that speck of dust out of your eye, when you cannot see the *ray of light* in your own eye?" RSV's "log" literally carries over Jesus' superb hyperbole; why change the figure to "ray of light?" Or, if we must shift the figure, why not be clear, "the ray of light that *blinds* your own eye?"

The book would also be improved by the addition of an index of passages translated, according to their canonical order, to facilitate use.

JOHN REUMANN

Markusevangeliet. By Anton Fridrichsen. Stockholm: S.K.D.B., 1952. 71 pages. Kr. 7:50.

The content of this little book was originally intended as an introduction to a commentary on Mark. This was to be one volume in a series of commentaries on the New Testament which is now in process of publication in Sweden. Two volumes have already appeared: A. Nygren, *Romans,* translated into English and published by the Muhlenberg Press;

and Hugo Odeberg, *The Corinthian Letters*. Since Prof. Fridrichsen is unable to finish the work due to ill health, the introduction has been published separately.

The book is divided into two parts: the Synoptic Gospels and the Gospel of Mark. In regard to the Synoptic Problem the author accepts the "two-document hypothesis" as virtually certain, but regards the work of form criticism with considerable skepticism. In regard to the specific questions about Mark's gospel he accepts the authorship of Mark, the tradition of Papias, Rome as the place of origin, and the date between A. D. 67 and 70.

What makes this introduction distinctive is the general approach to the gospel. While he discusses all the introductory problems, his chief concern is with the gospel, the *kerygma* of the early church. The early church was not distressed by the differences and discrepancies between the four gospels. They were interested in the gospel which appears in the words and deeds of Jesus. The historical record of his life and deeds is the gospel which they proclaim. Prof. Fridrichsen thus incorporates the gospel of Mark into the context of the missionary proclamation of the church. The gospel of Mark follows the apostolic *kerygma*, as can be seen by a comparison with the sermons in Acts, especially Acts 10:36-43. In his very clear and comprehensive analysis of the content, Prof. Fridrichsen brings out the theological purpose and the significance of the gospel. The book is an admirable example of what an introduction to a commentary ought to be.

E. H. Wahlstrom

Isaiah Fifty-Three. A Devotional and Expository Study. By Edward J. Young. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1952. 91 pages. $1.50.

Here is a verse by verse exposition of one of the greatest of Old Testament passages which point to Christ. The study includes Isa. 52:13-15, which properly belongs to the section. Dr. Young has attempted to combine careful scholarship with a non-technical, easy-to-read style, aimed at holding the interest of the general reader, and for the most part has succeeded admirably. The book should prove to be both informing and edifying to pastor and layman alike.

Dr. Young's interpretation is conservative. He understands the section to be a prophecy of Christ, and shows that it makes a remarkable revelation of his substitutionary suffering, atonement, death, and resurrection. The passage, "he shall sprinkle many nations" (52:15), has, as is well known, been much debated, many taking the Hebrew verb to mean "startle," others regarding the text corrupt. The author makes a strong case for the traditional reading "sprinkle" which alludes to the purifying rites of the priests, and thus points to Christ's priestly work of purifying and redeeming the nations. He supports the textual purity of the sentence by means of the Dead Sea Scrolls, and shows that the translation of the Hebrew verb by "sprinkle" ties in with the emphasis of the section as a whole. A weak point in the book, exegetically, is found in the places where the author finds the Calvinistic teaching that Christ died for the elect only, and not for all (pp. 20 and 66).

The text of the book is unbroken by references, no doubt to appeal to the general reader, but a few notes are found at the end of the book. One could wish that these notes might have been more copious.

Ethan Mengers

A Handbook on the Papacy. By William Shaw Kerr. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. 321 pages. $4.75.

Responding to the appeals of recent popes requesting all Protestants, specifically the Anglicans, to restudy their reasons for remaining apart from the Roman

Catholic Church, the bishop of Down and Dromore investigates in this volume the one crucial doctrine of Romanism, the claim of the Roman pontiff to universal supremacy and infallibility. He chose this particular subject because all objections of Protestants to any other teachings and practices of Romanism must fall to the ground if the dogma of papal supremacy and infallibility is accepted. It constitutes, as the author neatly points out, a "shortening of the line of defence" after the defeat of any Roman doctrine on the lines of the Bible and of history.

Papal supremacy and papal infallibility were "defined" as articles of faith by Pope Pius IX with the approval of the Vatican Council in 1870, and a solemn anathema was pronounced upon all who reject the doctrine. The results of Bishop Kerr's investigation show conclusively that neither on Scriptural, nor historical, nor logical grounds can the doctrine of papal supremacy and infallibility be maintained.

The entire argument in favor of the Roman dogma rests upon the assumption that the bishop of Rome is the successor of Peter, the "Prince of the Apostles," and therefore the heir of all his prerogatives. Whether this be true or not, Bishop Kerr shows that the New Testament contains no evidence whatever that Peter occupied a position of supreme authority in the apostolic church—rather the contrary. Neither the Book of Acts nor the Epistles show the least trace of any such authority ever exercised by him, whether it be in regard to the doctrine, the organization, or the life of the church, and a comparison of the two outstanding leaders of the apostolic age, Peter and Paul, will result in every respect in favor of the latter.

As for the three great *sedes doctrinae* upon which Rome rests its claims, Bishop Kerr shows that these "seats of doctrine" are very shaky indeed. Even granting for the sake of argument that when Christ in Matt. 16:18 said, "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock will I build my church," he meant the person of Peter, there is nothing to indicate that the "Rock" was to have successors in that position. Bishop Kerr dryly observes, "A foundation stone cannot have successors" (p. 45). Moreover, even Catholic writers agree that among the great Fathers and Teachers of the ancient church there was a wide divergence in their interpretation of this passage. The Roman Catholic writer Launoy "found that there were seventeen Fathers in favor of the rock meaning Peter; forty-four for it meaning the faith Peter confessed; sixteen for it being Christ himself; and eight for it [meaning] all the apostles" (p. 47). Archbishop Kendrick, of St. Louis, one of the very considerable minority at the Vatican Council who argued against the decree, adopted this summary and declared that "no argument at all, or a very feeble one, can be drawn . . . from the words, 'on this rock will I build my church'" (p. 47).

In Luke 22:32 Christ says to Peter, "I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not: and when thou art converted, strengthen thy brethren." Bishop Kerr insists that to find in these words a guarantee of papal infallibility through the centuries is "fantastic," "preposterous," "an outrage to reason." He asks, "If the prayer did not secure Peter's faith from failure [he subsequently denied his Lord] how can it be imagined it secured his alleged successors for whom it was not offered" (p. 50)?

John 21:15-17 simply records Peter's reinstatement in the apostolate, nothing more. To read into the words of Christ "a solemn investiture of Peter and the Bishops of Rome with full and supreme power of jurisdiction over the church is to make Scripture mean whatever we desire" (p. 53).

The claims of the Vatican decree to papal supremacy in the church are based largely upon the assumption that the popes are successors of Peter, who is said to have been the first bishop of

Rome. Was Peter ever at Rome? Did he ever work there for any length of time? Was he actually bishop of that city? The author grants the possibility that Peter visited Rome but proves conclusively that he never carried on any extensive missionary labors there and that he certainly was not at any time bishop of the Roman church. There is absolutely no Scripture evidence for it (the "babylon" from which the First Epistle of Peter was written *was* Babylon, not a metaphorical name for "Rome," p. 68 f.). The authentic patristic writings offer no indisputable proof, not even the Epistle of Clement, despite all the efforts of Roman apologists who make so much of it. The monarchical episcopate developed in Rome during the second century. Peter did not institute it. But once it had become clearly established, the Roman bishops, heading what was probably the largest church in Christendom, seated in the capital of the Empire, and representing a line of unusually able and aggressive men, soon began to claim their primacy and sovereignty over other bishops. But it is highly significant, as Bishop Kerr shows in considerable detail, that the great Church Fathers of the late second, third, fourth, and fifth centuries recognized no such supreme authority of the Roman bishop. In proof of his contention he cites Irenaeus, Tertullian, Cyprian, Hippolytus, Athanasius, Basil, Augustine, and others. In fact, some of these contended earnestly against any attempts of the Roman bishops to encroach upon the rights and powers of other bishops in the church.

What is true of the Church Fathers is also true of the great church councils of the ancient church. Bishop Kerr shows conclusively that during the first five or six centuries it was the general councils, not the bishops of Rome, that were regarded as the final and supreme authority in the formulation of dogma as well as in the government of the church universal. It is only by distortion or downright falsification of the records that the claim to papal supremacy can be maintained. Take for example the Council of Nicea in 325. "Here in the first assemblage of the bishops of the whole church there is blank ignorance shown of the sovereignty of an infallible Head" (p. 120). The council was called by Emperor Constantine, not by the Bishop of Rome. His correspondence with the Patriarch of Alexandria and other bishops after the council (quoted p. 118) shows that he deemed not *one* bishop, not even the bishop of Rome, as the final authority but the collective mind of the bishops in council assembled. The bishop of Rome did not preside. The council enacted laws for the appointment of bishops, the enforcement of excommunication, and the jurisdiction of metropolitans, all without any reference to the "supremacy" of the bishop of Rome. And above all, it was the council, not the pope, that rendered a decision in the great Arian controversy and formulated the orthodox doctrine in the Nicene Creed. "How was it possible," asks Bishop Kerr, "that at such a crisis no one thought of appealing to the bishop of Rome as the infallible Teacher and the Vicar of Christ" (p. 118)?

But what about the Council of Chalcedon in 451? Did not Pope Leo I actually dominate that council? Was it not he who in his famous Tome developed the orthodox doctrine of the two natures in the person of Christ which has ever since been the basis of the Christian dogma on that all-important subject? Romanists make much of this; but Bishop Kerr shows conclusively that the Council of Chalcedon was so far from recognizing any infallibility of the bishop of Rome even when he spoke *ex cathedra* that it subjected Leo's Tome and his entire theology to a most careful, minute, and prolonged scrutiny, and only after it had thus consciously exercised its own right to pronounce final judgment in matters of faith did it approve it as in agreement with the decisions of the Councils of Nicea and Constantinople.

Lest this review become altogether too lengthy, we shall pass over some highly illuminating sections of the book showing the unscrupulous use made by papal apologists of spurious source material, such as the apocryphal literature of the second century, the Donation of Constantine, and the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals, as well as the distortions and misrepresentations of literary and historical evidence, of which, as Bishop Kerr clearly shows, even the highest authorities in the church, popes and councils, yes, even the Vatican Council of 1870, are guilty. On such foundations does the papal claim of supremacy and infallibility rest!

But in view of the Vatican Council's solemn assurance that the Holy Spirit was "promised to the successors of Peter" so that "by His assistance they might inviolably keep and faithfully expound the revelation or deposit of faith delivered through the Apostles" and that "this See of holy Peter remains ever free from all blemish of error" (cf. Schaff, *Creeds of Christendom,* vol. II, p. 269), we must take at least a brief glance at Bishop Kerr's exposure of some of the downright heretical popes in St. Peter's succession. Here was Pope Liberius (356-366), whose apostasy from the truths confessed in the Nicene Creed is proved by overwhelming evidence from the writings of Athanasius, Hilary of Poitiers, Jerome, Sozomen, and others. Here was Pope Zosimus (417-18), who in the great Pelagian controversy that raged in his day sided openly with Pelagius and Celestius, who denied some of the very fundamental doctrines of the Christian faith; and in order to leave no possibility of doubting his pronouncement, he expressly declared that he spoke *apostolicae sedis auctoritate!* Here was Pope Vigilius (537-55), a most contemptible character who obtained his high position by pledging himself to support the Monophysite schemes of the Empress (p. 186) and in the controversy of the Three Chapters switched sides four times, anathematizing the very dogmas he had previously "defined" as pope and thus reduced the Roman claims of papal infallibility to absurdity. Here was Pope Honorius (625-638), who during the Monophysite schism was condemned for heresy several times by later popes and councils. For over three hundred years more than fifty popes on taking office were required to pronounce a solemn anathema on certain heretics, "together with Honorius, who added fuel to their wicked assertions" (pp. 198-200). Where was the divine guarantee of orthodoxy now?

One does not cease to wonder, in the light of such indisputable facts as these, how the Vatican Council could have the effrontery to make its preposterous claims. And the amazement increases as one contemplates with Bishop Kerr the personal lives of some of the "vicars of Christ on earth." The chapter on "Papal Personalities" reads like a report of the Kefauver Committee. Assassination, bribery, torture, harlotry and debauchery, utter contempt for holy things, murder by their own hands, perjury—what crimes did they not become guilty of, these "Holy Fathers," "Vicegerents of God upon earth!" The facts of history are so patent that even Roman Catholic historians cannot deny them. But the oft-repeated argument of Roman apologists that "the unworthiness of priests does not invalidate the truth of religion," that "gold remains gold in impure as in pure hands," etc., is no excuse for the moral turpitude of the vicars of Christ. After all, "the theory is that these pontiffs are given to the world to take Christ's place on earth and that they have a special divine assistance to rule, feed, and govern the church. . . . The lives of many popes can only be reconciled with Roman Catholic dogma if it be granted that morality is not vital to religion" (p. 321).

As one who has been engaged in the study and teaching of church history for more than thirty years, we read this book with keenest interest. Nowhere else have

we found within the covers of one volume a more formidable array of facts pertaining to the subject, a more penetrating analysis of these facts, and more convincing conclusions drawn from them, than in this book. The author's familiarity with the primary and secondary source material is apparent on every page; his presentation is clear, objective, unemotional, easily followed even by the non-theological reader. The entire subject matter is presented in fifty-six chapters rarely more than four or five pages in length. Thus a glance at the table of contents makes it possible for the reader to find quickly what he wants on any particular topic. There is also a very helpful index and an extensive bibliography. The table of Scripture references shows no reference to II Thess. 2:3-12, but this Lutheran reader of a book by an Anglican bishop is now convinced more than ever that St. Paul's prophecy in that passage is applicable to the papacy.

P. H. BUEHRING

A Protestant Manifesto. By Winfred E. Garrison. Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1952. 207 pages. $2.75.

Readers of *The Christian Century* are familiar with the book reviews by W. E. G. Likely they know also that the books he has written form an imposing list. This volume will be acknowledged as a worthy addition to the list.

For these days of "ecumenic" interest this book was written to state what Protestants have in common, and in what they differ from Roman Catholics. This is what is intended by the word "Manifesto" in the title. The book is a "statement of the common loyalties, convictions, and attitudes of Protestants." The word "American" should appear in the title, for the European scene is not included.

As a sort of popular "irenics" this book quotes discriminatingly from the various confessional writings of the churches to show how much they have in common. Moreover, doctrines are briefly explained according to their historical development—as befits an author with a long career as a professor of church history. All this is distinctly helpful to those unfamiliar with comparative symbolics or the history of doctrine.

Dr. Garrison, with his usual vigor, insists that the Protestant position is a positive one—more truly an affirmation than a protest. Those who consider Protestantism to be little more than a rejection of Romanism will herein be instructed concerning justification by faith, "the sufficiency of the Bible," and the priesthood of all believers. Salvation as God's free gift is clearly and strongly presented in sharp distinction to the Roman system of merits.

Moreover, in Chapter VIII, "Alien to the Protestant Spirit," and Chapter IX, "Protestantism Denies," the author enumerates the things in Romanism objectionable to Protestants, and indicates why they are obnoxious. Remembering his earlier volume, *Catholicism and the American Mind,* one is prepared to find him calling Roman policies toward Protestants "arrogant," Roman veneration of relics "odious and absurd," and Roman sacramentals apparently a "gross superstition."

The author's task was beset by two difficulties which are well-nigh insuperable. The first is that in his definition Protestantism includes all the churches and sects outside of Romanism and Eastern Orthodoxy. Thus when Quakers and (presumably) Unitarians are included, the statement of the "Protestant" position becomes a colorless generalization. This ignores the fact that the differences have become more significant than the agreements. The second difficulty is that in the brief compass of this volume only broad generalizations are possible. The qualifications of each generalization, necessary for a truly accurate picture, must be omitted.

Remembering Dr. Garrison's membership in the Disciples of Christ—a body that historically has been unionistic,

anti-creedal, and independent—one may be pardoned for anticipating evidences of these characteristics in this book. For example, it points out that some Protestants, knowing that the Nicene Creed was produced "by a turbulent council," cannot accept it "as perfect and final." Surely the author should know that we who accept the Nicene Creed recognize its limitations, but still prefer it to Arianism.

Furthermore, the author interprets the Protestant spirit as one of freedom. In a number of places he declares that Protestantism is characterized by religous liberty. And the inference lies near the surface that this means the separation of church and state. In the ecumenical movement he is interested in "unity on terms consistent with liberty" rather than with doctrine.

The theme of the book would have been greatly strengthened if alongside of *sola scriptura* and *sola fide* there had been a really vigorous affirmation of *solus Christus*. The central place of Christ needs to be much more emphatically confessed than is done in this "Manifesto."

A. D. ALLBECK

The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr. By Edward J. Carnell. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdman, 1952. 250 pages. $3.50.

The author of this volume, holding a Th.D. degree from Harvard Divinity School and a Ph.D. from Boston University, is at present professor of Apologetics at Fuller Theological Seminary, Pasadena, California, having previously served as professor of Philosophy at Gordon College of Theology, Boston, and at Gordon Divinity School, Brookline, Mass. By his previous training and by reason of the fact that he has taught subjects dealing with both philosophy and theology, the author should be well qualified for his present task of giving an appraisal of present-day tendencies in American theology, with special emphasis on how a certain type of theology has become epitomized in and through the writings of Reinhold Niebuhr.

In his preface the author states that he cannot, within the compass of one volume, deal with all aspects of Niebuhr's theology and that he therefore has restricted himself to the delineation of one controlling aspect—the dialectical relation between time and eternity—hoping that if his readers understand this they will be in position to evaluate Niebuhr's presentation of other subjects. The scope of the book, however, seems to be a great deal wider than could be assumed from this statement and covers a variety of theological concepts, which, in our opinion, does not detract from the value of the presentation. The theological presuppositions of Dr. Carnell stem from what he terms "classical Reformation theology" and it is not surprising therefore that he often finds himself at variance with the conclusions of Niebuhr, concerning whom he says that he "tends to draw implications from his initial observations which are far from compelling." In his evaluation of Niebuhr the author quotes a statement by John Bennett to the effect that Niebuhr "is the soul of Europe hovering over American thought." He further describes Niebuhr in the following manner: "American in his training and loyalties, and yet German by nature and Continental in his sympathies, Niebuhr has achieved a remarkable synthesis of Continental pessimism and American liberal optimism. With the publication of his Gifford Lectures, *The Nature and Destiny of Man,* Niebuhr has emerged as the undisputed leader of American dialectical theology" (p. 38).

In Part One, entitled "Background for the Dialectical Theology," the author presents a fine resumé of the factors that lead to the emergence of dialectic theology. In Part Two he sets forth the construction of dialectic theology, and in Part Three he deals with the Christian dialectic under the following three aspects: (1) Thesis: The wisdom of the

Cross, (2) Antithesis: The foolishness of the Cross, (3) Synthesis: The power of the Cross. Part Four contains Concluding Implications.

This is not a book that lends itself very readily to the usual approach on the part of a reviewer, and it would be impossible to set forth its main content in a few paragraphs. In fact, if one were to do so, the result would be almost as large as the book itself. It is a volume that should be read, and read carefully. Here is a fair evaluation, from what might be called an orthodox evangelical point of view, of a man who has set his stamp on much of our present-day theological thinking in America. Carnell has rendered us all a great service in setting forth the concepts of Niebuhr in a lucid and understandable manner, for of the latter it could also be said that in his writings "there are some things hard to understand" (II Pet. 2:16). Many of the shortcomings of the dialectical theology are pointed out, and the author finds the most glaring lacuna in Niebuhr's theology in connection with his treatment of the concept of sin and in his rejection of the idea of original sin. Not every reader will agree with Dr. Carnell's conclusions, and that can be neither expected nor desired. For that reason we state again that here is a book that must be read carefully. Such a reading will, however, be rewarding by reason of the added insights it gives into a theology that is very much "abroad in the land."

C. G. CARLFELT

The Cosmic Christ. By Allan D. Galloway. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951. 274 pages. $4.00.

This book meets a genuine need. As its subtitle indicates, it is "a development and exposition of the doctrine of cosmic redemption in biblical theology." To my knowledge, no work dealing specifically and thoroughly with this theme has heretofore appeared in English. Pioneer studies in this field have been made by German Lutheran theologians, such as Karl Heim with his *Jesus der Weltvollender* and Paul Althaus with his insistence on the *cosmocentric* significance of Christ. And Aulén has presented *Christus Victor* as the central figure of a cosmic drama. For the most part, however, our Christology has concentrated on what Christ means to individual human hearts, without much concern for the cosmic aspect of redemption. The broader perspective has been introduced recently into American theology by Paul Tillich, who condemns the splitting of reality into subjective and objective spheres and holds that salvation occurs in the area of "correlation" between the self and the world. Galloway's research was done under the supervision of Tillich and shows the influence of his thinking.

In the manner of the Lundensian motive research, Dr. Galloway traces the development of the idea of cosmic redemption through the ages. He is thus led to roam over the whole field of the history of theology and of philosophy. One could wish that the biblical origin and meaning of the idea itself had received a fuller exposition. But the concise, if over-abbreviated, account is discriminating and convincing. The thesis is that Judaism as a redemptive religion rejected any dualistic solution to the problem of evil and was thus forced to extend the reference of the redemptive implications of the covenant to cover the whole of creation. This idea finds expression in the cosmic symbolism of apocalyptic. The myth of the fallen angels, for example, points to a distortion in the very structure of existence and describes the fallen nature of the whole cosmos. The Synoptic Gospels present the overcoming of these demonic forces as the central activity of our Lord's ministry. In Paul and John we have the final conceptual formulation of the biblical doctrine. Paul, making use both of the symbolism of the Jewish apocalyptic and of the pagan expectation of a new world-age, despairs of the present demon-dis-

torted natural world and yet holds an unqualified hope for history as a whole through the redeeming Christ. The Logos doctrine of John is primarily an assertion of the cosmic significance of the work of Christ.

Turning to the Patristic period, Galloway agrees with Aulén that the cosmic drama of Christ triumphing over the evil powers of this world is the "classical" view of the Atonement, but believes that Aulén is wrong in treating it as a specific doctrine rather than as the basic conception in many widely different theories. The Gnostics misinterpreted the idea by so allegorizing it as to give it a purely spiritual reference and by introducing an out-and-out cosmic dualism. Origen asserts the regeneration of the whole physical cosmos but came close to the Gnostic dualism which he was combating. The conservative Fathers of the West reasserted the biblical symbolism but failed to give it the necesary re-interpretation. And when Augustine identified the earthly kingdom of Christ with the present reign of the Church, the idea of cosmic redemption faded into the background. The world-view of the Middle Ages was too determined by the dualism of nature and grace to pay it more than lip-service. And the Protestant Reformation, with its rediscovery of justification by faith, became pre-occupied with problems of inner personal experience.

In modern philosophical thinking, Kant drew such a sharp distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal, the natural and the moral, that any statement about the empirical environment became void of religious significance. Hegel's attempt to solve the Kantian dualism is profound nonsense, but he analyzes the "unhappy consciousness" of modern man, redirects attention to the cosmic work of Christ, and paves the way for an existential solution.

In his constructive formulation, Dr. Galloway restates the underlying problem in terms of the tension between the personal and the impersonal aspects of the universe, restores the reality of the demonic in terms of a mechanistic universe indifferent to the destiny of living spirit, and presents the cosmic Christ as the One who alone can overcome the "It" and give ultimate meaning to the whole of life.

In a book dealing with such a comprehensive theme and covering such a wide historical range, some arbitrariness in the selection of material and some superficiality in treatment are inevitable. The Reformation, for example, receives only cursory notice. In the systematic section, the identification of the demonic with the impersonal, a view that is questionable on the ground of Scripture, is inadequately supported. For all that, this is a provocative, well documented, and rewarding book. The author has a remarkable ability to disentangle permanently valid meanings from archaic forms of expression and to show their applicability to current dilemmas. It would be worth reading if only to recapture the Church's original awareness of the reality of the demonic. But it serves also the constructive purpose of glorifying the "fulness of Him that filleth all in all."

T. A. KANTONEN

Christian Knowledge of God. By J. Harry Cotton. New York: Macmillan, 1951. 180 pages. $2.75.

As one reads the pages of this little book, one cannot help sensing that the author is among those who are striving to love the Lord "with all their mind." Within the covers of his book the author, former president of McCormick Theological Seminary and now professor of philosophy at Wabash College, makes a sincere and earnest endeavor to come to grips with what he calls the dilemma of faith.

The source of faith's dilemma, he maintains, lies in the fact of the dual nature of man. As a thinking person, man reaches out for the universal; but as a finite creature, he is subject to all the

limitations of finitude. Knowledge consequently may be said to have an external and an internal aspect. The external aspect of knowledge is the objective or universal; the internal, the personal or relative. Any proposal which seeks to solve the dilemma by dealing with either aspect to the exclusion of the other is doomed to failure.

Dr. Cotton rejects the traditional arguments for the existence of God, all modern attempts at reducing the study of religion to the categories of empirical science, and the proposed solutions of both Aquinas and Barth on the ground that they seek to eliminate the dilemma by a consideration of only one of its horns.

Having presented the problem and rejected some of the historic answers, Cotton proceeds to delineate his own answer. He builds his own position on the cornerstone of the basic difference between the abstract knowledge of science and the concrete knowledge of personal relationships. It is his contention that the knowledge of God belongs to the latter and not to the former. God can only be known as he reveals himself, and this knowledge is open to faith alone. In this personal confrontation of man by God, the external and internal aspects of knowledge come to their fulfillment and the dilemma is resolved.

Those whose thinking is occupied with the epistemological problem will find in this little volume evidence of wide reading, of a real effort to come to grips with the problem, and, in an age that belittles reason, of a genuine desire to give thought its rightful place in theology.

GEORGE AUS

Hilfsbuch zum Studium der Dogmatik. By Emanuel Hirsch. Berlin & Leipzig: Walter de Gruyter, 1951. 446 pages. DM 14.

The author of this volume was professor in the University of Göttingen. He was a student of Karl Holl and for a time he held a prominent position in the new theology which evolved after World War I. Later he associated himself with the moderate wing of the German Christian movement. Since the conclusion of the last war he lives in retirement in Göttingen.

The present volume is a reprint of an earlier book first published in 1937. It is a source book of dogmatics. Beginning with an extract of Luther's Great Confession of 1528, it includes other selected passages from Luther, Melanchthon, Calvin, Lutheran and Calvinistic Orthodoxists, and a few Neo-Calvinistic theologians. All documents are printed in modern German.

It goes without saying that such a volume is of foremost importance for a thorough study of dogmatics. A similar volume in English, including also some significant passages from British and American theologians, would fill a real gap in our own theological literature because dogmatics still is, and always will be, the queen of theological studies.

OTTO W. HEICK

The Reawakening of Christian Faith. By Bernard Eugene Meland. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949. 125 pages. $2.00.

In a critical mood with reference to Neo-orthodoxy, Meland warns us lest we "soothe our perplexed minds into thinking that because we have once again accustomed ourselves to the familiar words of the faith we have recovered the faith. Language and reality are not always the same thing" (53). The disparity between language and reality involved in his own "approach to the historic faith" (63) does not however deter him from the attempt to transpose the symbols of the Christian faith into the key of a religious naturalism which he hopes will "disclose what is seminal in the Christian faith, and enable it to become living and compelling in our own time and culture" (63). "What I am trying to

say is that the myth, in any culture, is significant with meaning and living force far beyond the definitive meaning which can be distilled from it" (69).

HJALMAR W. JOHNSON

Om Människovärdet. By Henning Lindström. Stockholm: S.K.D. Bokförlag, 1951. 210 pages. Kr. 10:00.

In his Introduction the author states that this volume is to be considered not only as a presentation of the results of his academic research on the subject treated but also, and perhaps more so, as a personal attempt to arrive at clarity regarding one of the most pressing problems of the day. What he endeavors to do, then, is to present, to himself and to others, what according to his understanding biblical Christianity really has to say with reference to the value and worth of man.

As a background to the study itself there is a resumé of the development of the doctrine of anthropology since the time of the Reformation. Here the author arrives at the following conclusions: (1) That the genuinely Christian idea of creation has been totally lost. (2) That an attempt has been made to localize religion to the inner life of man, especially to his emotion and will. In either case God is not thought of as interested in or part of the everyday life of man. In this connection Lindström offers a just criticism of both liberalism and dialetical theology. He points out that, with respect to the concept of creation, neither of these dare, without qualifications, to think of God as *in* his creation, with the result that there is a cleavage between the spiritual and the human. It should not be so, for "God is in his creation, and his word is spoken through his works. The Word *is* and speaks in the situation where man is. Neither the Word, nor man, nor the means or instrumentalities of God need to be moved up into a higher, spiritual sphere in order to become filled with the Spirit" (p. 36).

The plan and the argument of the book is developed in the following manner. Man has worth and value only because he is created by God, but his value is realized only in relationship to God. Creation itself is an expression of the love of God, and it is this love which bestows a value on man. Man exists and has a value only in and through that relationship which God has created and which he constantly creates through the Son and the Spirit. In Christ we see the embodiment of the work of God. In him the creative Word and the redeeming Word are united, but the human and the divine are also united in him. In him, therefore, man has a value, and this in spite of the fact that man's relationship to God is never complete. Man is "simul justus et peccator" and consequently, besides his relationship to God, man also has a relationship to that which is evil.

It is therefore in creation and incarnation that we find the key to the problem of the value and worth of man. These acts show that God is not far removed but that in Christ he has entered our world. In the incarnation the creative Word has assumed humanity, and herein is seen what man is intended to become and how God can use all that man is and has—body, intellect, talents, and individuality—in his service. This points to the fact that man cannot be divided into a "higher" and a "lower" part or element. Man as a totality is a creation of God. He is saved as a totality and should, in the sum total of his being, live in fellowship with God and serve him. This service cannot be thought of as "in a vacuum" but must be rendered in the world in which man lives, and to his fellowmen, and is of a vicarious nature. In discussing this matter it seems that the author is in danger of departing from his former affirmation regarding the value of man as found exclusively in his relation to God. He now states (p. 184) that "it is in the relationship of service and of the giving of oneself that value is created." It should be added, however,

that the author also points out that the service that man renders is not based on his own powers; it is God who works in and through him. Man has a worth by reason of being created by God, but his real worth and value is attained only when he willingly places himself in the service of God, when unselfishly he becomes a "nothing" in the hands of the Creator.

Theology, and Systematic Theology in particular, has often been accused of being "isolationist" in character in that it has tended to sever itself from the main stream of life and of culture. This cannot be said of the author of the volume under review. He deals with one of the most important questions of the day, that of the value of man and of the relationship of God to his creation. The conclusions Lindstrom arrives at have many practical implications especially for the situation in Sweden and as a part in the current debate in that country relative to the relationship between life and religion. Even though there are some expressions which would need further clarification, as, for instance, the statement that "the relationship is God himself, through this, namely, that he creates out of nothing" (p. 54), or that "Christ is a common human being, because he is the human nothingness in the hand of God which is totally penetrated by the divine" (191), the author has given us a volume which is not only readable but which is also significant in calling attention to the actual and contemporary relationship between religion and all of life.

C. G. CARLFELT

Aspects of Liberalism. By L. Berkhof. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1951. 163 pages. $2.50.

Six lectures, delivered on various occasions but stressing particular aspects of one central subject, are brought together in this volume. The titles used are: The Social Gospel, Calvinism versus Modernism, Steadfastness Amid Confusion in the Religious World, The Value of a Calvinistic Education in a Disillusioned World, The Missing Chain in modern Liberal Theology, and Liberalism Adrift. Naturally in such a work the style will be that of a speaker, and some repetition will occur.

The author is the president-emeritus of Calvin Theological Seminary and a pronounced Calvinist. He presents much of the Calvinistic theology over against the teachings of Liberalism. Arminianism is charged with encouraging liberalism and the consequent confusion in the religious world. Luther is merely mentioned, but no reference is made to other groups in Protestantism, nor to Romanism, in their attitudes toward Liberalism.

Liberalism, or Modernism, is discussed extensively on the basis of the leaders and publications connected with the movement. From the titles of the lectures, as well as in their development, it is indicated that the teachings of Modernism have varied from time to time. Recent happenings in the world have brought many changes and, at least in emphases, in the whole field of religion, but most extensively in the positions of Modernists.

It is claimed for Modernism that it is "essentially an attitude, a method applied in searching for truth" (p. 44). It "owes its origin largely to the influence of Schleiermacher and Ritschl" (p. 46). Being a reaction against external authority either in an infallible church or Bible, or in ecclesiastical confessions, the aim is to maintain an open mind and to interpret religion primarily through reason. Hence the Bible is treated as a mere human production, the source of theology is thought to be in human reason and experience, the immanence and the love of God are emphasized to the subordination of his transcendence and justice, sin as a heritage or power for evil is minimized, man is held to be inherently capable of becoming good, and atonement is merely a moral process. The effect of two world wars has produced a changed conception of God and of man, and of the relation of God to man and the world, and in com-

pelling a more favorable attitude toward the tenets of the older theology. Of course, the author presents the teachings of Calvinism as an antidote and corrective of those of Modernism. However, it is admitted that the whole development has been helpful in alerting and stimulating the whole church to review and witness again to the Gospel.

M. L. Stirewalt

Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte. Edited by Gerhard Ritter, Harold J. Grimm, Roland H. Bainton, Heinrich Bornkamm. Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann Verlag, 1951. Heft 1/2. 288 pages. $5.00 a year.

This is the first postwar volume of the *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte,* a German periodical founded in 1903. Under its first editor, the late Walter Friedensburg, the periodical, on the whole, published unprinted source material of the German Reformation. When upon the death of Friedensburg in 1938 Gerhard Ritter was made editor, the scope of the periodical was enlarged. The history especially of Western and Northern Europe was to be taken into consideration. Dr. Ritter, however, was arrested by the Gestapo in 1944, and publication of the journal ceased. Through the efforts of Professors Schwiebert, Grimm, and Bainton the American Society for Reformation Research became interested in the venture. The present volume is the first one by the combined efforts of the new board of editors.

The volume contains eleven articles dealing with special phases of the theologies of such men as Luther, Calvin, Melanchthon, the English Puritans, etc. Nine of these articles are written in German, two in English. In addition, the volume includes a review of current books and periodicals, and also notes on the present state of Bucer research.

Undoubtedly, in its present form the *Archiv* will be a valuable asset to the study of church history. No scholar or theological library can afford to miss it.

The price of the present volume is DM 22. However, according to a note of the publisher, due to the rising cost of production, the price will be increased in the future.

Otto W. Heick

Fenelon's Dialogues on Eloquence. A Translation with an Introduction and Notes by Wilbur Samuel Howell. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951. 160 pages. $3.00.

This is a delightful book. Moreover, it is a helpful one. As a matter of fact, it is the most provocative book on preaching I have ever read. Written in the year 1679, it is timely and timeless.

Although the editor and translator specifically states that the book is more than a treatise on preaching, which is undoubtedly correct, yet it is at least that, and a superb one. Consisting of three dialogues, reminiscent of Plato, and each with the same three protagonists, A, B, and C, sermonizing as the art of communication is delightfully and profoundly discussed and dissected. With great humility and much profit I closed the book.

Some examples will illustrate: "Why should you speak if not to persuade, to instruct, and to proceed in such fashion that the listener remembers what you say?" Or this: "Even when he says everything that he ought to say, would they believe what he says when he himself does not appear to believe it?" Are there rhetoricians among us? "Plato shows that the great defect of the rhetoricians is that they strive for the art of persuasion before they understand . . . what are the things which they ought to seek to convince men of."

Or again, I was uncomfortable here: "It even seems that they are not speaking because they are overflowing with truths, but that they are seeking for truths because they are overflowing with a desire to speak." But not as uncomfortable as here: "If they make a living impression upon you, if they render your

mind attentive and sensitive to the things they say, if they warm you and raise you above yourself, then you may believe without fear that they have reached the goal of eloquence. If instead of moving you or inspiring strong feelings in you, they only act to please you and to make you admire the brilliance and the nicety of their thoughts and expressions, tell yourself that they are false speakers."

Do you memorize? "Then, sir, consider the advantages of the one who does not. . . . He is self-possessed, he speaks naturally, he does not talk in the manner of the declaimer. Things flow from their source. His utterances . . . are lively and full of movement." And with how many points do you come? Three? "Ordinarily they put there the kind of order that is more apparent than real. Moreover, they dry up the discourse and make it rigid." "When you divide, it is necessary to divide simply, naturally. One must have a division that is found ready-made in the very subject itself; a division that clarifies, . . . that is easily remembered, . . . a division, in short, that reveals the size of the subject and of its parts."

"Good evening, gentlemen. I leave you with these words of Saint Jerome to Nepotian. 'When you teach in the church, do not stir up applause; stir up lamentations in the people. Let the tears of your listeners be your praise. The discourses of a preacher must be full of the sacred Scripture. Don't be a declaimer, but a true teacher of the mysteries of your God."

Pages 1 to 53 are introduction. Pages 57 to the end are the three dialogues. And all 160 pages are well worth three dollars.

JOHN H. SARDESON

The Secret of Pulpit Power through Thematic Christian Preaching. By Simon Blocker. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1951. 209 pages. $3.00.

It is difficult to determine the frontier between conviction and obsession. But here is a book which belongs to the border country!

To Simon Blocker there is only one true sermonic form: the thematic. Every sermon, whether expository, textual, topical, doctrinal, or narrative in type, must be thematic. Having chosen a scriptural passage, topic, or doctrine to treat, a preacher's first obligation, he insists, is to select and to phrase the perfect "theme." This must be a brief sentence which at once expresses God's full message in the text or subject, encompasses the main divisions to be developed, and commends itself to the hearer as worthy of retention. The hours spent in experimentation with dozens of themes, and the sentences framed before the "perfect" gem has been discovered and polished, are never wasted, Dr. Blocker assures his reader, for these hours develop the preacher's mind and soul, and his experimental sentences may, at length, be worked into the body of the sermon.

The author insists on the rigid observance of further mechanical requirements in the construction of a thematic sermon. The perfected theme-sentence, for instance, must always be announced at the conclusion of a brief introduction. And it must be followed by a rehearsal of the main divisions, each of which should be stated both rhetorically and logically.

Six "demonstration sermons" are appended to the book. One of these, entitled "Christianity and World Crisis," is outstanding. The others, like the author's basic argument, seem overly concerned with mechanical and structural considerations.

HENRY B. LUFFBERRY

Sleeping Preachers. A Study in Ecstatic Religiosity. By Aarni Voipio. Helsinki: Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae, 1951. Paper, 86 pages. 2.50 mk.

A summary in English of several extensive studies previously published in Finnish is here offered by a theologian and psychologist. The phenomenon he dis-

cusses is the appearance in northern Europe of lay people, mostly women, who preach in conventicles while in a trance. Such somnambulist preaching occurred earlier among Anabaptists, Camisards, and primitive Pietists, but during the last hundred years the most notable examples have been found in Finland, where they are products of circumstances of social stress as well as of revival movements. After presenting biographical sketches of six typical modern "sleeping preachers," some of whom he examined personally, Dr. Voipio attempts to explain the curious phenomenon in terms of hypnotism, auto-suggestion, hysteria, compensation, and imitation. The external behavior of these preachers is not unlike that of American spiritualist mediums, but the burden of their messages is quite different. There may be parallels to the glossolalia and trances recorded in the New Testament.

Some imperfections in the English style of this study will be overlooked by those who are interested in securing information on a subject which is otherwise accessible only to readers of Finnish.

THEODORE G. TAPPERT

The Church in Community Action. By Harvey Seifert. Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1952. 234 pages. $2.75.

This is a "how-to" book. As such, it takes for granted for the most part both the theological sources of the church's obligation to the community and the validation of the goals which its author hopes the church will realize.

The above is not written to criticize but simply to define the scope of the book. Within its limitations the book is good, perhaps as good as anything the conscientious pastor or socially concerned congregation can obtain at present.

Seifert's essential aim is to make the church functional, i.e., an organization which gets things done in its community. He supplies techniques for discovering needs, for giving effective leadership, for meeting opposition creatively, for organizing for action, for educating for action, and for actually taking action both in economic life and in the political arena. He concludes with an emphasis on cooperation in the community.

So far as the "technological prescription" which Seifert offers is concerned, very little can be said in criticism. The techniques discussed are generally simple and within the range of competence of most churches. Congregations and pastors who have thus far done little or nothing may well find this book an excellent primer to get under way.

Lesson No. 1 in such a primer is, in my opinion, an organizational one. If social action is a function of the church (p. 99), then that function deserves organizational recognition. Every local church should have its committee on social action to serve as the source and center of impetus for whatever program the church undertakes. Equally important as a basis for success is the recognition that the kind of action possible depends not only on the needs discovered but also on adequate resources and favorable attitudes (p. 41); it is as necessary to develop resources and to change attitudes as it is to discover needs.

It is in the area of resources for action that the book is weak, for it looks primarily to community resources and to non-religious techniques; it does not explore the resources available in religious (as distinct from moral) convictions and experience. Seifert takes motivation largely for granted (except in how to deal with opposition). Yet motivation is an important ingredient in action. The pastor may very well ask, "But how do I get people *to want* to do something about race prejudice?"

A good part of the frame of reference of the book is implicit rather than explicit. The duty of community action, for example, evidently rests on certain statements about bringing in the Kingdom of God, but more emphasis is placed on getting action than on validating or even

making clear the ends of action. Even more important, Seifert makes a question-begging distinction between the functional church and the institutionalized church, in which the latter apparently has all the characteristics which Seifert disapproves, without ever making his value premises explicit. Furthermore, in his slur on localism (p. 31) he overlooks the fact that the urban church is often weak because it has no "local community"; a scattered parish is not likely to concern itself much for the neglected children who play on the church steps on Saturday night. In fact, at no point does the author explore the meaning of community adequately.

Basically, we need to know more about the social structure of churches in their local and denominational peculiarities before we can help the church build better in its various communities, local, metropolitan, national, and international. Seifert's book offers a *modus operandi* for an interim program of action until we know better and can do better.

KARL H. HERTZ

Open Prayer. By Jesse Halsey. Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1951. $7.50.

Not a book, this is a file box with twelve durable index cards (7x10) behind which 593 prayers and similar worship helps are provided on book-size sheets of paper. There is also a black folder to hold the sheets, along with sermon outlines when the pastor takes them into chancel and pulpit.

Persons who are completely wedded to standard liturgical forms will not be interested. Those who wish to enrich their services, particularly the occasional and more informal ones, and to provide the precious element of variety, will find an abundance of ready helps.

Along with the usual "Pastoral Prayers" and "Collects" there are such headings as "Calls to Worship," "Offertory Prayers," "Prayers Before and After the Sermon." The several indexes include one which cites biblical sources and discloses a notable scriptural emphasis.

A manual on use of the kit suggests adding to the file by clipping materials from other sources and adding sheets on which one's own prayers have been written. It also points out that the printed sheets have wide margins so that the pastor can amend the published materials.

Doubtless that provision should be stressed. The people of the congregations like to feel that their pastor, himself, is leading worship for them, personally; thus his own phraseology is important. Perhaps the highest value of such an instrument, then, is to serve as a crutch to support the leader of worship when he is not quite up to standing on his own feet exclusively.

Doubtless there will be no little scoffing in certain quarters about *Open Prayer.* Yet, if it were used rightly, it could well enrich the worship life of many a pastor and people. One can imagine, too, that some congregations will wish to provide this equipment for church school superintendents or youth and other lay leaders of worship. It seems to have considerable advantages over the usual books.

RALPH D. HEIM

Christopher Recordings on Sex Instruction. New York: The Christophers, 18 East 48th Street, 1951. $4.00.

Prepared for use by parents' organizations, this record presents, on its two sides, four recordings, each about ten minutes in length: "How Babies are Born," for little children; "Menstruation," for girls 10 to 12; "Problems of Growing Boys," for boys 11 to 13; and "The Marriage Union," for teen-agers. The recordings are dramatizations in which parents discuss the indicated problems with their children in a natural home setting and with humor as well as earnestness. Religious overtones, centering on God as creator of life and life processes, are introduced with skill and in such a way as to be acceptable to Protestants as well as

Roman Catholics, although some might be inclined to take issue with the (peripheral) treatment of the soul. The record is not intended to be played by or to children. It is intended for parents, to help them discuss sex with their children and to provide a basis for discussion in parents' groups. It is recommended for appropriate church organizations and PTAs.

The Christophers, producers of the records, represent a movement organized by Maryknoll Missionary James Keller to help people to express their Christian faith in everyday life.

The recordings are also available in an album of four records for 78 rpm phonographs at $6.00.

The New Life. By H. J. Boettcher. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1950. 141 pages.

This workbook (a companion to an earlier one, *Learning and Living*) has been put to an experimental test in eight schools where the senior classes were divided into two comparable groups, one using only the regular Catechism and the other using the Catechism and the Workbook. It is stated that a valid and reliable test showed that in each case the pupils who had the workbook gained more in knowledge, memory work, attitudes, and desirable conduct.

Material for thirty-four units (lessons) is found in the Workbook, presented in the form of exercises to provide supplementary learning activities in addition to regular classroom instruction and discussion. Each unit is intended to provide homework for one week. Commendable features are: provision for scoring by a parent or instructor; a large variety of Workbook devices and forms; a place for remarks and marks by the instructor; provision for a scrapbook section in connection with each unit.

Furthermore, parental interest and participation are enlisted in numerous and commendable ways throughout the assignments. The Bible, Catechism, and Hymnal are the basic resource materials to be used with the Workbook. The assignments direct the pupil to the use of these materials in a manner which leads to essential understandings, attitudes, and skills.

Some questions might be raised concerning an extreme degree of emphasis on memorization materials. Also, one would think that following the suggestions on including pictures, clippings, and other scrapbook materials could only lead to producing a bulky and unwieldy Workbook.

CELO V. LEITZEL

Christianity and the Class Struggle. By Abraham Kuyper. Grand Rapids: Piet Hein Publishers, 1950. 64 pages. $1.00.

The prominent Dutch theologian of the pre-World War I generation, Abraham Kuyper, who founded the Free Reformed Church of the Netherlands and became a leading statesman in his own country, also took an active part in social reform. He was a representative of the Christian Socialist movement which found a response in various countries of Europe and among whose other leaders were men like Maurice, Ragaz, and Naumann. His manifesto of 1890, here translated for the first time, was a challenge to the Christians of his day and it still has meaning for the Christians of our day. In addition, the translator, Dirk Jellema, has made an important historical document accessible to a larger audience.

The Christian and Literature. A Symposium. Edited by B. Pekelder and D. Jellema. Grand Rapids: Piet Hein Publishers, 1951. Paper, 47 pages. 75 cents.

Reproduced by varitype-offset method, this study deals especially with fiction and with the possible justification of realism in this form of literature. The six contributors are more or less aware that there is something wrong with so-called "re-

ligious novels." It is not enough to write a morally unobjectionable story; the story must interpret life in terms of Christian faith rather than of optimistic idealism. One of the contributors holds that a Christian writer should not permit a fictional character to curse. Others seem not to regard this as important and allow room for a realistic description of the darker side of life, provided that sin is interpreted as sin.

Religion and the New Psychology. By Alson J. Smith. New York: Doubleday, 1951. 192 pages. $2.50.

This is a brief and easily read analysis of the experiments in extra-sensory perception (called parapsychology) carried on during the last two decades by Dr. J. B. Rhine and his colleagues at Duke University. The book also takes into account the cautiously documented trials of "spiritualism" by several reputable scientists and theologians, both here and abroad, during the last seventy years. These ventures outside space and time are brought together in this book in order to study their meaning for religion.

The author, a Methodist clergyman in a parish near Stamford, Conn., is a writer of ability and certainly no amateur in the field of parapsychology. He believes these experiments, at Duke and elsewhere, have far-reaching implications in the field of religion. His enthusiasm is contagious.

Perhaps he himself best summarizes the book in a sentence on page 163: "This sober and considered judgment of the laboratory that man *is* more than his body, and that this 'spiritual component' in his personality actually exists and can be demonstrated in experiments, will tremendously strengthen the religious faith of the average man."

The book does not attempt to "prove" the things of the spirit. But to anyone who has the least acquaintance with Dr. Rhine's measurements of extra-sensory perception, and all the related experiments of this new infant, parapsychology, Smith's discussion will bring alive many interesting speculations. It is hard to lay the book down.

HENRY W. SNYDER, JR.

Letters to My Son. By Dagobert D. Runes. New York: Philosophical Library, 1949. 92 pages. $2.75.

Here is a book written by one who is *anti-antisemitic!* For that reason he not only indicts the so-called Christians of Nazi Germany but the so-called Christians in Georgia in the United States. At the same time, the great Jew and the noble pagan, even if the Jew is Spinoza and the pagan is Marcus Aurelius, are held up for emulation. But never the Christian, unless it be Galileo or Bruno. A few Christians, however, are at least found in his rosary of abnormal personalities.

Christians of our times are generally mere callous individuals, but nothing like that is implied concerning the Jew of America, the too often godless Jew of America. This book is born of hate—understandable, perhaps, but not excusable. Rather than a common confession, where Jew and Christian might make one together, we find the Pharisee pitted against the publican! The Epistle to the Romans ought to be read along with this book.

BENJAMIN LOTZ

Herdabrev till Växjö stift. By Elis Malmeström. Stockholm: Svenska kyrkans diakonistyrelses bokförlag, 1950. 143 pages. Kr. 6.

The pastoral letters which come from the pens of newly appointed bishops and archbishops in the Church of Sweden are rich sources of spiritual insight and practical guidance for the clergy of all lands. It is unfortunate that language barriers limit their availability. The bishop of Växjö is an author of recognized ability and established reputation in both the-

ological and literary fields. In this volume he is at his devotional best. The entire volume is built around II Corinthians 8:9. It is an almost homiletical exposition of the passage against the background of the task and mission of the church in which he presides as bishop. It is a profoundly simple and heart-searching analysis which he makes of the task of the pastor, and one feels instinctively that he is listening to one who knows the task of the pastor from within. "There are times," he says, "when the pastor must speak as one who has only his poverty to offer" (p. 21). The pastor must understand the forces that are at work in our shattered world, not in order to preach about them, but because he must know where the people are, and then rightly divide the Word of Truth for them. Although life in the spirit is a life of freedom, nevertheless, "where life is lived in trustful confidence in God, an orderliness appears, according to which life can be lived" (p. 37). He understands the Gospel which is to be preached in all its evangelical fullness. He makes what appears to be a helpful distinction between "God's relation to man" and "man's relation to God." "In the God-relationship through the Lord Christ we receive what Christ is and has, what he has won for us, while we give what we can: our poor hearts, but also our faith in him. . . . What is his is given to us through the overflowing of life from him to us. And all that is ours he makes his own through his love toward us" (p. 57).

Although the tone of the volume is deeply devotional and spiritual, many readers might consider it "pietistic." But the author is sharply critical of pietism for its tendency toward legalism (p. 76) and assigns it substantial responsibility for the secularizing of the modern mind. He is not an ascetic. It is the person who has the pearl and the treasure that can fast properly. The Christian fasts because of what he has, not because of what he hopes for.

EDGAR M. CARLSON

Spinoza Dictionary. Edited by Dagobert D. Runes. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. 309 pages. $5.00.

The *Spinoza Dictionary* is a volume of readings, arranged in alphabetical order, drawn from the writings of one of the most thoughtful, exacting, and discerning authors of modern times. The title, designedly bestowed by the editor, is not descriptive of the content; for even the most generous reading of this volume can allow that it is a dictionary only in one respect, viz., it is alphabetically arranged. The title deceives, too, because it is not about *all* of Spinoza. The selections included are from English translations only and from such as are in the public domain. The volume consequently is not the scholar's aid which the title promises, nor is it the major popularization of a difficult author which the editor suggests in his chatty preface.

Dictionaries have various and useful functions. Word dictionaries which give a clue to the incidence of word usage have proved useful for literary scholars and are accordingly in wide use. Their significance is limited, however, to those who read the author in his own tongue. Indices of concepts are also useful, particularly where a genetic and historic interest is expended. Scholars who consult the "register" of European editions of authors know well the advantages and limits of such tools of scholarship. But, the *Spinoza Dictionary* is clearly neither of the above. Its advantages are all Spinoza's. The volume's worth resides almost completely in the fact that its entries are from his pen.

As a dictionary this volume is confusing. In the entry "Books" one reads Spinoza's startling remarks about literary criticism. I am quite certain that anyone seeking out Spinoza on books would not be anticipating another, even though related, matter. Under "Amos" we find only the odd suggestion, "See Words," where, if patience abounds, we read a page about words and an incidental parenthetical ref-

erence to Amos. Under "Culture" (which is a heading allowing a little expectancy) we read: "Without mutual help men can hardly support life and cultivate the mind." Certainly, a reader would not be inclined to quarrel here with Spinoza, but there seems to be neither the extended coverage in the entry which the concept "culture" would allow nor the discursive inquiry into the use of the word itself and its cognates. Under "Crime" we are told to see "Essence"; under "Moses," "Freedom" and "Prophecy"; under "Plato," "Bible"; under "Sexual Intercourse," "Lust." The best we can say is that sexual intercourse sometimes implies lust—at least in the conceptual order—and here Spinoza and Runes have something in common. But the Bible and Plato and crime and essence have seemingly only the casual relationship given by discourse —when Spinoza talked about one he took occasion to talk about the other—and Mr. Runes obliges with a dictionary.

As casual and slipshod as this volume is, Spinoza's greatness as a thinker still is apparent. "It is not in the nature of reason to regard things as contingent, but as necessary," he says (p. 208). The clear distinction between philosophy and Scripture, between good and evil, between adequate and inadequate knowledge, between essence and existence—all of these reflect most tellingly the immense intellectual advantage that inheres in the pan-logistic view which he proposes. If men can succeed in refusing to draw distinctions between today and tomorrow, a plan and its fulfillment, "the two laws in my members," logical certainty and existential uncertainty, then the *sub specie aeternitatis* view which is proposed is most plausible. But to refuse to regard the contingent as contingent and to construe all things in the order of existence as if they were other than they are, is this not to refuse to be human? Such nobility comes at a very high price.

PAUL L. HOLMER

Christian Love. By Paul E. Johnson. Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1951. 228 pages. $3.00.

This book, in the intention of the author, is a "psychological study of Christian love." The Preface indicates various possible approaches to the subject, exegetical, historical, ethical, sociological. In distinction to these approaches Dr. Johnson proposes to pursue the study from the "viewpoint of interpersonal psychology."

The study is a reasonably thorough, though not too distinctive, presentation of the various aspects and implications of Christian love. It begins with some basic concepts, presented under the title "Works of Love," examines the meaning of love in the Scriptural definition of it, and then applies the concept to various phases of life—individual, family, community, national, and international.

In definition the work is sound. In interpretation of Scripture it is faithful. In theology it is acceptable. In insight and application it is excellent. The author sees and states clearly the failure of human devices and reliances and the necessity for the dynamic of love. He does not fall into the error of attempting to achieve the good life by merely human genius and excellence. "The Beloved Community" is seen not as the product of a wise and benign planning commission, but as the fruit of an inner spirit. There are numerous counsels which are designed to be practical aids in making Christian love vital and effective.

Possibly the greatest strength of the book lies in the author's capacity for analysis and application. He is able to present forcefully the implications of Christian love for the total life of society and to apply them vitally. The chapters on The Christian Family, Sex and Marriage, and Explosives in Social Conflict are marked examples of this capacity.

One disappointment that may be noted is that in spite of the careful distinctions made in the Preface, the actual treatment is not too distinctive or novel. Some of the sections seem rather general and

elementary. There are points at which the author is at pains to demonstrate the obvious and impress the commonplace.

HARRY F. BAUGHMAN

The Man of Sorrows. By Albert T. W. Steinhaeuser. Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1951. 293 pages. $2.50.

The publisher calls this reprint of a work, first published in 1925, a "Lenten Classic," and this reviewer agrees wholeheartedly.

Dr. Steinhaeuser, a native of Buffalo and graduate of Mount Airy Seminary, served a parish in Allentown, Pa., for over twenty years until his death in 1924. *The Man of Sorrows* was his last literary work and the result of many years of devoted labor.

The book offers a devotional service for every weekday in Lent. Each service consists of (1) a motto or introit (generally taken from the Old Testament), (2) a lesson taken from the Passion Story (the lessons lead from the decision to kill Jesus to His burial), (3) a meditation on the lesson, (4) a free prayer based on the same lesson, (5) a collection of collects and litanies, ancient and modern, relative to the theme, (6) a suitable poem or hymn, and (7) a concluding sentence prayer.

These services are solidly grounded and anchored in the Bible. The author has an amazing skill in using the rich imagery of the Bible, and in pointing out references and parallels in remote sections of Holy Scripture. Doctrinally, the work is soundly Lutheran. Steinhaeuser digs deep into the doctrinal ramifications of the Passion and sets forth the victory of God behind the suffering of the Man. Yet these devotions remain true to their purpose. They aim to edify, not to instruct. The spirit of true prayer which permeates them prevents them from becoming mere dogmatical exercises. As a matter of fact, some of the prayers are extremely personal, without however becoming maudlin or sentimental. Lastly, the literary form is superb. This book is written in beautiful musical language. The author's English is reverent, yet never stilted or sanctimonious; drawing freely from the vocabulary of the Authorized Version, yet modern; functional, and yet melodious.

To sum it up, this book deserves the name "classic" because it combines worthy content with beautiful form. Too many devotional books published by Lutheran publishers read like excerpts from a textbook of dogmatics, and with their dull pedantry they stifle the spirit of prayer. Others again forsake the teachings of their church in order to offer a "lyrical religion" which is just that and no more: a rosy fringe for the gray realities of the work-a-day world. *The Man of Sorrows* was evidently written by a man who was so firmly grounded in the teachings of his Bible and his church that he could express them without repeating some ancient clichés, and whose life had become so much imbued with devotion that he needed not to assume pious airs in order to talk to his Lord.

Put this on your book list for the next Lenten season.

U. S. LEUPOLD

Day by Day We Magnify Thee. Daily Meditations from Luther's Writings arranged according to the Year of the Church. Compiled and translated by Margarete Steiner and Percy Scott. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1950. 437 pages. $2.50.

Martin Luther does not belong to history in the sense that Philip Melanchthon, John Colet, Martin Bucer, and many others of his contemporary reformers belong to the ages past. Their works are resting in libraries, the burial ground of books. Luther, like St. Paul and St. Augustine, belongs to the small group of churchmen whose treatises have been read through the centuries and who, through their writings, still are a first class spiritual power. Especially in the Ger-

man, Scandinavian, and Finnish churches Luther remains a daily spiritual companion in countless homes; and publishers still compete in the printing of his postils, commentaries, and daily meditations compiled from his writings. English-speaking Lutheranism presents a different picture in this respect: the study of Luther has been restricted mainly to the parsonage.

The situation is changing rapidly, however, and book after book on or by Luther is being published in the English language. *Day by Day We Magnify Thee* belongs to the best of them. It contains a short devotional meditation for each day of the Church Year with additional passages for more important festival days, all suitable reading at family prayers and devotions. The purpose of the book is to bring a daily message of Luther to the Christian home.

It has been a happy solution to give the source and, in most cases, also the date of the text, data usually lacking in corresponding European publications. The Weimar edition of Luther's works has been used; and the translation is both fluent and accurate, a fact which renders the book usable also for theological studies. Luther's biblical style has been preserved.

It is natural that the compilers have used mostly the sermons, expositions, and commentaries of Luther. Out of the 411 meditations 354 are taken from these sources; the sermons alone have given 241. From all the rest of the Reformer's writings come 57 meditations, taken from 29 different treatises. The result might have been even a better cross-section of Luther's religious thinking if the use of his sermons, which in some cases were "doctored" by his friends, had been more restricted as source material, and his other writings used more liberally. But even with this remark we are pleased to state that this collection of Luther's thoughts is a very good one and fully serves its purpose. The selection of texts follows the leading ideas of the Church Year and at the same time presents the true Luther, whose faith in Christ is child-like and openhearted, and who proclaims the Gospel in simple but powerful language.

ARMAS K. E. HOLMIO

John Wesley's Journal. Abridged by Nehemiah Curnock. New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1951. 433 pages. $3.75.

The standard eight-volume Journal of John Wesley, founder of the Methodist Church, is here abridged in such a way as to preserve the most interesting portions, especially of the early years. Although the publisher has not seen fit to disclose this, the abridgment is reprinted from old plates. Wesley's Journal is a classic of eighteenth century Pietism, and this is a convenient edition for those who would have a generous taste of it.

The Chief Steward. By J. E. Herrmann. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1951. 113 pages. $1.75.

Mr. Herrmann is stewardship counselor for the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod. He has written a manual for his own field of labor in his own church body; but it is a book of interest and importance far beyond those boundaries, and anyone who feels quarantined by synodical lines of demarcation will be robbing himself in this instance.

After the foundations are laid in Chapters I and II, and the foundations are at Calvary, the reader of this book, if he is a pastor, is very quickly confronted with the fact that he is it. He *is* the chief steward. There is a strong chapter on Christian stewardship in general. Then the pastor is confronted with his basic task in this field. A strong chapter on pastoral leadership confronts one suddenly with Chapter V, The Universal Priesthood of Believers, a treatment which is instructive, stimulating, and revealing. The more technical matters of parish program and of enlisting and training the laity are well handled.

Chapter VIII, The Pastor and Synod, is pointed very definitely to the author's own ministry and church, but may be read with profit by others also. The brief and pungent section headed "I Dare You," with which the book draws toward its close, reveals the spirit of Christian boldness which permeates the book.

This little volume will take its place well up on the list of books on Christian stewardship.

T. F. GULLIXSON

Self-Deceit. By Frederick Faber. Wallingford, Pa.: Pendle Hill, 1949. 47 pages, 35 cents.

Frederic Faber (or, Frederic William Faber, the style by which he is frequently known today) was one of the "bright young men" who were in Oxford University in the fateful years 1833-1843, during which many of the "lights," greater and lesser, were carried over into a strange house, the Roman, to adorn and to illuminate it. Like his friend and peer, John Henry Newman, Faber had a background that was Calvinistic and Evangelical. But both Newman and Faber were fired by a religious ardor, and by romantic imaginings, which made them dissatisfied with the condition and prospects of the Church of England and led them to seek their ideals in the Church of Rome.

Frederick Faber is generally known as the author of English hymns which have become popular throughout the world. His hymns have a grace and fervor all their own. They combine the highest kind of objectivity with the most intense personal feeling. What would a hymnal be without "My God, how wonderful thou art?" "There's a wideness in God's mercy," "O come and mourn with me awhile" (and, save the mark in days with ignorance dark, "Faith of our fathers!"). The spirit of these hymns is the justification for the remark of a latter-day relative of Faber, ". . . the church bells were always ringing in his heart." One needs to know the kind of man who wrote *Self-Deceit* if one is fully to understand the work.

Self-Deceit is an intense and searching and effective inquiry into the honesty of the human mind and heart. It takes a spiritual scalpel and lays bare the human soul. The sub-title is, "A Comedy on Lies; A Way of Overcoming Them." It was first published in 1858 and has now been brought back from suspended animation to take a place among the Pendle Hill pamphlets.

The work really belongs to a sub-section of "methods of the spiritual life," the examination of self. The style of the work is narrative; but it is also inquisitive, analytical, and psychological. The narration is accomplished with considerable literary skill and a creative handling of human situations. It is deeply moving, and frequently quite persuasive.

An outline of the progress of the work will serve to show the approach. Faber takes up successively the fountains, the varieties, the characteristics, and the remedies of self-deceit. The kind of discussion is seen under the varieties: self-deceit which takes no advice; self-deceit which is always taking advice; complacent self-deceit; censorious self-deceit; ambitious self-deceit; scrupulous self-deceit; and falsely humble self-deceit. It is the kind of approach which some preachers adopt when they come to a text: they surround it on the north and south, on the east and west, get beneath it and above it (sometimes exhausting both the text and the auditor). The danger is that the point be belabored and that the life depart.

To many of the readers of this journal Faber's pamphlet will seem too atomistic and analytical, too psychological and exhaustive to be completely helpful; and, moreover, deficient in its treatment of the positive points with which the work concludes: the healing power of the love of God and the illumination which comes from the vision of God. Its approach will for many modern Christians seem "scholastic" and "religious" (in a technical sense) and lacking in the clear and sufficient assurances that we have in the person and work of our Lord.

Yet there are many golden lines in the fabric of the work. "There is no serving God in unhappiness, when the unhappiness is of our own making. Let us serve God in the sunshine, while He makes the sunshine. We shall then serve him all the better in the dark, when he sends the darkness."

Grateful acknowledgment should be made for the excellent introduction furnished by Gilbert Kilpack. One may be made serious, or even depressed, by the book itself. But let one get a firm grip on one's chair and then turn to the stories of St. Philip Neri in the Introduction. There one will see another side of Faber. One may even be led to parody Faber's own words (from a panegyric on Ignatius of Loyola): "This, then, my dear brethren, is Frederic Faber's way to heaven; and, thank God, it is not the only way."

GEORGE R. SELTZER

Pastoral Care. Edited by J. Richard Spann. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1951. 272 pages. $2.50.

Here is a somewhat fresh and promising approach to the study of pastoral care. There are two major divisions: (1) the background of pastoral care, five articles; (2) the field for pastoral care, fourteen articles. There follow biographical notes on the contributors and a good working index. The freshness lies in the fact that in Part II each author deals with the pastoral care of one type of person: children, youth, young newlyweds, middle aged, senior members (old folk), the heavy-laden, the sick, alcoholics, mentally ill, church officials, new members, those without a church, those in institutions, and college students. He is said to have specialized in his field—at least he is an "eminent authority" and an "outstanding contributor." And it is implied, if not explicitly stated, that each contributor is thoroughly at home with the "new findings in the fields of psychology and psychiatry" (Jacket). This is what makes the book promising.

Let it be said at the outset, then, that the volume has genuine merit. There are some articles in it worth the cost of the book, articles which blend Christian theology with psychological findings, and these with personal faith and extensive, edifying experience. Some of the contributions came from the hands of masters —masters in scholarship, masters in practical pastoral work, masters in construction and composition. There are perhaps a half dozen in this class. The rest are, in the reviewer's judgment, a poor second. Some have little, if any, theological undergirding; some are good, but too sketchy to be of much value; some evidently have good ideas and suggestions, but express them very vaguely; some seem to have been tossed together in short order. For instance, most of Part I could have been omitted — it serves as nothing but a hazard beyond which few readers will get —and this space utilized to give some of the writers of Park II a little more room in which to include essential details. If this seems to be unduly caustic, it is not meant to be so. The volume is worth studying. A second edition, radically revised in places and better edited, can make of this a truly outstanding book in its field.

PAUL J. HOH

Predikan och Guds Ord. By Olle Nystedt. Stockholm: Svenska kyrkans diakonistyrelses bokförlag, 1950. 130 pages. Kr. 6:00.

Olle Nystedt is rector in the central and oldest church in Sweden's capital. His book—in translation, "Preaching and the Word of God"—is a dissertation prepared for the specific purpose of serving as basis for "an exchange of thought" at the pastoral conference of the clergy of the Stockholm Diocese in 1951. It does not lay claim to any new points of view, but rather serves to remind the reader of basic and long accepted principles of homiletics. There are seven chapters setting forth, in turn, the importance of

"the Word and the preaching of the gospel"; the relation between Bible research and preaching; the Bible as a message concerning the works of God; the function of preaching in church history; the text as the sole message; faithfulness to the text the requisite of right preaching; the practical aspect of faithfulness to the text.

While the book is true to the prevalent emphasis in the state church—on the sermon's contents and structure rather than on those for whom the message is delivered—there is a formal attempt made to point out that the message must not be spoken "out into space, merely," but must seek its target—the listeners. How much this thought needs development in a church such as the Church of Sweden!

O. H. Bostrom

Exploring God's Word. By Jacob Tanner. Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1950. 168 pages. $1.50.

As "A Study Guide to Bible Teachings," the contents of this book were prepared for a course at Waldorf College, Forest City, Iowa. The students were of college sophomore level.

The book consists of nineteen brief chapters of markedly unequal length. Many of the chapters have a number of subdivisions. The absence of an index is no loss considering the type of organization of the contents. But the lack of a bibliography in a college textbook is surprising.

In outline, the treatment follows the pattern of systematic theology, beginning with God and ending with the future life. Considerable attention is given to God's attributes and to the nature and work of Christ.

The method is to indicate several passages of Scripture to be read, and to follow the references with one or more paragraphs of discussion. At the end of each section are "study questions."

The whole work is marked by simplicity. Difficult and controversial questions are almost entirely avoided. The faith implied in these studies is child-like and tranquil — undisturbed by doubts, satisfied with simple answers.

Neither as fluid as milk nor as strong as meat, the treatment may not be as hearty as sophomores need. Ethics are not discussed, and there is no mention of the social application of the Gospel.

W. D. Allbeck

Parsonage Doorway. By Anna Laura Gebhard. Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1950. 144 pages. $1.75.

The author of this book is a minister's wife who gives an intimate picture of family life, particularly as it centers around their four young children. The scene is laid in the parsonage of a small town in Minnesota. However, it might well be any parsonage anywhere.

The purpose of the book seems to be at first to give a true and interesting description of the kaleidoscopic life in the parsonage, where there is never a dull moment. But underneath this simple human-interest material are revealed the efforts of two sincere parents to guide active, energetic children in their growth to an appreciation of the deep truths of Christianity and how to live those truths in the close-knit life of the family and the wider circle of life in the community and in the world.

The familiar friendly style of the author is complemented by numerous line-drawing illustrations by Janet Smalley which add greatly to the attractiveness of the book.

This volume will have an appeal to those who enjoy family life and want a picture of how it is lived in a parsonage. Minister's wives will be especially attracted to it not only because they will see how one of their sisters is meeting the problems and opportunities of bringing up children in a parsonage, but also because they will certainly get many ideas and

suggestions for their calling of bringing up their children in the nurture and admonition of the Lord.

LUTHER SCHLENKER

The Secret of God. By Robert D. Hershey. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1951. 162 pages. $1.75.

Printed sermons and meditations are often like cold mashed potatoes or unheated canned beans: substantial, healthful but *unappetizing.* There are, however, noteworthy exceptions. Dr. Hershey's Lenten devotions are such: sound, interesting, spiritually and intellectually stimulating.

The general theme indicated by the title is divided into fourteen subheadings, each treated in a brief discourse. The basic truths of our redemption are thus made to pass in rapid review. The meaning of the Gospel and its relationship to faith and life are vividly presented.

The chapter that seems to the reviewer least satisfactory is XI on the Secret of Forgiveness. While it contains many observations that are entirely sound both psychologically and theologically, it is difficult to follow the author when he remarks that "forgiveness does not exclude indignation against sin any more than *it precludes punishment.*" [italics mine] The latter clause suggests forgiveness in some peculiar Pickwickian sense incompatible with the teachings of Christ, particularly as set forth in the parable of the Prodigal Son. Notwithstanding, the chapter redeems itself when it is asserted that ". . . forgiveness is restored relationship with our Father—and the cost thereof is the cross."

The value of the book is best shown by letting the author speak for himself. The major difficulty in doing so is that of selection. The work abounds in pointed observations. The following, however, are representative. "The sense of sin is abnormally atrophied and deadened. . . . Take the average man and talk with him for five minutes and you'll understand it perfectly. He's a likeable and kindly soul who admits his faults and failings and yet goes on his way complacently and undisturbed. . . . He simply can't believe that his fall is momentous or that God is even passively concerned about such trivial things as his little self-indulgences at home, or his irritability at the office when he's busy and somebody does something stupid, or his gradually slipping out of the habit of prayer, or his lack of any serious concern over a social system which serves his own comforts but leaves many another out in the cold. . . . When sin and moral evil are omitted from the view of the world, grace is automatically bypassed. . . . Grace evaporates when we sentimentalize or aestheticize our religion. . . . All Christians are volunteers, not conscripts. . . . To one who knows not God as Christ has revealed Him, life is one consistent impoverishment, a progression of losses, a philosophy of destruction. To the Christian, life is a consistent enrichment, a progression of gains, a philosophy of renewal and fulfillment. . . . We live among shadows. The full realities are yet to be perceived. But there is a day awaiting us when we shall see things face to face, and know even as we are known. As our eyes are able to bear the radiance, it will all be shown to us."

The publishers have rightly said of the book, ". . . for preachers a source of seed thoughts for sermons during the Lenten season." It is a work to be digested and pondered, definitely not a "sermon help" for one disinclined to use the thinking capacities God has given him.

A. C. M. AHLÉN

Culture and Faith. By Richard Kroner. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951. 278 pages. $5.00.

Richard Kroner is professor of the philosophy of religion at Union Theological Seminary. This volume is another, in a long series, dealing with the relation of faith to culture or to the realm of his-

tory. Old civilizations are crumbling and men are asking as to what can be done to save them or what direction shall the new order take. The author discusses the meaning of civilization and its nature. He deals with the manner in which the Christian faith can save our civilization. He does not suggest programs, or deal with the problem from a practical or political point of view. The approach is altogether philosophical.

The author holds that there are contradictions in experience which man tries to solve by his cultural activities. Man does not fully succeed because culture has been separated from religious faith. Secularization is the primary cause of the sickness of western civilization. We have lost an integrating center for life and only religious faith can supply us with such a center. The author also tries to construct a bridge between secular philosophy and Christian theology, from the understanding of culture to the understanding of faith, and from the self-comprehension of man to the comprehension of the Word of God. This is a book which is not easy reading but it is rewarding in its approach to the problem involved and in the insights which appear.

A. D. Mattson

CONTRIBUTORS

HENRY HORNEMAN BAGGER is pastor of Trinity Lutheran Church, Lancaster, Pa.

ARMAS K. E. HOLMIO is professor of Historical Theology at Suomi College and Theological Seminary, Hancock, Mich.

CONRAD BERGENDOFF is president of Augustana College, Rock Island, Ill.

HERBERT W. STROUP is associate professor of Sociology and Anthropology at Brooklyn College, Brooklyn, N. Y.

CHARLES W. KEGLEY is professor of Philosophy at Wagner College, Staten Island, N. Y.

Among the reviewers of books in this number are ALVIN N. ROGNESS, pastor of First Lutheran Church (E.L.C.) in Sioux Falls, S. D.; ERIC H. WAHLSTROM, professor of the New Testament in Augustana Seminary, Rock Island; JOHN REUMANN, instructor in the Bible in the Philadelphia Seminary; ETHAN MENGERS, professor of the Old Testament in Trinity Seminary, Blair, Neb.; P. H. BUEHRING, professor of Church History in the Seminary of Capital University, Columbus; WILLARD D. ALLBECK, professor of Church History in Hamma Divinity School, Springfield, Ohio; C. G. CARLFELT, professor of Systematic Theology in Augustana Seminary, Rock Island; T. A. KANTONEN, professor of Systematic Theology in Hamma Divinity School, Springfield, Ohio; GEORGE AUS, professor of Systematic Theology in Luther Seminary, St. Paul; OTTO W. HEICK, professor of Systematic Theology in the Seminary of Canada, Waterloo, Ontario; HJALMAR W. JOHNSON, professor of the Philosophy of Religion in Augustana Seminary, Rock Island; MARTIN LUTHER STIREWALT, professor of Systematic Theology in the Southern Seminary, Columbia, S. C.; JOHN H. SARDESON, pastor of the Lutheran Church at Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y.; KARL H. HERTZ, professor of Sociology in Capital University, Columbus; RALPH D. HEIM, professor of Christian Education in the Gettysburg Seminary; CELO V. LEITZEL, instructor in Christian Education in the Philadelphia Seminary; HENRY W. SNYDER, JR., pastor of the Church of the Holy Trinity in Bethlehem, Pa.; BENJAMIN LOTZ, assistant professor of Philosophy in Susquehanna University, Selinsgrove, Pa.; EDGAR M. CARLSON, president of Gustavus Adolphus College in St. Peter, Minn.